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Alinubx.sys / Rapuncel

Summary

LastPass (the brand's own security team) and Delphos Labs disclosed on September 17, 2026 (relayed by The Hacker News September 21) a Windows credential-theft campaign in which a fake LastPass Authenticator installer installs a kernel driver signed through Microsoft's own Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher (WHCP) attestation chain, a driver whose only executed function is to terminate 145 named antivirus/EDR/security processes from kernel level, below the layer where those products can see or block anything. With security software down, the companion stealer (which LastPass calls Rapuncel) harvests saved passwords from more than two dozen browsers, cryptocurrency wallet files, Discord/Steam/Telegram sessions, Windows Credential Manager contents, and files named like "password"/"seed"/"recovery," then ZIPs and exfiltrates them.

The campaign is a textbook assembly of three durable failure modes:

  1. Attestation ≠ safety. The driver was renamed Alinubx.sys from CcProtect.sys, a driver from the Chinese disk-encryption product CnCrypt already cataloged on LOLDrivers as a process killer with public PoC code. Same product name, version, and submitter, only the file name and description changed. That rename dropped detections from ~7/70 engines to zero on VirusTotal. Microsoft's signing dates the attestation to March 2023, years before the campaign. Researchers' framing: "Microsoft attestation proves a driver passed through a trust pipeline. It does not prove the driver is safe."
  2. The vulnerable-driver blocklist is a hash list, and this driver, renamed OR original, was never on it. Delphos checked Microsoft's blocklist (on by default since the Windows 11 2022 update) on August 20 and found neither file listed; it is still not listed as of the September 17 report. The blocklist matches known hashes, a renamed or recompiled driver produces a new hash the list does not carry, so the blocklist is structurally behind BYOVD reuse.
  3. App-bound encryption defeated by asking the browser to decrypt. For Chrome/Edge's app-bound encryption (designed to stop exactly this theft), the stealer injects code into the browser and asks the browser's own decryption service to release the passwords, the trust boundary is walked through, not broken.

Delivery chain

  • Lure: a fake GitHub organization page github.com/LastPass-Authenticator that ranks in search results for terms like "LastPass Authenticator download" and mimics a real product page. The download button chains through several GitHub pages to an attacker server serving impersonation pages for at least 40 brands (LastPass statement). A near-identical second fake page for a "macOS LastPass" product was taken down before researchers could examine it. The real LastPass Authenticator ships only from lastpass.com and official app stores, not GitHub.
  • Dropper: ZIP archives of 148 MB and 127.9 MB, padded with junk files so scanners with size limits skip them. Inside: a renamed copy of Microsoft's genuine debug tool vsdbg.exe beside a malicious vsdbg.dll, classic DLL side-loading.
  • Escalation: the loader tries three privilege-escalation paths, reaches SYSTEM, and installs the kernel driver as a service.
  • Driver: Alinubx.sys carries the 145-name kill list and executes it at load. Its code ALSO contains file-hiding, process-injection, and web-traffic-rerouting routines gated on a configuration file the attackers did not ship, dormant capabilities. The driver re-kills security tools and re-runs the stealer on every reboot, defeating cleanup attempts that don't remove the service.
  • Lineage: Delphos assesses with high confidence the loader was built with the Cruciferra crypter, a paid tool whose default kill list also holds 145 names and whose driver is interchangeable, and with moderate confidence that Rapuncel is a relative (not identical build) of BoryptGrab, the fake-repository stealer Trend Micro documented in March. Arctic Wolf separately reported a wave of nearly 300 fake GitHub repositories delivering this family in July. No victim count is public.

Tags

Durable pivots (hunt these, lineage/behavior, not one file name)

Artifact Value
Driver service name NvFsFilter
Driver path C:\Windows\System32\drivers\nvfsflt64.sys
Driver file name Alinubx.sys (operators already renamed once, expect renames)
Device path \\.\Alinubx
Signer metadata Henan Dafeng Software / contains CnCrypt
Behavior driver load immediately followed by security-process terminations
Side-load pair vsdbg.exe + same-directory vsdbg.dll (genuine Microsoft tool is single-file)
Archive tell 100+ MB ZIP download for a consumer authenticator

Community detection for this exact driver is published on LOLDrivers, but it is hash-matched and shares the same rename weakness.

Defender guidance

  • Treat a machine that ran this as kernel-compromised. Every browser-saved password on it is stolen, plus wallet files, Discord/Steam/Telegram sessions, and Credential Manager contents, the stealer copies these BEFORE the driver work begins. Rotate from a separate clean device. Rebuild (or at minimum kernel-level forensic inspect) rather than clean-and-hope: the driver re-kills protections and re-runs the stealer on every boot.
  • Blocklist your own drivers. Microsoft's blocklist does not cover the CnCrypt lineage, push LOLDrivers entries into your own Windows Driver Control / SOC policy (deny-by-signer for Henan Dafeng Software/CnCrypt product metadata), and alert on driver-service creation (System event log 7045) naming non-Microsoft INF-signed kernel drivers on workstations.
  • App-bound encryption is not a safe default on shared/managed hosts, its defense is the browser service itself, which injectable-process malware co-opts. Password managers whose vaults require a second factor outside the OS remain the compensating control.
  • Detection of the kill pattern beats detection of the file: a burst of security-process exits shortly after a new driver-service load is behaviorally unmissable at the EDR-controller level, even when the endpoint agent is already dead, the controller sees the agent stop reporting.
  • For maintainers/orgs: this family's distribution is GitHub organizations that rank in search. Treat top-search-result "product downloads" hosted on GitHub as hostile-by-default; pin vendor domains.

Systemic read

Microsoft's response to Delphos (reported Aug 19): the behavior does not meet Microsoft's definition of a security vulnerability because the driver is not a Microsoft component; researchers were pointed to the separate blocklist-intake channel, which had not listed the driver as of disclosure. That is the durable governance gap: the attestation pipeline and the blocklist pipeline are separate systems with different definitions of harm, and BYOVD abuse falls between them. Compare the on-wiki GodDamn/GentleKiller BYOVD record and the ShieldBreak/RoguePlanet Defender-driver case: 2026's recurring endpoint-killer pattern is signed-driver reuse, and hash blocklists lose the race by design. The capability-vs-incident discipline in this report is also worth copying: the driver's un-configured routines (hiding, injection, rerouting) are documented as dormant, not claimed as executed.

Monitoring

  • Whether Microsoft adds the CnCrypt/CcProtect lineage to the vulnerable-driver blocklist (the blocklist gap is the story, track the intake outcome, not the file).
  • Backfill of the joint LastPass/Delphos report's full IOC list (contract server IPs/domains, the 40 impersonated brands) and any named-victim or infection-count disclosure.
  • Whether the vsdbg side-load + padded-ZIP + fake-GitHub-org pattern is reused for other brands (the same family is already documented in ~300 repos per Arctic Wolf).
  • Cruciferra crypter takedown/rotation (the 145-name kill list is the crypter's, so crypter-side changes move the whole family's behavior).
  • Whether the dormant driver routines (file hiding / injection / traffic rerouting) ever ship with a config file, that would upgrade the family from stealer-enabler to full interceptor.

Sources

  • The Hacker News (Swati Khandelwal), "Fake LastPass Authenticator Installer Abuses Microsoft-Signed Driver to Kill Antivirus and EDR," Sep 21, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/fake-lastpass-authenticator-installer.html (full text captured by this wiki Sep 22, 2026; attributes LastPass + Delphos Labs, disclosure Sep 17, 2026).
  • Delphos Labs site live at capture (canonical joint report URL not yet retrievable, SPA front-end; backfill pending).
  • LOLDrivers entry for the CcProtect.sys / CnCrypt lineage (referenced by researchers; community detection is hash-matched).