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Star Blizzard's 2026 overhaul, "RedFlick"

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Summary

Microsoft Threat Intelligence's September 29 update documents Star Blizzard (attributed by CISA as subordinate to FSB Centre 18) rebuilding its tradecraft since January 2026 after the October 2025 GTI COLDCOPY exposure. Three shifts, all in service of volume:

  1. Spear phishing → large-scale initial-contact campaigns, tens to hundreds of emails per campaign, at least 13 distinct campaigns Jan-Aug 2026, affecting 100+ organizations, primarily US and UK: NGOs, think tanks, governments, financial institutions, diplomacy, anything with a Ukraine-support nexus. Early campaigns (Jan-Feb) tested on Ukr.net users with Ukrainian-authority lures (tax-audit, fine notices); from March the actor scaled globally with fake closed-door invitations (IISS, CES, Atlantic Council, Chatham House "London Conference 2026", MAMA Summit). Read: Ukraine as the test range, then export, capability-progression signature.
  2. Phishing senders moved from free email (Proton/Microsoft consumer) to accounts created on compromised CPanel/WordPress websites, reusing the SAME account name across multiple domains, sender reputation borrowed from sites your filters already trust.
  3. Malware delivery: ClickFix → "RedFlick", a single user interaction replaces the multi-step ClickFix flow.

The RedFlick chain

  • Follow-up email after target engagement carries a password-protected RAR/ZIP, the password is delivered as an IMAGE in the email body.
  • Mid-Jan variant: malicious VHDX ships a LNK disguised as a PDF + hidden BAT + decoy PDF; LNK → hidden conhost.exe → cmd.exe → BAT opens the decoy PDF and invokes SSH.exe with PermitLocalCommand to download+execute a remote MSI. OpenSSH as a download rail with command execution on connect, the signed-system-binary inversion again.
  • MSI creates scheduled task(s) running control.exe against a remote WebDAV path → downloads/executes the CosmicPulse downloader compiled as a Control Panel applet (DLL/CPL), masquerading as a Control Panel item. Downloader publicly known as NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH.
  • From April, THREE scheduled tasks masquerading as network components:
  • Task 1 ("Internet Quality Test Connection" masquerade): exfiltrates UTF-16+Base64 of hostname+username to C2 AND executes an attacker-chosen DLL via Shell32.dll!Control_RunDLL over a WebDAV UNC path (HTTP transport, not SMB).
  • Task 2 ("Network Configuration Manager"): prepares the WebDAV redirector/WebClient machinery the other tasks ride.
  • Task 3 ("System Health Monitor"): control.exe → remote path → next stage.
  • CosmicPulse installation: downloader fetches two ZIPs (Python 3.8 runtime + bootstrapper; payload = YESROBOT), writes an AES key to HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis, bootstrapper recovers it with an embedded AES-ECB key, decodes the payload. Registry-as-config under a fake file-extension class key.
  • July addition: payloads hidden in PDF files; mid-August campaign used steganography to conceal identifiers. One Atlantic Council-themed campaign delivered a DarkSword iOS backdoor install link instead (ties to Proofpoint's March report, Star Blizzard running iOS exploitation beside Windows).
  • DLUA (Digital Security Lab Ukraine, June 2026) observed overlapping TTPs.

Defender actions

  • Hunt the task triad: scheduled tasks named like network components whose action is control.exe with a UNC/WebDAV target; webcache/WebClient service activity from non-admin users; Control_RunDLL invocations; conhost.exe with hidden window spawning cmd; ssh.exe with PermitLocalCommand in the command line; VHDX mounts from Downloads; HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis keys; follow-up-email attachments that are password-protected archives where the password arrived as an image.
  • Structural: block WebDAV (WebClient) execution paths for standard users; treat newly-created accounts on your own or partners' CMS sites as a phishing surface, if you run WordPress/CPanel, your contact/signup form is someone else's sender-reputation farm.
  • Microsoft ships AlertInfo-based hunting queries + Defender detections; direct customer notifications continue.

Sources