@zereight/mcp-gitlab CVE-2026-61560
Summary
The GitHub security advisory for @zereight/mcp-gitlab, the most popular community GitLab MCP server (npm, ~2,000 GitHub stars, ~82,000 npm downloads/week at the time of the advisory), publishes CVE-2026-61560 (CVSS 9.8, published September 16, 2026): in SSE transport mode (SSE=true), which the project's own docker-compose.yaml presents as the intended Docker deployment, the /sse and /messages endpoints carry zero authentication, and the default-enabled upload_markdown tool reads any file on the server's filesystem via an unsanitized file_path parameter and uploads it to a GitLab project. Chained, any network-reachable attacker connects without credentials, reads /proc/self/environ (which contains GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN in plaintext), retrieves the uploaded file from GitLab, and owns whatever the PAT can touch, repositories, issues, CI variables, the whole account. The container runs as root (the Dockerfile has no USER directive) and the compose file maps 3002:3002, binding 0.0.0.0. REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION is explicitly incompatible with SSE mode in this codebase, so there was no per-request auth to enable. Patched in 2.1.27 (auth token gating + path restrictions landed via PRs #482/#554/#622, merge 73d198c); maintainers ask deployers of v2.1.27+ to run with SSE_AUTH_TOKEN set. This is the internet-exposed-unauthenticated-MCP-server pattern instantiated in a single mass-adopted package: the MCP server is a privileged GitLab proxy with an anonymous front door.
Tags
- tools
- mcp-gitlab
- zereight
- CVE-2026-61560
- GHSA-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5
- MCP
- Model Context Protocol
- SSE transport
- unauthenticated access
- arbitrary file read
- path traversal
- PAT theft
- GitLab
- credential theft
- account takeover
- AI agent tooling
- npm
- Docker defaults
- CVSS 9.8
September 16 (evening) update: CVE-2026-61560 is one of SIX advisories on this package, the "2.1.27 fixes it" boundary does not hold
The repo advisory list (github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security/advisories, verified via the GitHub API Sep 16, 2026) carries six published advisories for the same package, five siblings beyond GHSA-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5:
| Advisory | CVE | Severity | What it defeats |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-2h44-8472-frjj | CVE-2026-61559 | critical (report CVSS v3.1 8.5, S:C) | SSRF via X-GitLab-API-URL header when ENABLE_DYNAMIC_API_URL=true: the header is only syntax-checked (new URL()) and the victim's Private-Token is attached to every outbound fetch to the attacker's host, straight PAT theft. "Patched versions: None at time of report." |
| GHSA-vmp7-252j-cwp7 | CVE-2026-61568 | critical | DNS rebinding to the local Streamable HTTP transport (CWE-350): no Host/Origin allowlist; express.json() is installed globally before any MCP route guard, so a malicious web page routes browser requests to a victim's local MCP listener. Confirmed on 2.1.18. |
| GHSA-5648-rgj9-v224 | , | high | Five defects defeating the package's own safety controls (reviewed on 2.1.28): execute_graphql defeats BOTH read-only mode and GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS; Streamable HTTP /mcp unauthenticated under cookie-jar/device-flow credentials; SSE unauthenticated by default with no Origin/Host validation; unauthenticated session/transport-exhaustion DoS (token check is syntactic only); verbatim CI job-trace return (prompt-injection vector under the MCP threat model). |
| GHSA-7c3w-fxgh-frc7 | , | high | job_id path traversal: project_id is URL-encoded but job_id is interpolated raw, so job_id=../../../user escapes /projects/{id}/jobs/... to an arbitrary /api/v4/ endpoint under the operator token (confirmed on 2.1.18: returned the admin user object). |
| GHSA-4rm9-rfp2-j39q | , | high | download_release_asset path escape via unrestricted direct_asset_path, normalizing out of the release-download path and bypassing GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS as a scope control (tested on 2.1.30). |
Two consequences change the defender guidance above:
- The fix version is a moving target. The
execute_graphql/allowlist bypasses were reviewed on 2.1.28, after the 2.1.27 CVE-2026-61560 patch, and the release-asset escape was tested on 2.1.30. None of the three CVE-less siblings populatesfirst_patched_version; they express the fix only as a vulnerable range, GHSA-5648-rgj9-v224< 2.1.30, GHSA-7c3w-fxgh-frc7< 2.1.32, GHSA-4rm9-rfp2-j39q< 2.1.41(verified via the repo-advisories API, Sep 16 late UTC), so the effective floor implied by the full advisory set is ≥ 2.1.41, while npmlatestis already 2.1.63 (published Sep 16, 2026, 21:07 UTC) with a fast release cadence (2.1.58-2.1.63 in two weeks). Practical rule: run the newest release, not a pinned "patched" version, a deployment pinned at the 2.1.27 "fix" for CVE-2026-61560 is still inside three sibling vulnerable ranges, and re-verify before every deploy. (Earlier in the day the GHSA page for CVE-2026-61559 still read "Patched versions: None at time of report"; the API now bounds it at< 2.1.27withfirst_patched_version 2.1.27, and the same API pass confirms CVE-2026-61568 is bounded at< 2.1.30.) - This is a systemic-boundary story, not one bug. Ten weeks, six advisories, one package, unauthenticated transport, SSRF header trust, missing Host/Origin validation, allowlist bypasses, and two API-path traversals all defeat the same safety model (read-only mode, project allow-list, transport auth). Under the MCP threat model the advisory itself invokes (tool arguments shaped by prompt injection or a malicious client), any one of these is a full-credential event because the server holds a PAT. Treat a pinned older deployment as vulnerable regardless of version number, and keep the PAT-scope and rotation guidance below.
Vulnerability mechanics
- Surface: SSE transport (
SSE=true), the mode the shippeddocker-compose.yamlis built for.GET /ssehands out asessionIdwith no authentication middleware;POST /messages?sessionId=...then executes any of ~100+ registered tools using the server's configured PAT. - Auth dead-end: the project's
REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=trueoption is explicitly incompatible with SSE mode in the code (the server rejects the combination), so the documented Docker deployment had no way to authenticate callers. - File-read primitive:
upload_markdown(in the default-enableduserstoolset) callsfs.readFileSync(filePath)wherefilePathcomes straight from user input, the Zod schema declaresfile_pathas a barez.string()with no allowlist, sandboxing, or path restrictions. - Exfiltration channel: the file is uploaded through the legitimate GitLab API (
POST /projects/:id/uploads) and returned as a fetchable/uploads/<hash>/<name>URL, the victim's own GitLab becomes the drop site. - Full PoC path (published in the advisory): connect to
/sse→ capturesessionId→list_projectsto find a writable project →upload_markdownwithfile_path=/proc/self/environ→ fetch the uploaded file from GitLab → extractGITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=glpat-...→ use the PAT as the account. Container runs as root, so/proc/self/cmdline, SSH keys, and mounted secrets are also readable.
Defender heuristics
- Version-audit: upgrade to ≥ 2.1.41 (the highest vulnerable-range floor across all six advisories, 2.1.27 covers only CVE-2026-61560/-61559; the siblings extend the floor to
< 2.1.30,< 2.1.32,< 2.1.41; newest release is safest) and setSSE_AUTH_TOKEN, the fix is registration/transport gating plus an explicit token; patching without configuring the token keeps you exposed. - Audit every exposed MCP endpoint you own, this package or any other: an MCP server holding a PAT, API key, database role, or cloud credential and answering anonymous
/sseor/messagesrequests is a credential vault with an open door.tools/listhands an attacker a machine-readable capability catalog by design. - Rotate now if you ran a vulnerable default deployment: the PAT in the container environment must be assumed burned, revoke it at GitLab (admin-level revoke, not just user delete), and audit the account's recent API activity and project uploads for unexpected
/uploads/objects. - Hunt artifacts: unauthenticated
GET /sseandPOST /messages?sessionId=traffic on port 3002 (or any reverse-proxied MCP path) from non-administrative source ranges; GitLab-side tells = upload objects namedenviron/cmdline/dotfiles appearing in projects, and API use of a PAT from the MCP server's host plus other hosts. - Design rule for MCP deployments: put the server behind authentication at the transport layer you actually ship; never rely on "the client won't call that tool"; restrict toolsets to what the integration needs (this read lived in a default-on toolset); run containers as non-root; keep PATs out of world-readable process environments where a file-read primitive can reach them; bind Docker ports to
127.0.0.1unless you deliberately expose the service. - Ecosystem read: one widely used package shipped an unauthenticated arbitrary-file-read-to-credential-exfiltration chain as its default documented deployment. Treat MCP servers as Tier-1 network assets in inventory and exposure scanning, exactly like the Bifrost management API finding from the same fortnight.
Related pages
- Internet-exposed unauthenticated MCP servers (pattern)
- Bifrost CVE-2026-90898: unauthenticated MCP stdio client-registration RCE
- MCP stdio command-execution boundary (pattern)
- Wiz "Off Guard" LiteLLM MCP bypass → cloud compromise
Sources
- GitHub Advisory: GHSA-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5, @zereight/mcp-gitlab: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via
upload_markdownenables PAT exfiltration and full account takeover (CVSS 9.8, patched 2.1.27, published 2026-09-16) - NVD record: CVE-2026-61560
- Fixes: PR #482 · PR #554 · PR #622 · v2.1.27 release