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ViteVenom / ChainVeil npm campaign

Summary

Checkmarx Zero reported ViteVenom, a cluster of seven malicious scoped npm packages impersonating Vite ecosystem tooling. The nine malicious versions were published from approximately June 29 through July 3, 2026 and accumulated 2,420 downloads before removal.

ViteVenom is linked with high confidence to the previously reported ChainVeil campaign and actor label SuccessKey through shared Tier-2 blockchain wallets, XOR keys, loader structure, and the same final 77 KB remote-access trojan. Checkmarx notes that a shared malware-as-a-service backend cannot be ruled out, so the operator relationship should not be treated as identity-level attribution.

Tags

Affected packages

Package Malicious version(s)
@uw010010/vite-tree 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.6.1
@vite-tab/tab 3.15.10
@vite-ln/build-ts 5.15.10
@vite-mcp/vite-type 6.44.1
@vite-pro/vite-ui 2.5.10
@vitets/vite-ts 1.5.10
@vite-ts/vite-ui 6.44.1

The fake scopes imitate the legitimate @vitejs/* namespace and, in the case of @vitets, differ by one character from the legitimate @vitest scope. @uw010010/vite-tree also published clean versions 3.4.1 and 8.1.0; checking only the latest release can therefore miss exposure to an older malicious version.

Execution and infrastructure

  • All seven packages contain the malicious entry point bin/vite.js, with only the global.i='*5-*' campaign marker varying.
  • Execution occurs when the package is imported, not through an install script. The loader hides sensitive strings behind array-index lookups and uses a 30-second anti-replay guard.
  • The first path resolves an encrypted payload through Tron, falls back to Aptos, follows the resulting Binance Smart Chain transaction pointer, XOR-decrypts the transaction data, and evaluates it in the main Node.js process.
  • A second path launches a detached, hidden node -e child and can retrieve the RAT directly from 198.105.127[.]210 at /$/boot.
  • The shared Tier-2 wallets and cryptographic material match ChainVeil. The campaign-specific Tier-1 wallets and C2 assignment differ, consistent with compartmentalized delivery tracks.
  • Checkmarx reports the packages were removed on July 3, but the blockchain pointers and backend infrastructure remained operational at publication time.

Durable pivots

  • ViteVenom C2: 198.105.127[.]210 on ports 80 and 443.
  • Related ChainVeil infrastructure: 166.88.54[.]158:443 and 23.27.202[.]27:443/27017.
  • Tier-1 Tron wallets: TCqf6ZkaQD84vYsC2cuu1jRwB6JveTaRrF and TFMryB9m6d4kBMRjEVyFRbqKSV1cV2NcpH.
  • Shared Tier-2 Tron wallet: TA48dct6rFW8BXsiLAtjFaVFoSuryMjD3v.
  • Shared Tier-2 Aptos account: 0x533b2dbcaeff19cd1f799234a27b578d713d8fcaa341b7501e4526106483e0b1.
  • BSC transactions: 0x5ab85abe6c67adb94322e5700a36915c38d1db1e604920da8aa4fcb530408af0 and 0xbcc976e1c8f3dfd93e146ff424836a9635ab36d991a54675635d7fdf30e60616.
  • Loader strings: api.trongrid.io, fullnode.mainnet.aptoslabs.com, bsc-dataseed.binance.org, eth_getTransactionByHash, and the ?.? BSC payload delimiter.

Defender guidance

  • Search SBOMs, lockfiles, package-manager caches, build artifacts, and developer workstations for the exact package/version pairs; do not rely on current npm state or the latest package version.
  • Hunt node_modules/**/bin/vite.js for global.i, the blockchain API strings, shared wallet addresses, or the reported XOR-key material. Review detached node -e children and orphaned Node.js processes.
  • Investigate network access to the reported C2 addresses and unusual developer-workstation calls to Tron, Aptos, or BSC RPC APIs immediately after Node.js package imports.
  • Inspect .bashrc, .zshrc, and .profile for RAT persistence hidden after long whitespace padding, and search for unexpected machineId files in hidden directories.
  • If execution is plausible, isolate affected developer and CI systems, preserve package and process evidence, then rotate npm, source-control, SSH, cloud, API, wallet, and CI credentials available to the process. Rebuild from known-clean dependencies and invalidate caches.
  • Treat the shared blockchain and loader signatures as campaign-family detections: package names and first-tier wallets are disposable, while the backend has supported multiple delivery clusters.

September 22 follow-up (this wiki): npm security-holder-ed the ENTIRE seven-package fleet, five names holder-created two months after their own advisories

State change recorded by direct registry checks (~01:25-01:40 UTC, Sep 22, 2026): all seven ViteVenom names now serve latest = 0.0.1-security, publisher npm@npmjs.com, repository: npm/security-holder, the same registry-neutralization signature this wiki documented for the mathmain trio on the evening of Sep 21. Five of the seven holders were created 2026-09-21 23:12-23:16 UTC, and their OSV records re-advised the SAME hour with fresh GHSA mirrors:

Package Original OSV (Jun-Jul) New GHSA mirror (Sep 21 UTC) Holder created (UTC)
@vite-ts/vite-ui MAL-2026-10527 (Jul 14) GHSA-jm6h-xxm2-2mr3 23:12:45 23:12:05
@vite-mcp/vite-type MAL-2026-10525 (Jul 14) GHSA-mqf9-3wx8-45cj 23:13:22 23:12:58
@vite-pro/vite-ui MAL-2026-10526 (Jul 14) GHSA-phpx-wpr2-26pv 23:14:42 23:14:20
@vite-tab/tabui MAL-2026-16371 (NEW, 23:16:23) GHSA-q5h9-3mvh-45cf 23:16:23 23:15:50
@vite-tab/tab MAL-2026-6988 (Jul 8) GHSA-74pv-97c8-9hfp 23:16:23 23:16:40
@vitets/vite-ts MAL-2026-10528 (Jul 14) GHSA-733v-wc48-f65r 23:17:00 23:16:38
@uw010010/vite-tree MAL-2026-10470 (holder since Aug 13) , 2026-08-13
@vite-ln/build-ts holder since Jul 8 , 2026-07-08

Two durable facts from the time blocks (method on-wiki, the npm time document survives removal):

  1. A campaign's advisory backlog can sit un-neutralized for ~2.5 months and then close in four minutes. @vite-mcp/vite-type was OSV-advised July 14 and holder-created September 21, a 69-day gap during which Checkmarx's own removal claim (packages "removed on July 3") was only half-true: versions purged, name left resquattable. The Sep 21 23:12-23:16 UTC burst (six holder creations + six fresh GHSA publishes inside five minutes, interleaved) is a batch registry sweep, not case-by-case triage. Registry hygiene arrives as wavefronts; the time block is the audit trail of when a name stopped being a squat target.
  2. @vite-tab/tabui is a NAME THIS WIKI'S CHECKS NEVER SAW BEFORE, tabui is not in Checkmarx's seven-package list, the OSV record (MAL-2026-16371, published 23:16:23 UTC) is brand-new, and the name had zero prior versions. Either the campaign published an eighth package after Checkmarx's July report (a time block that would prove it is now gone with the versions, the deletion erased its own exposure record), or npm/GitHub acted on a fresh unreported sighting. Either way: the ViteVenom namespace is still a live operator interest as of Sep 21 night, two months after Checkmarx called it closed. Monitor for further @vite-*-shaped first-publications.

Publisher detail: the two surviving pre-holder versions of @vite-tab/tab (3.15.10 Jun 30, 5.7.0 Jul 7, the second a post-Checkmarx-report republish the July writeup never listed) were published by shupengwei13@gmail.com, first on-wiki publisher email for this campaign; useful account-level pivot for sibling-name searches.

Defender read: holder-ification is namespace protection, not detection, nothing in this sweep would have caught a ViteVenom package shipping today. The durable checks remain the July ones (import-time execution in bin/, blockchain-RPC hostnames in dependency-less "tools", the global.i='*5-*' marker). What changed is only that these seven specific names can no longer be re-armed.

Sources