Blinder Tunnel
Actor: CL-STA-1178 (Unit 42 tracking), assessed high confidence Iranian state-aligned; previously linked by Elastic Security Labs to "The Shelby Strategy" and TTP-overlapping with Screening Serpens / Agent Serpens (low-confidence TTP overlap per Unit 42). Campaign: "Blinder Tunnel" (named after attacker infrastructure terms + the malware's tunneling capability), "Peaky Blinders"-themed branding, theme song embedded in malware. Targets: Iraqi critical infrastructure (telecom, aviation); staging observed as early as Nov 18, 2025, activation March 2026. Source: Unit 42, published October 6, 2026 10:00 UTC, full text captured by this wiki same-day. GitHub has taken down the identified malicious infrastructure. Unit 42 notes other vendors covered fragments (Elastic, CPX, Group IB, Sophos/Drokbk, Cybereason); this is the first report tying the cluster together.
Initial access: the recruitment three-act
- Fake career portal (credibility builder). Inno Setup installer "Dubai Airport Careers" presenting an offline, self-contained mock Dubai Airports IT careers site with recruiter-supplied login and a 10-question HR questionnaire. The questionnaire is a pure decoy, zero network activity, zero exfil, zero execution. Its only function is lowering the target's guard.
- Weaponized "coding challenge" (April 2026). Archive
DubaiAirport_Carrers_IT_Test.zip(misspelling in the archive name is the attacker's) with a personalized Readme.md ("Dear"), a C# Flight Management System project, and an intentional planted bug (a for-loop skipping the last element) to make the "fix it and run it" instruction credible to a real engineer. - Execution via the IDE itself. The
.csprojoverrides MSBuild'sGetFrameworkPathstarget, during Visual Studio's design-time build this executes the attacker's custom target the MOMENT the project loads, before any compile or run. It copies hidden binaries from the project's Resources folder to%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\and launches a sideloadedRuntimeBroker.exe. Hunt: anyGetFrameworkPaths(or other standard-target override) defined inside a .csproj, and any repo shipping binaries under Resources.
Chain = weaponized .csproj → AppDomainManager hijacking (an emerging evasion technique Unit 42 reports Iranian groups adopting; also used to disable ETW) → DLL sideloading.
Tool set (all .NET, all Obfuscar-obfuscated with runtime string decryption + non-printable Unicode identifiers)
| Component | File | Role |
|---|---|---|
| ShelbyLoader V2 | RuntimeBroker.dll |
Loader/persistence/fingerprint + C2 registrar |
| PsProxy.dll | PsProxy.dll |
Stateless in-memory PowerShell engine, hooks System.Management.Automation.dll, custom runspace, never spawns powershell.exe, no disk scripts |
| ShelbyC2 V2 | RuntimeBrokerApi.dll (AES-CBC file, decrypted at runtime) |
Primary RAT; stages Blackwood |
| Blackwood | Blackwood.dll sideloaded via Microsoft-signed vshost32.exe + .config |
Zero-disk Chisel tunneling wrapper, reflective-loads an 8.4 MB AES-256-CBC-encrypted Blackwood.Cheese.xml manifest resource; reverse SOCKS proxy R:0.0.0.0:10999:socks |
ShelbyLoader V2 mechanics: persistence = registry Run key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicrosoftRuntime (120-s check, four logged states reported to C2: already persisted / newly persisted / key not found / executable not found); 63-s beacon loop authenticating with a hard-coded GitHub PAT against repo peakyblinders-tm/myLic: uploads Base64 machine fingerprint to /{machineId}/Lic.txt, polls /{machineId}/Inf.txt for Base64 commands, acknowledges by uploading the SHA-256 of the file to clear it; HTTP 403 (rate limit) → one-hour sleep. machineId = first 16 lowercase-hex chars of SHA-256("Peaky Blinders 2.1" + machine fingerprint). Anti-analysis: WMI/process/registry/file VM markers, CPU/RAM/disk checks, must be spawned by explorer.exe.
ShelbyC2 V2 decryption key = full SHA-256 of the license string fetched live from the Lic.txt C2 path (IV = first 16 bytes of that hash), the RAT binary on disk is inert without the live GitHub key.
Blackwood config crypto: if the loader's extension is .dll, Blackwood.dll.conf is Base64 + RC4 with hardcoded key My name is Blackwood !; renaming the extension makes the loader read it as plaintext and fail (anti-analysis tripwire). Chisel payload key = SHA-256 of hardcoded passphrase y0Da+QH#pwSg38E?=8R;71-jQu8Tqq.
GitHub Issues C2 fallback (the durable mechanic): if the PAT is revoked or primary channel returns 401, a dead-drop resolver queries the GitHub Issues Search API for issues created that day (yyyymmdd query + repo + is:issue filter), fetches comment bodies, extracts ciphertext between <!-- --> HTML comment markers, AES-256-CBC-decrypts with key = MD5(date-string + machineId), IV = MD5-of-key iterated 5×, then regex-updates its own config: Owner=(\w.+) / LicRepo=(\w.+) / LicToken=(\w.+). Operators also planted encrypted fallback C2 data in comments of benign unrelated GitHub issues, undecryptable without the victim's machineId. This is the Sophos-documented Drokbk dead-drop pattern hardened with per-victim keys.
Attribution artifacts (Unit 42)
- Blackwood C2 IP hosted on Iranian ISP TOSE'EH ERTEBATAT NOVIN ARIA; secondary Hetzner tunneling server resolves to Persian-language domains likely bought via an Iranian reseller.
- Attacker-hosted
.mp3in the public GitHub repo retained metadata pointing to MusicDel.ir (Iranian music platform). - Victimology (Iraqi critical infrastructure, Israeli entity, UAE lure) + TTP convergence (aviation lures, AppDomainManager hijacking resembling Screening Serpens, GitHub dead-drop resolvers, in-memory .NET PowerShell wrappers resembling Agent Serpens).
Operational-testing artifacts (how they were burned)
- Nov 18, 2025: dead-drop C2 validated via a public GitHub issue comment before campaign activation.
- Apr 24, 2026: issue titled
asasasinpeakyblinders-tmused as a mock "New device Found / Login detected" telemetry dashboard, including fabricated IP138.256.21.23(invalid octet, non-routable by design) tagged countryIQ. - May-Jun 2026: the same server
65.109.214.145carried BOTH the Blackwood backend (port 8080) AND a credential-harvesting phishing site against an Israeli entity, Google Drive typosquats (cloud.g-drive.cam,googeldrive.cam,drivegoogel.cam,googelmeet.online,meetonline.cam) serving a fake Drive error page luringWarUnPublishedDocuments.zipdownload then a fake Google login. Earlier staging onasdfafadafg.online→38.180.136.127. Google confirmed no Drive infrastructure involved; Safe Browsing blocks the domains.
Indicators (from Unit 42's published set)
SHA-256:
- DubaiAirport_Carrers_IT_Test.zip 6e7d9b33f1e72ea1ede71373a604ecdb060dab7d42055179c1eede9ecd1fd239
- FlightManager.csproj f5b12772db6817f7a765a6fe7565fd3d4f87edc28e42fe3ec0244a372a410fc9
- RuntimeBroker.dll (ShelbyLoader V2) 53f35e49eb9b271fd8cbcd3daacb525328dbf159a03dbd1c7adebe0363daa402
- PsProxy.dll 3fd810a3aa0039993393741b32287c367a9a5037a41e826906440887cdd3ed13
- Blackwood.dll 76273382e4252c1f60a2251141e108942494409c759358320735891762c0682e
- Blackwood.dll.conf (→ 91.107.156.29) d3561bd4aad003dc3e08157b0891860bb496b80cd6e44901692e08ab1d4e8260
- Blackwood archive → 65.109.214.145: f5ba1645694c62f527ed6ceda8c68a5c3dd92b4032439167e8e937e72803b4bd
- Blackwood archive → 87.248.129.239: 7cc571aca6d8715d9aaad3d83e1bcd30467565d583db1dfe73697c5d00a1f875
IPs: 91.107.156.29, 87.248.129.239, 65.109.214.145, 38.180.136.127.
Domains: cloud.g-drive.cam, googeldrive.cam, drivegoogel.cam, googelmeet.online, meetonline.cam, asdfafadafg.online.
Registry: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicrosoftRuntime; payload dir %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\.
GitHub accounts (taken down): peakyblinders-tm (repos myLic, pubs), GreenBeret0.
Durable reads for this wiki's audience
- The IDE build pipeline is an execution path. A
.csprojis code. Design-time build targets (GetFrameworkPathsand siblings) run with the developer's full privileges the moment a project opens, no build, no run, no script consent prompt. Hunt: standard MSBuild target names defined inside project files; binaries under projectResources/;RuntimeBrokersunder%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\(the attacker chose a folder that looks native). - GitHub-API C2 with Issues dead-drop is the hardest C2 to block, the traffic is TLS to api.github.com indistinguishable from developer traffic, tasking lives in repo file contents, and rotation lives in HTML comments on public issues, including innocent third-party issues. Blocking is per-account/report, not per-domain. Detection is behavioral: unusual GET volume to
/repos/*/contents/*+/search/issuesfrom non-development processes (a .NET process that isn't git/gh polling the search API every 63 s is the tell). - Per-victim-keyed dead-drops defeat sweep-and-patrol hunting. The planted comments are ciphertext without the victim's machineId, defenders cannot IoC the tasking itself, only the query grammar (
yyyymmdd+is:issuesearch patterns) and account reputation. - Recruitment lures now stage credibility as a separate artifact. The zero-network decoy portal defeats sandbox triage (it IS clean) and is a deliberate trust-investment device; the malicious step is the SECOND delivery days later. Corporate recruiting-awareness programs keyed on "malicious attachment" miss this: the first artifact never is.
- OpSec, not tech, attributed them: theme-song MP3 metadata, an Iranian ISP on one C2 IP, QWERTY-smash test issues, and reusing one server for tunneling AND phishing. Infrastructure hygiene failures still collapse "living off the cloud" ops.
- This is the developer-estate-targeting class this wiki tracks from the registry side (see SubQuery, abstract-claude, virgil-cli entries) approached from the APT side: the same laptops, IDEs, GitHub identities, cloud creds, are the target, via code-repo intrusion here instead of package installation.
Related pages
- SubQuery release-pipeline compromise, same developer/GitHub estate, registry-side technique, unrelated actor
- algamil7x npm DNS-exfil recon cluster, this wiki's standing OSV watch stream carrying the eighty-first-sweep verification of this publication
- ai-augmented adversary operations, actor-tooling context
Sources: Unit 42 "Blinder Tunnel Campaign Targets Iraqi Infrastructure" (October 6, 2026, full text captured by this wiki same-day, including appendices A-C and the published IOC set); Elastic "The Shelby Strategy", CPX Blackwood analysis, Sophos Drokbk, ClearSky Iranian Dream Job campaign, all cited via the Unit 42 report. Public sources only.