NovaCookies
Summary
On August 26, 2026, Island Security disclosed details (via a report shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication) of NovaCookies, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing toolkit operating as a $320/month subscription phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that relays Microsoft 365 sign-ins through attacker-controlled infrastructure and captures authenticated sessions, including MFA. The kit has been used against hundreds of organizations across multiple sectors in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, Israel, and the U.A.E. Proofpoint assesses NovaCookies to be a variant of the Sneaky 2FA phishing kit, extending its original Microsoft-account focus with dedicated flows for other identity providers, including Okta and Entra domains federated to GoDaddy.
The durable tradecraft pattern: campaigns used genuine Docusign envelopes to carry counterfeit document-share lures, with some clicks routed through legitimate Microsoft or Google sign-in endpoints as redirect hops before reaching the kit, so the message, the document service, and the redirect can each appear trustworthy in isolation until the browser reaches attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Tags
- ops
- phishing
- AitM
- adversary-in-the-middle
- PhaaS
- phishing-as-a-service
- NovaCookies
- Sneaky 2FA
- Sneaky2FA
- Docusign
- document-share lure
- Microsoft 365
- session theft
- MFA bypass
- pass-the-cookie
- OAuth error redirect
- .vu TLD
- PwPt-sHaRe
- Ms36-AcCeSs
- ClOd-ViEw
- fordmotbvmorcompany.vu
- Telegram
- subscription PhaaS
- Okta
- GoDaddy federation
- Island Security
- Proofpoint
- anti-analysis
- Cloudflare gate
- debugging detection
- cybercrime
How the campaign works
- Genuine Docusign delivery: the victim receives a real Docusign notification (genuine sender-authentication and reputation pass because the email really is a Docusign share notice), styled as an accounting department sharing a "remittance-advice PDF." The malicious destination sits inside the shared document, below the layer most mail security products inspect.
- Redirect hops: some clicks are routed through legitimate Microsoft or Google sign-in endpoints before reaching the kit, so each hop looks legitimate on its own, "a trusted delivery service, an identity-provider redirect, then a familiar sign-in page."
- OAuth error-redirect into the relay: the attack uses an OAuth error-redirect technique previously detailed by Microsoft (March 2026) to hand the victim to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
- Live AitM session capture: the NovaCookies relay captures credentials and MFA codes and relays them to Microsoft in real time, harvesting the authenticated session, the standard AitM session-theft model.
- Anti-analysis: the kit evades security scanners with a Cloudflare gate and a mechanism to detect debugging-tool execution passes before serving the bogus login form.
Observable characteristics (per Island, via THN)
- Lure domains: many hosted on
.vu, e.g.fordmotbvmorcompany[.]vu. - Phishing URLs with alternating-case labels masquerading as Microsoft services:
PwPt-sHaRe,Ms36-AcCeSs,ClOd-ViEw. - Distribution/support: advertised via Telegram, which is also used to manage customer profiles, configure redirect services, and contact support, a centrally managed PhaaS operator model rather than per-affiliate hosting.
Why it matters
- Trusted-brand notification abuse with the payload inside the document defeats envelope-level mail filtering: the email is authentic Docusign; the malice is in the content. Document-share lures inside trusted SaaS notifications are a growing pattern (compare Mirage2FA's M365 login-flow abuse).
- PhaaS economics: at $320/month with central hosting, non-technical actors can run AitM MFA-bypass campaigns at scale. This is one of several new subscription PhaaS services emerging in recent months (e.g., the AnonyMousKIT AI-vishing service noted in the same report).
- Multi-IdP scope: unlike original Sneaky2FA (Microsoft-focused), the NovaCookies variant covers Okta and GoDaddy-federated Entra, relevant for SaaS-heavy environments using non-Microsoft IdPs.
Defender priorities
- Treat trusted-SaaS notifications as inspectable content: Docusign (and similar) share notices are not free from inspection; content-aware inspection of shared-document links is the control, plus user guidance that shared documents inside trusted-service emails can still be malicious.
- Hunt the URL patterns:
.vu-hosted lures, alternating-case Microsoft-service label strings (PwPt-sHaRe,Ms36-AcCeSs,ClOd-ViEw), and OAuth error-redirect URLs pointing at unfamiliar infrastructure. - Monitor OAuth error-redirect behavior: the technique Microsoft documented in March 2026 is the hand-off point, alert on OAuth error-redirect flows that terminate at non-corporate infrastructure.
- Session-hygiene baseline: with AitM session capture active at scale, keep conditional-access refresh, token-lifetime controls, and PRT (Primary Refresh Token) revocation runbooks tested, stolen M365 sessions are the direct objective.
- Multi-IdP scope: extend detection beyond M365 to Okta and any GoDaddy-federated Entra flows if present.
Caveats
- Island's assessment and the Proofpoint variant assessment are as reported by The Hacker News (August 26, 2026); Island's own blog post was not independently reachable at scan time.
- "Hundreds of organizations" is Island's characterization of observed campaigns, not a confirmed victim list.
- No actor attribution beyond the PhaaS operator model; the kit is commercialized tooling, not a named threat group.
Timeline
- March 2026, Microsoft details the OAuth error-redirect technique later used by the campaign.
- July 2026 (approx.), Proofpoint posts its assessment of NovaCookies as a Sneaky2FA variant (X post, "last month" as of the August 26 report).
- August 26, 2026, Island report via The Hacker News disclosure.
Related pages
- Mirage2FA M365 PhaaS: 4,500 US and EU companies
- Forg365 Microsoft 365 PhaaS
- Kratos Microsoft 365 PhaaS and infrastructure disruption
- JWR phishing framework (likely The Outsider variant)
Sources
- The Hacker News (Ravie Lakshmanan): NovaCookies Campaigns Abuse Genuine Docusign Notifications to Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions (August 26, 2026; cites Island Security's pre-publication report and Proofpoint's assessment)
- Island Security blog (referenced in the THN report; blog listing not independently reachable at scan time)
- Proofpoint assessment of NovaCookies as a Sneaky2FA variant (X post, referenced in the THN report)