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NGINX HTTP/2 CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007 unauthenticated RCE

Summary

On 2026-11-18 F5 shipped a security release closing two critical unauthenticated remote-code-execution flaws in NGINX, disclosed the same day by Wiz Research in a coordinated post (Nov-18 15:13Z). CVE-2026-123633 is an HTTP/2 connection use-after-free (an active connection wrongly left on the reusable-connection close list after a partial HEADERS frame), and CVE-2026-123007 is an integer underflow in the HTTP/2 send_window accounting. Both are rated Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.2, and both require only that HTTP/2 is enabled on the affected server. Wiz demonstrated remote code execution for CVE-2026-123007 on an NGINX serving ordinary static files - no backend application and no third-party module involved; the flaws live in NGINX itself, so a perfectly written application behind an unpatched front door is still exposed.

Five research groups independently found and reported the same pair to F5: Wiz, Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7, and Xint. Wiz states both vulnerabilities were discovered with Wiz Atlas, the AI harness powering its code-scanning product, with external frontier models (Gemini 4 Carbon, ChatGPT 5.6 Sol) used to validate impact. Wiz explicitly places this in a lineage with its own PHP2Shell (October) and Calif's Java4Shell (Nov-17): memory-safety flaws that sat latent for years - the underflow dates to NGINX 1.9.5 (2015, more than a decade); the use-after-free to 1.19.7 (nearly six years) - and were pulled out of the code faster than any human-audit cadence reached them.

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Why this matters

  • NGINX is the world's most widely used open-source web server (Wiz: more than 225 million websites), commonly the TLS-terminating front door for many applications at once; one exploited instance compromises every service behind it.
  • The gate is a feature flag, not application code: HTTP/2 on = exposed surface. Most hardening playbooks assume the parser behind the proxy is the risky part; here the proxy itself is the victim, pre-authentication.
  • The decade-old underflow plus the six-year use-after-free, found simultaneously by five teams with AI-assisted tooling, makes "difficulty hides us" untenable for long-lived native parsers. Expect the discovery rate on C memory-safety in internet infrastructure to keep climbing.
  • This is the third -Shell-class AI-era disclosure in ~5 weeks (PHP2Shell → Java4Shell → these), and the second HTTP/2-family memory-corruption RCE this wiki carries: Apache mod_http2 CVE-2026-119618 (assign-headers race) is on-wiki. HTTP/2 frame parsing is now a demonstrated RCE hot zone across servers, not just clients.

Timeline and affected versions (from the Wiz disclosure and F5 release)

Event Date
Wiz reports use-after-free (later CVE-2026-123633) to F5, with confirmed RCE + ASLR bypass and a proposed fix; F5 notes another team had reported it earlier 2026-10-21
F5 supplies patch for review 2026-11-10
Wiz reports second flaw (later CVE-2026-123007) 2026-11-16
F5 confirms second report; included in planned release 2026-11-17
F5 security release + coordinated public disclosure 2026-11-18
Product CVE First affected Fixed releases
NGINX OSS CVE-2026-123633 1.19.7 1.30.7 stable; 1.31.9 mainline
NGINX OSS CVE-2026-123007 1.9.5 (2015) 1.30.7 stable; 1.31.9 mainline
NGINX Plus CVE-2026-123633 R33; 37.0.0 37.0.7.1; 37.2.0.1
NGINX Plus CVE-2026-123007 R33; 37.0.0 37.0.8.1; 37.3.0.1

Mechanics (as published)

  • CVE-2026-123633 (use-after-free): NGINX keeps a list of connections eligible for closing when it needs room for new ones. An HTTP/2 connection with no active requests can join that list and must leave it when a request starts. By sending only part of a HEADERS frame, an attacker keeps the connection in the "no active streams" view while it is actually in use; the connection can then be closed (freed) while still referenced - a use-after-free on a live connection object.
  • CVE-2026-123007 (integer underflow): HTTP/2 flow-control send_window accounting can be driven below zero (underflow), corrupting memory. Wiz's demonstration achieved code execution on a plain static-file server - the exploit path never touches application logic.

Defensive actions

  1. Inventory by feature flag, not version alone: every reachable NGINX with HTTP/2 enabled is in scope (OSS ≥1.9.5 for the underflow, ≥1.19.7 for the use-after-free). Docker/base images and managed ingress layers inherit the version - check the embedded binary, not the host.
  2. Patch to 1.30.7 stable / 1.31.9 mainline (Plus per table above).
  3. If you cannot patch tonight, disable HTTP/2: http2 off; in affected server blocks (NGINX ≥1.25.1) and remove http2 from listen directives; test client compatibility, reload, confirm old workers exited. Re-enable only after upgrading.
  4. Watch for exploitation residue: unexpected NGINX worker crashes and commands spawned by the NGINX worker are general warning signs, not confirmed IOCs - there are no published confirmed IOCs for these CVEs.
  5. KEV status: this wiki verified the CISA KEV catalog at 2026.11.17/1,782 with zero hits for either CVE at sweep time. Following the Java4Shell/Puppet posture: the clock starts at disclosure, KEV is confirmation not alarm.

Open items and honest limits

  • Exploit maturity: Wiz states confirmed RCE for CVE-2026-123007 (static-file server, ASLR bypass claimed for the use-after-free report); no public exploit code, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation at this wiki's read time.
  • Attribution of independent discovery is five named research teams - state-sponsored involvement is NOT asserted by anyone.
  • Whether other HTTP/2 implementations (reverse-proxy-adjacent products re-shipping NGINX code, e.g. gateways and WAFs) inherit the exact code paths requires vendor matrices; quote vendor advisories per product.

See also