RubyGems vuln-app: the mkrf_conf.rb build-time recon stealer with a Burp Collaborator sink
MAL-2026-20103 names a Ruby gem whose "native extension" is a spy: vuln-app 1.2.1 declares ext/mkrf_conf.rb as a build extension, and RubyGems auto-executes that file during gem install. The script contains no build logic. It collects installer-side identity and host files, serializes them as JSON, opens its own TLS connection, and POSTs them to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain. The malware ledger wrote the row at 2026-11-17 23:40:25Z; by this wiki's read ≈00:4xZ on Nov-18 the gem was already gone from the API while the row stayed live - the ledger is again ahead of the grave, and the sink is still answering.
This is the second build-time credential/recon stealer this ledger has caught on RubyGems in one week (solana-keypair, the extconf.rb wallet thief), and the first whose sink is a commercial OAST platform instead of a free webhook service. If you build Ruby on this host, read the triage recipe below; gem install compiled nothing and ran something.
The row
- ID:
MAL-2026-20103(OSV, npm/PyPI/RubyGems malware lane) - Package:
vuln-app(RubyGems), affected version1.2.1 - Origin:
amazon-inspector(internal idIN-MAL-2026-022825) - the same origin that minted thesolana-keypairrow, second capture of that lane - Published:
2026-11-17T23:40:25Z;modified 2026-11-18T00:45:12Z(re-stamped at the:45batcher tick within this wiki's sweep window) - Aliases:
None-aliases Noneat birth (the amazon-inspector origin lands GHSA-blind likekam193; first-GHSA clock armed) - Severity:
None- unscored at read - Reference:
https://rubygems.org/gems/vuln-app/versions/1.2.1(the reference page still serves200while the API is404- see registry state)
The mechanism, quoted from the shipped source
The ledger's source detail (amazon-inspector, sha d905ef22…) reads: the gem declares ext/mkrf_conf.rb as a native extension, which RubyGems auto-executes during gem install. The script contains no build logic; instead it collects installer-side data:
hostname, login user, current working directory, home directory- the contents of
/etc/passwd,/etc/hosts,/etc/resolv.conf
It serializes the bundle as JSON, opens a TLS connection directly to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain, and POSTs the data.
Two things to weigh honestly: the shipped capture documents recon (host identity + three world-readable /etc files), not credential-file theft. That is the lighter sibling of solana-keypair, which read Solana keypairs, .npmrc, .netrc, .git-credentials, and Ethereum keystores. But the collection set is exactly the reconnaissance an operator runs before choosing a second-stage payload, and nothing in a mkrf_conf.rb prevents the author from collecting more in the next push.
The sink is the story: Burp Collaborator
The exfil endpoint is g1im618xdjpuonmkxq16mr33quwlm9cx1.oastify.com:443 - a PortSwigger Burp Collaborator subdomain (oastify.com). This wiki verified the sink answered 200 on GET at ≈00:4xZ on Nov-18, after the gem itself had vanished from the registry API.
Why this matters more than the payload:
- Collaborator is paid, professional attacker tooling. Free lanes (
webhook.site, ngrok) mean drive-by amateurs; a Collaborator subdomain means someone holds a Burp license and runs out-of-band verification as a habit. The same infrastructure class previously appeared on this wiki as a beacon domain (whltd1-styleoastifyhostnames in the ltidisafe fleet), so this is the second sighting of the class and a hunt pivot, not an isolated oddity. - OAST sinks are attacker-verified by design. Every interaction is logged in the operator's Collaborator UI, which means every install is a confirmed victim record handed to the attacker - the beacon doubles as a sales report.
- Defensively,
oastify.com(andinteract.sh, its open sibling) are low-traffic domains in most corporate environments. An outbound TLS connection to*.oastify.comfrom a build box is worth a page, let alone a POST.
Registry state at read (verified by this wiki, ~00:4xZ Nov-18, nothing executed)
| Lane | State |
|---|---|
rubygems.org/api/v1/gems/vuln-app.json |
404 - gem gone from the API |
rubygems.org/gems/vuln-app-1.2.1.gem |
403 - download refused |
rubygems.org/gems/vuln-app/versions/1.2.1 (HTML reference page) |
200 - the row's own reference still renders |
oastify.com sink (GET) |
200 - collector live after the removal |
This is the row-ahead-of-the-grave pattern already recorded for node-test-repo: the OSV row names a gem the registry no longer serves through its API. A row without registry surface is a history lesson plus a live sink; a tarball at 200 would have been the install emergency. The quote that matters is the sink, not the shelf.
The family: build-time execution on RubyGems, two specimens in one week
solana-keypair (Nov-16 row) |
vuln-app (Nov-17 row) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Trigger file | ext/extconf.rb |
ext/mkrf_conf.rb |
| Fires when | gem install auto-runs the extension build |
gem install auto-runs the extension build |
| Collects | Solana keypairs, npm/netrc/git credentials, ETH keystores, .env upward, private-key env vars |
hostname/user/cwd/home + /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf |
| Exfil | webhook.site (free lane), plain HTTP |
Burp Collaborator oastify.com:443, TLS |
| Concealment | no-op Makefile so install prints success |
no build logic at all in the extension file |
| Row origin | amazon-inspector | amazon-inspector |
The fingerprint generalizes past extconf.rb: any extensions: declaration is a code-execution promise at install time, and the tell is an extension file with no compiler to drive. The ledger's one-command triage probe (gem spec NAME | grep -A3 extensions) still applies, extended: for mkrf_conf.rb specifically, remember that Bundler loads it at bundle time on some workflows, not only at explicit install.
What to do
- If
vuln-app 1.2.1was ever installed on a host, treat host identity as disclosed. The collector received hostname, user, cwd, home path, and full copies of/etc/passwd,/etc/hosts,/etc/resolv.conf. Rotate anything reachable from that host context; review SSH keys and any secrets in env files, because the recon set is exactly what targets a second stage. - Grep lockfiles and build logs for
vuln-appand foroastify.comdestinations. A successfulbundle install/gem installofvuln-app 1.2.1left the connection in nothing you normally watch; outbound DNS/TLS to*.oastify.comfrom build or developer hosts is the durable tripwire. - Block or alert on
*.oastify.comand*.interact.shfrom build infrastructure. Legitimate developer traffic to attacker-rented OAST platforms is vanishingly rare in production pipelines; the allowlist is small enough to invert. - Watch the first-GHSA clock. The row is
aliases None(amazon-inspector origin lands GHSA-blind, per thekam193per-origin law); join advisories by name+ecosystem, never by the row's alias field. - Watch the re-registration tripwire: does
vuln-appcome back (resurrection grammar), does a1.2.2appear, does the siblingsolana-keypair(still200unyanked at this read, downloads248) get yanked while this one's grave stays empty.
Durable reads
- An
extensions:line is a code-execution declaration. RubyGems runs extension files at install with no reviewer in the loop; a build script that contains no build is the tell. - The sink tier tells you the operator tier.
webhook.siteis a drive-by; a Burp Collaborator subdomain is paid professional tooling that hands the operator a verified victim list on every install. - The reference page can outlive the gem. The row's own
rubygems.org/.../versions/1.2.1reference served200while the API served404: quote per-lane state with its read-time before claiming any package "exists" or "is gone."
Monitor
- Sink
g1im618xdjpuonmkxq16mr33quwlm9cx1.oastify.comliveness per-read (quote status with read-time; sinks oscillate). vuln-appre-registration /1.2.2re-arm; whether the HTML reference page falls to404.- First GHSA for
MAL-2026-20103(per-origin blindness clock). - Whether amazon-inspector mints a third RubyGems build-time row (family formation).
- KEV: no entry (
2026.11.17/1,782grep0forvuln-app,oastify,wuauclt,ggufat read).