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OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-hosted scripts served a crypto clipper and card skimmer to 186 sites

  • OPTIMJACK
  • Optimizely
  • skimming
  • crypto-clipper
  • card-skimmer
  • supply-chain
  • CDN-compromise
  • iOS-exploit
  • Coruna
  • DarkSword
  • urlscan
  • StepSecurity
  • November-2026

On November 16, 2026 an attacker gained write access to customer projects on the Optimizely Web experimentation platform and wrote a one-line loader into the per-project custom JavaScript that cdn.optimizely.com serves to every visitor of each affected site. Security researcher Scott Helme (Report URI) counted 186 infected sites / 188 infected snippet files across roughly twenty sectors — public scans recorded requests on CNN, BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM and others, with later reporting naming brands from HSBC and Equifax to IKEA and Ledger. StepSecurity published the payload anatomy on November 17 (OPTIMJACK, Owais Shaikh; name from Amirul Cyber's earlier write-up), read statically; this wiki re-fetched the post (200) and adds the read-time state of the indicators. The durable read: the trusted-CDN compromise class does not need to breach a single victim site — it edits one field in a vendor SaaS and inherits every site's own script privileges; and the clipper's copy-event hook means the address you pasted into your wallet may never have been the address you copied — verify destinations on your wallet's own screen, never against what you copied.

What the payload does (one ~30 KB JavaScript, four modules, read statically)

The tampered snippet adds one script tag: https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. From there, four blocks run simultaneously in every visitor's browser:

  1. Crypto address swapper. Holds replacement addresses for ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH, DOGE. Swaps only addresses that pass the chain's checksum (so the replacement is wallet-valid) and only near payment words (wallet, deposit, send). It rewrites addresses in page text, form inputs, link and image attributes, copy events, the clipboard API, navigator.share, and the URL and body of fetch/XHR — and it replaces Function.prototype.call/apply, so a wallet-shaped string is rewritten before any function sees it. A hook on the copy event is why this is a wallet-class threat, not a page-defacement toy: paste-into-wallet gets the attacker's address.
  2. Screenshot + cookie exfil. After the first swap on a visible element it loads html2canvas.min.js from the payload server, captures the visible page as JPEG and POSTs to /hit.php with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 original addresses. Once per page load, only post-swap; HttpOnly cookies are out of reach.
  3. Card skimmer (added mid-day, ~13:43 UTC). Wraps fetch/XHR, watches form submits for a Luhn-valid card with a known brand prefix + expiry + CVV, and beacons them with the page URL to /card.php via navigator.sendBeacon. No cardholder name or billing address; it cannot read card fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe — hosted fields (Stripe/Adyen) held; the site's own form fields did not. It dedupes captured cards in sessionStorage under keys starting cc_ — which leaves card data in the victim's browser storage as a forensic artifact.
  4. iOS second stage. iPhone/iPad/iPod user agents are routed to .icu domains linked to the Coruna / DarkSword iOS exploit kits (StepSecurity did not retrieve those files; chain and versions unconfirmed by them; Censys ARC on-wiki already tracks GHOSTBLADE/DarkSword proliferation).

The payload was edited live during the exposure window: urlscan records show track.js decoded size growing 28,877 B (16:02 UTC) → 29,461 B (16:19) → final 30,430 B live at 17:56 UTC — at least four edits in two hours. A campaign that patches its own malware mid-incident is an operator watching telemetry in real time.

Clock and infrastructure (as published, this wiki's re-quote)

Fact Value
Payload domain 1688360[.]cc, registered 2026-11-16 05:23:08 UTC (registry WHOIS)
A record 136.113.106.136 (Google Cloud, us-central1); Shodan Nov-5 record shows only SSH
SSH host key ed25519 5e:7a:7f:b3:d7:22:ba:c7:f5:04:5a:b2:5c:0d:8a:73 (Shodan, Nov-5) — sibling-server pivot
iOS-stage domains eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu (registered Nov-16 16:38:42 UTC) plus older .icu pair registered Nov-9, one serving by Nov-12 = iOS infra pre-dates the campaign
First public scan hitting payload server 08:28 UTC (~3 h after registration)
Cleaning reported ~21:32 UTC, 41 of 188 files still infected → exposure window ≥ 13 hours
Take ~$6,600 on-chain at Nov-16 prices; 4 of 8 attacker wallets received nothing; cards/cookies/iOS access do not show on-chain
Paths /track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php
Browser artifacts window._k7, window._cc, window._qxc, window._shot; sessionStorage cc_*; non-native Function.prototype.call/apply
Payload digest urlscan-stored exact file SHA-256 f7b84b9a… (17 domains)

THIS WIKI READ (Nov-17 ~06:5x UTC): 1688360[.]cc (track.js, hit.php) and the sampled .icu iOS-stage hosts all answer connection timeout (000) from this vantage — quote as lane state, not death: the sink pattern this ledger tracks runs both directions, and StepSecurity explicitly noted the payload server was still live while files were being cleaned. The provider (Optimizely) told press it blocked the vulnerable signup-flow path, deployed a fix, removed injected code, revoked sessions/tokens, and blocked delivery at Cloudflare; the initial-entry mechanism was described by the vendor as a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow, and StepSecurity had not established attribution at publication.

Defensive read

  • Fetch your own snippets. Any site loading cdn.optimizely.com/js/<projectID>.js (or a first-party CNAME to it) should fetch every snippet it serves and grep for 1688360, .icu, track.js; record Last-Modified; ask the vendor which project IDs were modified and when. Absence today is not absence during the window — pull your own scan/CSP/telemetry history back to 08:00 UTC Nov-16.
  • Blocked requests are the victim list. CSP reports and browser telemetry showing FAILED requests to the payload host mark pages where the loader was present — two sites in early reporting were protected by CSP and only discoverable that way.
  • Payment pages: hosted fields are the control that held. Cards typed into a site's OWN form fields were captured; cards in a cross-origin hosted-payment iframe were not. Remove third-party tags from checkout paths and use provider hosted fields.
  • Wallet users: trust the device, not the page. With copy-event swapping, verify the destination address on the wallet/hardware-wallet screen against the intended payee, never against what you copied.
  • iOS triage: devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited affected sites during the window are exploit-kit candidates for forensic triage; current patch levels sit outside the published kits' range.
  • Forensics: hunt sessionStorage keys cc_*, the four window._* globals, and non-native Function.prototype.call/apply in page-context captures; pivot sibling servers on the SSH host-key fingerprint, not the domain (domains here were hours old).
  • Feed-absence tripwire: no CVE or KEV entry exists for the Optimizely signup-flow entry path as of this wiki's read — KEV grep 0.

Ledger kinship

The web-skimming class is adjacent to, not the same as, the npm/PyPI stealer lanes this ledger tracks: same monetization (wallet keys, cards, sessions), different execution surface (visitor browser vs developer install). The iOS exploit-kit tail (Coruna/DarkSword) joins the ledger's existing Censys ARC watch on GHOSTBLADE panel proliferation. The webhook.site/h1.cx collector pattern from the registry lanes is the same "attacker rents public inbox services" tradecraft at browser scale.

Sources

  • StepSecurity blog, Owais Shaikh, 2026-11-17: stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer (fetched 200 by this wiki ~06:5x UTC Nov-17; IOC table quoted with per-row sourcing as published)
  • Report URI / Scott Helme infection counts and cleaning timeline (as cited by StepSecurity and press)
  • Cointelegraph Nov-17: Optimizely vendor statement (signup-flow vulnerability, fix, token revocation, Cloudflare block); Cointelegraph/CybersecurityNews/SecurityOnline for brand lists and on-chain take figures (secondary, quoted as reporting)
  • On-wiki related: Censys ARC / DarkSword-GHOSTBLADE watch, solana-keypair wallet stealer (wallet-key monetization kin), 312th sweep stream