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ShinyHunters

Summary

ShinyHunters is a public extortion and data-theft persona tracked by Google Mandiant / GTIG as UNC6240 in the June 2026 Oracle PeopleSoft campaign. Mandiant reported that UNC6240 exploited Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 as a zero-day against PeopleSoft application infrastructure, with stolen organization data later published on the ShinyHunters data-leak site.

This page is intentionally narrow: it records durable, sourced operational facts for threat.wiki and should not be used to merge unrelated public ShinyHunters ecosystem claims without additional primary sourcing.

Tags

Known activity

2025-2026 Salesforce OAuth and trusted-integration abuse

  • Microsoft reported ShinyHunters-associated SaaS intrusion activity observed between mid-2025 and mid-2026 against Salesforce customer environments.
  • Microsoft grouped the activity into three trust-abuse paths: vishing users into consenting to attacker-controlled Salesforce connected apps, abusing trusted SaaS integrations and OAuth tokens from Salesloft Drift / Gainsight / Klue-style workflows, and using misconfigured Salesforce Experience Cloud guest access through Aura / GraphQL requests.
  • Microsoft explicitly framed the activity as abuse of OAuth relationships, integrations, and guest-user permissions rather than a Salesforce product vulnerability.
  • The impact pattern is CRM enumeration, bulk data querying, and exfiltration through legitimate-looking API and connected-app activity that may evade authentication-centric detections.

2026 Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day exploitation

  • Google Mandiant and GTIG attribute an Oracle PeopleSoft exploitation and extortion campaign to UNC6240 (ShinyHunters).
  • Activity was observed from 2026-05-27 through 2026-06-09 and aligned with exploitation of CVE-2026-35273, a critical unauthenticated PeopleSoft PeopleTools remote-code-execution vulnerability.
  • Mandiant reported that the actor targeted Environment Management Hub (PSEMHUB) endpoints and used staging servers with customized MeshCentral agents, command histories, and a victim-specific fanout script.
  • GTIG notified more than 100 organizations whose IP addresses correlated with potentially vulnerable endpoints; 68% were higher-education institutions.
  • Mandiant tied the campaign to stolen organization data published on the ShinyHunters data-leak site on 2026-06-09.

September 2026: post-betrayal extortion escalation, refuse-to-pay publication confirmed at state scale

  • Google GTG's LABScon disclosure (Sep 18) had already established that ShinyHunters went rogue from its TeamPCP revenue-share arrangement ~mid-2026, extorting with TeamPCP's stolen credentials and leaking its own chat log to Google in the process; September's public incidents show the resulting operation's extortion-at-refusal pattern executing at scale:
  • Florida FLHSMV DAVID breach (disclosed Sep 4, records published ~Sep 16-17, 2026): after the State of Florida declined to pay, the ShinyHunters extortion group published claimed 200,000+ records from Florida's Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID), a law-enforcement/government system, not a public portal, to its dark-web leak site. FLHSMV attributed the intrusion to a single Plant City Police Department user whose login had been improperly stored on a personal electronic device; the state described the attacker only as an "international cybercriminal organization" and has not named ShinyHunters or confirmed the 200k figure. ShinyHunters separately told BleepingComputer it entered via a password-reset flaw affecting multiple DAVID accounts, including DMV employees and an FBI agent, an account Florida has not corroborated. TechCrunch's review of the leak: hundreds of thousands of vehicle-ownership certificates (names, addresses, VINs) plus a smaller set with SSNs and government documents including non-U.S. passports/immigration papers; no driver's-license photos apparent. Earlier proof-of-access included a record tied to the late Jeffrey Epstein. Defender read: a single poorly-stored law-enforcement credential on a personal device reached a statewide LE query system, inventory and vault-store shared/government logins on out-of-policy devices, and treat password-reset flows on LE systems as Tier-1 attack surface (TechCrunch Sep 16, SOFX Sep 17, 2026).
  • McKesson (August disclosure, Sep 10-19 scope updates): ShinyHunters claimed theft from the medical-supply giant (claims of up to 284 million patient records); McKesson confirmed a third-party-application-mediated cyberattack, and The Register / HIPAA Journal reported 6.4 million unique email addresses in exposed data as of Sep 19, the SaaS/third-party-app OAuth abuse lane already documented on this page, now with healthcare-scale victim numbers.
  • Keep sourcing narrow per page policy: FLHSMV has not named ShinyHunters; the FBI-account entry claim is a single one-party account; the McKesson record counts are attacker-claimed pending company validation.

November 2026: Unit 42 consolidates the Com-affiliated vishing extortion wave under the ShinyHunters name

  • Unit 42's November 20 "Dialing for Data" report lists Bling Libra (aka ShinyHunters) as the named actor atop a Com-affiliated vishing-extortion economy of six activity clusters (CL-CRI-1116 Redact/formerly BlackFile, CL-CRI-1147 Pink, CL-CRI-1182 Falcon, CL-CRI-1192 Helix, and two NEW: CL-CRI-1264 Vortex, CL-CRI-1274 Cinder), with Vortex/Cinder overlapping Google's UNC6671 tracking.
  • New tradecraft tells this wiki carries forward: Vortex's minute-scale unauthorized MFA-device enrollment reusing one device named Pixel 10a across accounts; Cinder's Duo bypass via replayed persistent "keep me signed in" session token from proxy infrastructure; and a sideloaded fake "Google Chrome" extension (keylogger, cookie/IndexedDB theft, QR-code MFA-token harvesting, webcam, Chrome-DevTools-Protocol remote control) served from oskeysetup[.]com, a host already on this wiki's September passkey-theme census.
  • Full detail on the dedicated page; the elder-cluster baseline stays on the BlackFile/UNC6671 page.

Defender focus

  • Treat ShinyHunters / UNC6240 reporting as extortion-driven intrusion activity, not just credential resale or leak-site branding.
  • For Salesforce and adjacent SaaS environments, inventory connected apps, review OAuth scopes, revoke stale or unneeded integrations, monitor API-heavy connected-app behavior, and validate Experience Cloud guest-user permissions.
  • For PeopleSoft environments, prioritize the operational page's endpoint restrictions, WebLogic log review, PSEMHUB filesystem inspection, and outbound SMB monitoring.
  • Preserve staging, web-tier, process-scheduler, and outbound network evidence before removing web shells or remote-management agents.

Sources