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Graphalgo crosses ecosystems

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Summary

Aikido Security Research published on September 22, 2026 that the Graphalgo malware family, first reported by ReversingLabs in February 2026 on npm, and covered during the last week by SafeDep, Checkmarx, and JFrog, has been ported to Go and is now distributed through at least two Terraform providers and two Go Modules. This is the first case of systematic malware distribution through Terraform providers that Aikido (and, per the post, the wider research community) is aware of. The Go samples share blockchain and Slack infrastructure and an ECDH public key with recent npm Graphalgo payloads, the key 302a300506032b656e032100bad013df6eec5d686f4cc8551e0a5c87a0135164bdd1dafb1c75141d1b526702 has appeared in npm payloads since at least April 2026, first in modern-events, a package that sits in this wiki's own Equation-of-Compromise campaign inventory (modern-events 1.3.3-1.5.2, XRAY-968383, March 3, npm-holdered since April). The public key is therefore a hard cryptographic join between the npm campaign record this wiki tracks and the new Go/Terraform operation; contract addresses, Telegram addresses, and Slack workspaces additionally link back to ReversingLabs' April post.

Malicious artifacts (any versions):

Ecosystem Name Notes
Terraform provider gocommunity-io/dockerd TA-controlled org gocommunity-io
Terraform provider kreuzwenker/docker Typosquat of kreuzwerker/docker (56 M downloads)
Go module gocommunity.io/orderedbtree malware in plaintext; forged commits
Go module gogets.dev/btreex malware in ZIP masquerading as .sql; forged commits backdating to Nov 2025

Aikido reports the operation as small and targeted, 18 unique hostnames across 725 plaintext check-ins (3 Windows, 5 Linux, 10 macOS since mid-July), the actor's own test machine (Frank/Frank1) included in the earliest messages.

The activation design: inert unless the runtime matches a hash

Both Terraform providers hide entry points in internal/provider/resource_docker_container_funcs.go that activate only when SHA256(containerName + networkID) of the Terraform variables equals b9966e3762e9a0d5d263b8cb3cca07294f81af9714d40ddf4628cb85d74e8ad5. That hash doubles as the AES key that decrypts a file path inside the package; the named archive, examples/resources/docker_container/import-resource.sqlite3 (SHA-256 5f892a5424e88a21a3eb3d7f82ebf04d8ac31cdb19ada25153be4165df977d0f, ZIP-magic despite the .sqlite3 extension), is unzipped, each file AES-decrypted, and executed as a Go package via a detached go run ..

gocommunity.io/orderedbtree (published Aug 11) carried the same malware in plaintext. gogets.dev/btreex (published Sep 8) hides it in a ZIP masquerading as btreex.sql (SHA-256 ab01686d87565250fc4989faddb877d793667b07ec217a61cbd798f5695d62f5) and only activates when processing an object with a specific price integer value, the same selective-trigger design.

This is the Checkmarx indexed-btree runtime-loader lesson replayed in Go (see the Equation-of-Compromise Sep 22 section): no install-time execution, code dormant behind a runtime-condition equality test, so install-time scanning and publish-time scanning both return clean. A sha256'd trigger constant in a provider's source is the artifact, grep your vendored providers for b9966e3762.

Second stage: dual-channel C2 with per-victim ECDH, the sophisticated member of the blockchain dead-drop family

The Go RAT fingerprints hardware/OS/hostname/user and whether node exists, posts a "System Report" to channel frontend-devs in Slack workspace portfolio-devs.slack[.]com, then publishes its ephemeral public key there. All subsequent traffic is ECDH-encrypted to two operator public keys (Slack side uses the hardcoded key above), and tasking moves to channel qa-announcements in a second workspace, portfolio-testers.slack[.]com (a third, mediumstar.slack[.]com, is a historical unreported indicator). Slack API calls hit api.slack.com, the workspace subdomains are never contacted, so proxy blocks on the workspace hostnames do nothing.

The blockchain channel resolves from an Arbitrum Sepolia contract, 0xAD02b5cDE693529d3bdA0266299501ad0193036C: the client reads the operator's public key and a shared-wallet private key (itself encrypted under the second-stage key material), registers its ephemeral key via a setCPubKey method, and reads encrypted commands from serviceData1/serviceData2. The shared wallet is permissioned to write ONLY the setCPubKey key-value store, rogue or compromised clients cannot spam or disrupt the channel. Polling: blockchain every 3 s, Slack every 10 s. Decrypted messages carry a header selecting execution as Go or JavaScript (via node) or self-deletion. Every client consumes every message and no-ops when decryption fails, commands are invisible to all other infected hosts. Aikido explicitly rates this a notably sophisticated blockchain dead-drop implementation with bidirectional communication and minimal leakage/disruption risk.

Cross-vendor join for defenders: this lands in the on-wiki on-chain-C2 family (ChainScript Polygon/WebSocket, GoCaracal eth_getStorageAt, Aeternum Polygon getDomain(), JFrog's Sepolia tasking registries, ChainDrop /router), and it is the first Arbitrum Sepolia member: hunting JSON-RPC to public Sepolia endpoints must now include Arbitrum Sepolia RPC as well. Same-family tells: portfolio-devs / Slack-as-C2 is the same channel type JFrog documented for the npm campaign's dual-bot agent (10-s no-jitter conversations.history-class polling).

The fake-ecosystem infrastructure and forged git dates

GitHub accounts/orgs in the report: gocommunity-io, go-pack-tech, kreuzwenker, victormmpp (dropper repo with forged commits), gogets-dev, markcary3, steveb082, go-community-admin. The actor periodically cleans its malware off GitHub to extend account lifetimes. Two companion websites, gogets[.]dev and gocommunity[.]io, registered within a day of the attacker-controlled orgs, present themselves as vanity-naming Go package ecosystems but accept no external packages: their function is social-engineering legitimacy for module paths that would otherwise look wrong (gogets.dev/btreex is not a real proxy-routable ecosystem the way a legitimate vanity host would be). Both sites were LIVE (HTTP 200) at this wiki's Sep 22 check, as were both Terraform provider pages on the official registry (registry.terraform.io/providers/gocommunity-io/dockerd/latest and .../kreuzwenker/docker/latest both returned 200, the providers were not yet removed at check).

markcary3's commits in gogets-dev/btreex were forged to backdate to November 2025, and because the Go module proxy and pkg.go.dev treat commit dates as authoritative, the falsified publication date is what everyone downstream displays. Durable: in the Go ecosystem, publication-date ordering is forgeable at the git layer, a module that "predates" an incident may not. The same authorship-forgery class as GitHub commit-date abuse, now with proxy-level enforcement of the lie.

Why Terraform targeting matters

Aikido's assessment, adopted here: Terraform users skew toward infrastructure deployment roles, a compromised DevOps workstation is a more direct line to production cloud credentials than a general developer laptop. Their IR guidance follows: treat any environment that installed these as fully compromised; isolate before rotating (dual live C2 channels mean the host stays reachable after package removal); rotate cloud/infra credentials FIRST for the Terraform vector; reimage, the decrypted second stage ran via a detached go run ., so package deletion cannot guarantee cleanup; audit Terraform applies, package publishes, and Actions runs inside the exposure window.

Timeline (UTC, per Aikido + this wiki)

Date Event
Feb 2026 ReversingLabs first reports Graphalgo on npm
≥ Apr 2026 ECDH public key present in npm payloads (modern-events first, on-wiki campaign inventory)
Jul 16 Earliest Slack check-ins (actor's own Windows test host)
Aug 11 gocommunity.io/orderedbtree published (plaintext malware)
Aug 16 First contract transaction per Aikido's count (1,402 txns since)
Early Sep Terraform providers gocommunity-io/dockerd, kreuzwenker/docker published
Sep 8 gogets.dev/btreex published (SQL-masquerade ZIP, forged commit dates)
Sep 22 Aikido publishes; this wiki verifies gogets.dev + gocommunity.io live, both providers live on registry.terraform.io

Durable reads

  1. A malware family is not its ecosystem. Graphalgo ported npm→Go wholesale while keeping the same crypto and C2 identities. Family tracking must pivot on keys, contract addresses, channel names, and code shapes, not on which registry the samples sit in. The ECDH public key is the strongest join in this report because it cannot be casually rotated without rebuilding every payload.
  2. Terraform providers are now a confirmed malware rail, first systematic case. Practical: the provider source is fetched and compiled on YOUR machine; pin provider sources to registry.terraform.io AND verify namespace spelling (kreuzwenker vs kreuzwerker is one transposed letter), grep .terraform.lock.hcl namespaces like you grep lockfiles (see this wiki's TraderTraitor .terraform.lock.hcl page, that delivery shape was provider execution by a different route).
  3. Selective-activation payloads defeat every publish-time scanner: SHA256-of-runtime-input trigger (Terraform), specific-price-value trigger (Go module). Detection moves to static artifacts (trigger constants, .sqlite3-named ZIPs, go run . spawn logic) and behavioral (a terraform/node process spawning go run detached).
  4. Fake package ecosystems as social engineering, the vanity-host façade exists to make malicious module paths look legitimate. A module hosted on an unknown vanity domain that refuses external publishing is a targeting artifact, not infrastructure.
  5. Go proxy trust in git commit dates is an integrity hole, backdated commits change what pkg.go.dev and the proxy believe about release order. Treat first-seen-at-proxy time, not commit date, as the honest clock.
  6. Permissioned shared wallets are the next evolution of on-chain C2, write-limited to one key-value method, disrupting the channel requires seizing the contract itself. Combine with this wiki's ChainScript read: C2 discovery keeps moving to infrastructure you cannot seize; the countermeasure is egress detection (JSON-RPC including Arbitrum Sepolia; api.slack.com from build agents).

Indicators of compromise

  • Packages/providers: gocommunity-io/dockerd, kreuzwenker/docker (Terraform, any version); gocommunity.io/orderedbtree, gogets.dev/btreex (Go modules, any version)
  • Files: import-resource.sqlite3 SHA-256 5f892a5424e88a21a3eb3d7f82ebf04d8ac31cdb19ada25153be4165df977d0f; btreex.sql SHA-256 ab01686d87565250fc4989faddb877d793667b07ec217a61cbd798f5695d62f5
  • Trigger hash / AES key: b9966e3762e9a0d5d263b8cb3cca07294f81af9714d40ddf4628cb85d74e8ad5
  • ECDH public key (npm+Go join): 302a300506032b656e032100bad013df6eec5d686f4cc8551e0a5c87a0135164bdd1dafb1c75141d1b526702
  • Contract: Arbitrum Sepolia 0xAD02b5cDE693529d3bdA0266299501ad0193036C (setCPubKey, serviceData1/2)
  • Slack: workspaces portfolio-devs.slack[.]com (channel frontend-devs), portfolio-testers.slack[.]com (channel qa-announcements), mediumstar.slack[.]com (historical)
  • Domains: gogets[.]dev, gocommunity[.]io (LIVE at Sep 22 check); GitHub accounts/orgs listed above
  • Hunt: go run . detached children of terraform/node processes; JSON-RPC to Arbitrum Sepolia RPC endpoints from dev/CI hosts; api.slack.com calls from build agents/CI; import-resource.sqlite3 whose first bytes are PK

Caveats and open questions

  • Aikido names no actor; Graphalgo remains a family-level label (ReversingLabs Feb 2026 origin). The npm↔Go identity join is Aikido's key/infra comparison, strong, but the operator behind both waves is unnamed.
  • The precise relationship between "Graphalgo," JFrog's Equation-of-Compromise campaign, and Checkmarx's indexed-btree operation is asserted by Aikido only as shared infrastructure/strings across "Graphalgo" reports; the on-wiki inventory overlap (modern-events public key) is this wiki's own join observation on Aikido's stated first-seen package, label it as such until the operators name contracts/keys in the same artifact.
  • ReversingLabs canonical Feb/April post URLs not retrievable at capture (blog listing returned no graphalgo href), backfill.
  • Whether the Terraform Registry removes the two providers, and whether the registry adds publish-time malware scanning for providers (Aikido notes it has no Terraform coverage itself yet), is the enforcement question to watch.
  • Victim notification: Aikido states it cannot identify victims from plaintext check-ins; the 18 hostnames are the actor's client census, not a target list.

October 2 follow-up: OSV finally carries the two Go modules, first MAL- records for the Go ecosystem in the malicious stream

MAL-2026-17453 (gocommunity.io/orderedbtree, first published ~Aug 11) and MAL-2026-17454 (gogets.dev/btreex, ~Sep 8) landed in OSV 2026-10-02T00:00Z (introduced: 0 = all versions, source reference = Aikido's post, modified ~07:01Z). The records repeat the core mechanics captured above (plaintext RAT vs ZIP-in-btreex.sql disguise, price-integer trigger on the btreex side, dual-channel Arbitrum Sepolia contract + Slack bot-token C2, 3-10 s polling). Durable reads: (1) this is the first appearance of Go-ecosystem packages in the OSV malicious-package stream, the ingestion path now covers the fake vanity ecosystems, which means module names from gogets[.]dev / gocommunity[.]io will generate advisories going forward; (2) the detection→advisory gap for these two was ~10-52 days, closing after this wiki's own Sep-22 capture; (3) ENFORCEMENT CONFIRMED Oct 2: the Terraform Registry has REMOVED both malicious providers. registry.terraform.io/v1/providers/kreuzwenker/docker → 404 and /v1/providers/gocommunity-io/dockerd → 404 at this wiki's Oct 2 ~07:30Z check (both listed HTTP 200 at the Sep 22 capture), the enforcement question on this page's watch list closes ~10 days after disclosure. (4) The Go side is NOT enforced: proxy.golang.org/gogets.dev/btreex/@v/list still serves v1.0.0-v1.2.3 and gocommunity.io/orderedbtree still resolves 200, the Go module proxy immutability model means advisories are the only consumer-side control for modules, no registry takedown exists to wait for. Monitor: whether the removal was HashiCorp/IBM proactive or disclosure-driven, whether the fake domains gogets[.]dev / gocommunity[.]io themselves go down, and whether the OSV Go coverage extends to the npm-side Graphalgo names that still lack records.

October 2 forty-fifth-sweep follow-up: one of the two fake vanity domains has lost its A record

At this wiki's Oct 2 ~09:30Z check, gocommunity[.]io returns NOERROR with no Answer via DoH (Google + Cloudflare agree), the Cloudflare SOA is still served (serial 2416140274, soa-email dns.cloudflare.com), meaning the zone exists but the A record was removed or the apex is no longer pointed at attacker hosting. gogets[.]dev remains fully live: resolves 38.110.228.92 and serves a polished landing page titled "GOGETS.DEV, Go Modules, Packages & Import Paths." Asymmetric takedown state: one fake Go ecosystem down at DNS level, its sibling still operational. The Terraform API removals HOLD (/v1/providers/kreuzwenker/docker and /v1/providers/gocommunity-io/dockerd both still 404; note the HTML docs path serves the SPA shell with HTTP 200 for any slug, always probe /v1/providers/..., never the docs URL). proxy.golang.org still serves every version of both modules (200 on both /@v/list), unchanged advisories-only posture on the Go side. Monitor: whether gocommunity[.]io's A record returns (operator re-point), whether gogets[.]dev follows, and whether 38.110.228.92 appears in other infrastructure.

October 2 forty-seventh-sweep follow-up: the surviving fake domain lost its TLS, gogets[.]dev now HTTP-only

At this wiki's Oct 2 ~13:25Z check, gogets[.]dev's A record is UNCHANGED (38.110.228.92, DoH) and HTTP on port 80 still serves the identical 16,679-byte "GOGETS.DEV, Go Modules, Packages & Import Paths" landing page, but port 443 no longer answers: three consecutive HTTPS fetches connection-timeout and a direct TCP probe to 38.110.228.92:443 also times out (port 80 on the same IP is open). The TLS front-end on the fake-registry host has been removed, broken, or firewalled between the forty-sixth-sweep check (~11:25Z, HTTPS still served 200) and this one, the second structural degradation of the Graphalgo fake-Go-ecosystem infrastructure in ~4 h (first: gocommunity[.]io's A-record removal, forty-fifth sweep; that record is still removed at this check, Cloudflare SOA serial 2416140274 unchanged). Enforcement shape is now: gocommunity[.]io dark at DNS, gogets[.]dev half-dark (HTTP-only), both Terraform providers still 404 via /v1/providers/, proxy.golang.org still serving every version of both modules. Operational implication for victims: go get over the default HTTPS path against gogets[.]dev now fails outright (Go's module fetch requires HTTPS or an explicit GOPRIVATE/GONOSUMDB workaround), which silently breaks any implant still resolving modules through the fake domain, consistent with either progressive takedown pressure on the hoster (38.110.228.92) or operator abandonment. Monitor: TLS return, A-record return on gocommunity[.]io, whole-host silence, and 38.110.228.92 sightings in other infrastructure.

Sources

  • Aikido Security Research (Oliver Smith), "Graphalgo campaign spreads to Terraform providers and Go Modules," Sep 22, 2026, https://www.aikido.dev/blog/graphalgo-terraform-go-modules (full text captured by this wiki)
  • This wiki live checks (Sep 22 ~19:15-19:30 UTC): gogets.dev HTTP 200, gocommunity.io HTTP 200, portfolio-devs/portfolio-testers.slack.com HTTP 403 (workspace pages, not contacted by malware), registry.terraform.io provider pages HTTP 200 (providers still listed), api.github.com/repos/canove/libsignal-node (unrelated cross-check)
  • Referenced upstream: ReversingLabs Feb 2026 Graphalgo post (URL backfill pending); SafeDep / Checkmarx / JFrog Graphalgo-adjacent coverage on-wiki