ViteVenom / ChainVeil npm campaign
Summary
Checkmarx Zero reported ViteVenom, a cluster of seven malicious scoped npm packages impersonating Vite ecosystem tooling. The nine malicious versions were published from approximately June 29 through July 3, 2026 and accumulated 2,420 downloads before removal.
ViteVenom is linked with high confidence to the previously reported ChainVeil campaign and actor label SuccessKey through shared Tier-2 blockchain wallets, XOR keys, loader structure, and the same final 77 KB remote-access trojan. Checkmarx notes that a shared malware-as-a-service backend cannot be ruled out, so the operator relationship should not be treated as identity-level attribution.
Tags
- ops
- operations
- ViteVenom
- ChainVeil
- SuccessKey
- npm
- npm supply-chain
- malicious packages
- scoped package impersonation
- Vite
- Vitest
- import-time execution
- blockchain C2
- Tron
- Aptos
- Binance Smart Chain
- remote access trojan
- developer targeting
- credential theft
- Checkmarx
Affected packages
| Package | Malicious version(s) |
|---|---|
@uw010010/vite-tree |
3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.6.1 |
@vite-tab/tab |
3.15.10 |
@vite-ln/build-ts |
5.15.10 |
@vite-mcp/vite-type |
6.44.1 |
@vite-pro/vite-ui |
2.5.10 |
@vitets/vite-ts |
1.5.10 |
@vite-ts/vite-ui |
6.44.1 |
The fake scopes imitate the legitimate @vitejs/* namespace and, in the case of @vitets, differ by one character from the legitimate @vitest scope. @uw010010/vite-tree also published clean versions 3.4.1 and 8.1.0; checking only the latest release can therefore miss exposure to an older malicious version.
Execution and infrastructure
- All seven packages contain the malicious entry point
bin/vite.js, with only theglobal.i='*5-*'campaign marker varying. - Execution occurs when the package is imported, not through an install script. The loader hides sensitive strings behind array-index lookups and uses a 30-second anti-replay guard.
- The first path resolves an encrypted payload through Tron, falls back to Aptos, follows the resulting Binance Smart Chain transaction pointer, XOR-decrypts the transaction data, and evaluates it in the main Node.js process.
- A second path launches a detached, hidden
node -echild and can retrieve the RAT directly from198.105.127[.]210at/$/boot. - The shared Tier-2 wallets and cryptographic material match ChainVeil. The campaign-specific Tier-1 wallets and C2 assignment differ, consistent with compartmentalized delivery tracks.
- Checkmarx reports the packages were removed on July 3, but the blockchain pointers and backend infrastructure remained operational at publication time.
Durable pivots
- ViteVenom C2:
198.105.127[.]210on ports 80 and 443. - Related ChainVeil infrastructure:
166.88.54[.]158:443and23.27.202[.]27:443/27017. - Tier-1 Tron wallets:
TCqf6ZkaQD84vYsC2cuu1jRwB6JveTaRrFandTFMryB9m6d4kBMRjEVyFRbqKSV1cV2NcpH. - Shared Tier-2 Tron wallet:
TA48dct6rFW8BXsiLAtjFaVFoSuryMjD3v. - Shared Tier-2 Aptos account:
0x533b2dbcaeff19cd1f799234a27b578d713d8fcaa341b7501e4526106483e0b1. - BSC transactions:
0x5ab85abe6c67adb94322e5700a36915c38d1db1e604920da8aa4fcb530408af0and0xbcc976e1c8f3dfd93e146ff424836a9635ab36d991a54675635d7fdf30e60616. - Loader strings:
api.trongrid.io,fullnode.mainnet.aptoslabs.com,bsc-dataseed.binance.org,eth_getTransactionByHash, and the?.?BSC payload delimiter.
Defender guidance
- Search SBOMs, lockfiles, package-manager caches, build artifacts, and developer workstations for the exact package/version pairs; do not rely on current npm state or the latest package version.
- Hunt
node_modules/**/bin/vite.jsforglobal.i, the blockchain API strings, shared wallet addresses, or the reported XOR-key material. Review detachednode -echildren and orphaned Node.js processes. - Investigate network access to the reported C2 addresses and unusual developer-workstation calls to Tron, Aptos, or BSC RPC APIs immediately after Node.js package imports.
- Inspect
.bashrc,.zshrc, and.profilefor RAT persistence hidden after long whitespace padding, and search for unexpectedmachineIdfiles in hidden directories. - If execution is plausible, isolate affected developer and CI systems, preserve package and process evidence, then rotate npm, source-control, SSH, cloud, API, wallet, and CI credentials available to the process. Rebuild from known-clean dependencies and invalidate caches.
- Treat the shared blockchain and loader signatures as campaign-family detections: package names and first-tier wallets are disposable, while the backend has supported multiple delivery clusters.
September 22 follow-up (this wiki): npm security-holder-ed the ENTIRE seven-package fleet, five names holder-created two months after their own advisories
State change recorded by direct registry checks (~01:25-01:40 UTC, Sep 22, 2026): all seven ViteVenom names now serve latest = 0.0.1-security, publisher npm@npmjs.com, repository: npm/security-holder, the same registry-neutralization signature this wiki documented for the mathmain trio on the evening of Sep 21. Five of the seven holders were created 2026-09-21 23:12-23:16 UTC, and their OSV records re-advised the SAME hour with fresh GHSA mirrors:
| Package | Original OSV (Jun-Jul) | New GHSA mirror (Sep 21 UTC) | Holder created (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|
@vite-ts/vite-ui |
MAL-2026-10527 (Jul 14) |
GHSA-jm6h-xxm2-2mr3 23:12:45 |
23:12:05 |
@vite-mcp/vite-type |
MAL-2026-10525 (Jul 14) |
GHSA-mqf9-3wx8-45cj 23:13:22 |
23:12:58 |
@vite-pro/vite-ui |
MAL-2026-10526 (Jul 14) |
GHSA-phpx-wpr2-26pv 23:14:42 |
23:14:20 |
@vite-tab/tabui |
MAL-2026-16371 (NEW, 23:16:23) |
GHSA-q5h9-3mvh-45cf 23:16:23 |
23:15:50 |
@vite-tab/tab |
MAL-2026-6988 (Jul 8) |
GHSA-74pv-97c8-9hfp 23:16:23 |
23:16:40 |
@vitets/vite-ts |
MAL-2026-10528 (Jul 14) |
GHSA-733v-wc48-f65r 23:17:00 |
23:16:38 |
@uw010010/vite-tree |
MAL-2026-10470 (holder since Aug 13) |
, | 2026-08-13 |
@vite-ln/build-ts |
holder since Jul 8 | , | 2026-07-08 |
Two durable facts from the time blocks (method on-wiki, the npm time document survives removal):
- A campaign's advisory backlog can sit un-neutralized for ~2.5 months and then close in four minutes.
@vite-mcp/vite-typewas OSV-advised July 14 and holder-created September 21, a 69-day gap during which Checkmarx's own removal claim (packages "removed on July 3") was only half-true: versions purged, name left resquattable. The Sep 21 23:12-23:16 UTC burst (six holder creations + six fresh GHSA publishes inside five minutes, interleaved) is a batch registry sweep, not case-by-case triage. Registry hygiene arrives as wavefronts; thetimeblock is the audit trail of when a name stopped being a squat target. @vite-tab/tabuiis a NAME THIS WIKI'S CHECKS NEVER SAW BEFORE,tabuiis not in Checkmarx's seven-package list, the OSV record (MAL-2026-16371, published 23:16:23 UTC) is brand-new, and the name had zero prior versions. Either the campaign published an eighth package after Checkmarx's July report (atimeblock that would prove it is now gone with the versions, the deletion erased its own exposure record), or npm/GitHub acted on a fresh unreported sighting. Either way: the ViteVenom namespace is still a live operator interest as of Sep 21 night, two months after Checkmarx called it closed. Monitor for further@vite-*-shaped first-publications.
Publisher detail: the two surviving pre-holder versions of @vite-tab/tab (3.15.10 Jun 30, 5.7.0 Jul 7, the second a post-Checkmarx-report republish the July writeup never listed) were published by shupengwei13@gmail.com, first on-wiki publisher email for this campaign; useful account-level pivot for sibling-name searches.
Defender read: holder-ification is namespace protection, not detection, nothing in this sweep would have caught a ViteVenom package shipping today. The durable checks remain the July ones (import-time execution in bin/, blockchain-RPC hostnames in dependency-less "tools", the global.i='*5-*' marker). What changed is only that these seven specific names can no longer be re-armed.
Related pages
- PolinRider cross-ecosystem supply-chain campaign
- Astro config blockchain C2 PR injection
- npm install explicit-trust controls