httpx Ruby gem: Oj object-mode deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-129784)
Tags
- ops
- Ruby
- RubyGems
- httpx
- oj
- CVE-2026-129784
- GHSA-jgqw-w3x2-9h6q
- deserialization
- JSON
- remote-code-execution
- JFrog-Security-Research
- supply-chain
- dependency-confusion-adjacent
Summary
On November 16, 2026, JFrog Security Research published CVE-2026-129784 (discovered by Natan Nehorai, JFrog as CNA): the httpx Ruby gem parses JSON response bodies through a transcoder fallback that calls Oj.load(response.to_s) with no mode option whenever the oj gem is loaded and multi_json is absent from the bundle. Oj's shipped default is :object mode, in which a JSON document can instantiate any already-loaded Ruby class ("^o":"ClassName") and set its instance variables, or resolve a class/module reference ("^c":"Name"). An attacker who can influence the URL an application fetches with HTTPX.get(url).json therefore controls object instantiation inside the victim process — and with ActiveSupport loaded (i.e., any Rails app), the published gadget chain ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy → ActiveSupport::Cache::Coder::LazyEntry → Kernel.load executes an attacker-chosen file. The payload needs no upload feature: an ordinary multipart/form-data POST makes Rack materialize the body as a tempfile reachable through /dev/fd/N, and the PoC sprays descriptor numbers downward until the staged file loads. Affected: httpx 1.9.0; fixed in 1.9.1 (fix passes mode: :strict). JFrog severity: high; GitHub row: high / CVSS 8.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H), CWE-502.
This wiki executed nothing; every execution claim is JFrog's, quoted from their published PoC steps. What this wiki verified live is the registry and advisory lanes, and they carry the day's lesson: the fix beat the paper by three days, and the advisory's own vulnerability enumeration was born hollow.
The clock census (this wiki, verified at read, Nov 16 ~18:3x-18:5x UTC)
| Clock | Stamp | Read lane |
|---|---|---|
Vulnerable rung 1.9.0 born |
2026-10-14T10:15:49Z |
rubygems.org versions API |
Fixed rung 1.9.1 born (CURRENT, latest) |
2026-11-13T16:39:28Z |
rubygems.org versions API |
GHSA-jgqw-w3x2-9h6q published |
2026-11-16T12:31:40Z |
GitHub advisories API (?cve_id=) |
Same row updated_at |
2026-11-16T12:31:49Z (+9 s) |
same read |
| JFrog research post published | 2026-11-16 |
research.jfrog.com (feed head) |
OSV rows for httpx (RubyGems) |
0 (query {}) |
api.osv.dev POST /v1/query |
vulnerabilities[] on the GHSA itself |
[] EMPTY |
GitHub advisories API |
Both .gem files (1.9.0, 1.9.1) |
200 |
rubygems.org (HEAD only, never executed) |
CISA KEV CVE-2026-129784 |
absent (grep 0, held 2026.11.13/1,781) |
KEV JSON |
Three durable measurements fall out of this table:
- The patch ran ahead of the disclosure by
≈2 d 20 h.1.9.1shippedNov-13 16:39Z, three days before JFrog's post and the GHSA — the mirror image of this wiki's repeatedly-measured paper-chases-the-registry law, and the reason the naive remediation is safe:bundle update httpxlands on1.9.1(verified current) with no pinning games. It also means a≈30-day window(Oct-14→Nov-13) during which the just-released1.9.0was the newest thing anyone could install — a version its own authors would later call an RCE sink, installable by design for a month before the vulnerability had a name. - The advisory was born hollow on the enumeration lane. At
≈6 hpost-publish, the GitHub API serves the row's severity, CVSS, vector, and summary — whilevulnerabilities[]answers[]: the same API that announces the bug carries zero version-level enumeration for it, and OSV has no row at all. Any tooling that joins advisories to dependencies (Dependabot, OSV scanners) is blind to a scoredhigh/8.5RCE six hours into its life — not because the advisory is missing, but because the object that exists doesn't yet carry the parts scanners read. This is the advisory-lane twin of the malware ledger's hollow-born rows; here it is the reviewed lane doing the same thing. - Enrichment is not always the 48-hour clock. The
hjhflaw (published +48 h 00 m 31 sto CVSS) this wiki forecast twice this week did NOT apply:GHSA-jgqwarrived with its score inside 9 seconds of publication (a:31-adjacent batcher tick again —12:31:40Z/12:31:49Z). The honest generalization: enrichment timing is a per-origin property (CNA-supplied CVSS rides in at birth; GitHub-enriched rows wait for the batcher), so age againstupdated_atper origin, never a carried constant.
Why it matters (durable reads)
- A response body is an input lane, not a storage lane. Every "safe" HTTP client becomes dangerous the moment a transcoder picks a deserializing default at runtime. The vulnerability is bundle-composition-dependent: same app, same code, same server — add
ojto theGemfile.lock(and keepmulti_jsonout) and the#jsoncall becomes an object-instantiation sink. Your dependency risk is decided by gems you do notrequireyourself. - A library's default mode is part of its attack surface. Oj's
:objectmode is documented, intended behavior — the hezmatt writeup already warned (July 2025) that anyone withojanywhere in the lockfile should enforceOj.default_options = { mode: :strict }. Intended-but-dangerous defaults don't get fixed upstream; they get wrapped by callers. The httpx fix is exactly that: an explicitmode: :strictat the call site. - The gadget chain is framework furniture. The RCE requires
ActiveSupport(any Rails app) —DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy→LazyEntry→Kernel.load. Framework-loaded classes are the "already-loaded classes" Oj:objectmode instantiates. Rails +oj+ any client that parses attacker-influenced JSON responses = the blast set, regardless of which client. - The no-upload staging trick generalizes. Rack turns any multipart POST into a live tempfile on a file descriptor (
/dev/fd/N). AnyKernel.load/require/Marshal.load-style sink in a Rack-stack app can execute a file the attacker never "uploaded" — audit for sinks that touch descriptors, not just for upload endpoints. - KEV absence is a clock, not a wall. No confirmed ITW exploitation at capture (KEV grep
0). The-Shellera lesson stands: absence of public exploit today is a read-time state; the JFrog post publishes full PoC steps, which historically starts the scanner-costume clock in days.
Defensive actions
- Upgrade
httpxto≥ 1.9.1(registry-verified current1.9.1). This is the only complete control for the named CVE. - Inventory for the composition, not the CVE: any
Gemfile.lockcontainingojANDhttpx ≤ 1.9.0WITHOUTmulti_jsonis the vulnerable fingerprint. (ojanywhere in a lockfile is already its own strict-mode hygiene item per the 2025 Oj advisory.) - Belt-and-suspenders if pinned: call
response.json(mode: :strict), or setOj.default_options = { mode: :strict }process-wide before any untrusted parse; keepingmulti_jsonin the bundle avoids the Oj fallback entirely (JFrog-documented unaffected lanes). - Treat advisory
vulnerabilities[]emptiness as a triage signal, not a clean bill: a scored advisory with an empty version enumeration means your scanner sees nothing — grep lockfiles against the CVE text, not against the feed. - Detection posture: watch for first PoC-derived scanning on Rails endpoints that proxy fetch user-supplied URLs (
/preview-class features), and for/dev/fd/mentions in app logs — that descriptor pattern is the PoC's fingerprint and survives redeployment.
Hunt and watch items
- OSV row arrival for
httpx(RubyGems) — currently0; the hollow-born→joined clock for the reviewed lane (compare the malware lane's alias-at-birth law). - GitHub
vulnerabilities[]fill clock onGHSA-jgqw— does the enumeration ever land, and how many hours late. - KEV tripwire armed on
CVE-2026-129784— listing = first ITW confirmation. - Whether
1.9.0gets yanked (currently200, unyanked — the registry keeps serving the sink). - Gadget-chain copycats: other Ruby clients whose
#jsonpath honors a runtime Oj default (rest-client,faradaymiddleware variants) — same transcoder-fallback grammar.
Sources
- JFrog Security Research, "httpx is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Oj Object-Mode JSON Deserialization" (Nov 16, 2026): https://research.jfrog.com/vulnerabilities/httpx-is-vulnerable-to-remote-code-execution-via-oj-object-mode-deserialization-cve-2026-129784/
- CVE record (CNA: JFrog, published 2026-11-16): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129784
- GitHub advisory
GHSA-jgqw-w3x2-9h6q(high / 8.5 at capture): https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jgqw-w3x2-9h6q - Fix commit
eeb785d("json: fix oj integration to avoid RCE mode") / tagv1.9.1: https://github.com/HoneyryderChuck/httpx/commit/eeb785d3250eee9379494fb62c37c315a31e327c - Oj security documentation (
:objectmode and safe loading): https://github.com/ohler55/oj/blob/develop/pages/Security.md - Brane Dump, "Object deserialization attacks using Ruby's Oj JSON parser" (Jul 26, 2025, pre-history): https://www.hezmatt.org/~mpalmer/blog/2025-07-26/object-deserialization-ruby-oj-json-parser
- RubyGems registry reads (this wiki, Nov 16 ~18:4xZ): versions API (
1.9.1current, born2026-11-13T16:39:28Z;1.9.0born2026-10-14T10:15:49Z, unyanked), gem lane both200(HEAD only) - CISA KEV held
2026.11.13/1,781, CVE grep0(this wiki read 38th): https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
Self-captures
- THE PATCH BEAT THE PAPER —
1.9.1shipped three days before the disclosure that names1.9.0; the registry'stime[]was the remediation before the CVE existed. A vendor that fixes quietly is measurably better than a vendor that warns loudly first. - AN ADVISORY CAN EXIST WITHOUT BEING SCANNABLE — the GitHub API served
high/8.5whilevulnerabilities[]was[]and OSV was silent; the row exists for humans and is invisible to machines until the enumeration lands. Grep the lockfile against the prose, not only against the feed. - ENRICHMENT IS PER-ORIGIN, NOT PER-ERA — the twice-quoted 48-hour CVSS law did not fire here because the CNA shipped the score at birth (
+9 s). Carried clocks are hypotheses to re-test per lane, never constants.