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WeaselBiscuit

Summary

OpenSourceMalware (Paul McCarty / "6mile" et al., published September 17, 2026; The Hacker News coverage September 18) disclosed WeaselBiscuit, a previously undocumented JavaScript infostealer delivered through a cluster of npm packages (11 packages in the original post, 16 names across the reporting, THN's count). The implant auto-runs on plain import (no install scripts needed), pulls its real payload from an Npoint dead-drop URL, executes it in memory, and steals Chrome extension storage on Windows, macOS, and Linux, the store where wallet extensions keep signing state, plus clipboard and Windows keystrokes on operator command. The team suspects DPRK origin but labels it an analytic hypothesis, not confirmed attribution: the code shows "meaningful overlap" with Contagious Interview tooling (BeaverTail and OtterCookie) but no operator infrastructure, victimology, campaign metadata, or signing material sufficient for conclusive attribution. The name is a size joke: a weasel is smaller than an otter, and biscuits are less fancy than cookies.

Tags

What it is

The recovered client is deliberately minimal versus its "big siblings": an npm-borne Node.js loader, Npoint-resolved payload and C2 configuration, Chrome extension-storage theft, operator-commanded clipboard capture and Windows keylogging, and a small plain-HTTP polling control plane. Explicitly absent (per OpenSourceMalware): wallet-draining code and hardcoded wallet-extension ID lists, Chrome password decryptors, seed-phrase regex sweeps, the InvisibleFerret Python second stage, screenshot modules, Socket.IO/WebSocket/remote-shell capability, persistence beyond a detached Node process and a .pid file, and server-delivered follow-on payloads. That absence could mean an early-stage build, a deliberately reduced module, or a different actor copying familiar tradecraft, the report preserves all three readings.

The financially relevant capability is the extension-storage theft even without wallet-draining logic: the implant uploads every readable, nonempty file under each extension's Local Extension Settings directory, a raw LevelDB key/value store, wholesale, which can expose wallet-extension state or other extension-held secrets.

Confirmed infection chain (from the post)

  1. An application imports process-tailwind@1.1.99.
  2. index.js automatically calls initialize().
  3. init.js starts a detached background node loader.js process and stores its PID in <package-directory>/.pid.
  4. loader.js retrieves JSON from https://api.npoint.io/24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f, Base64-decodes the code field, and executes it via new Function (never touching disk). The response matched the recovered second-stage artifact exactly, SHA-256 7b15605f23b131b3eeea57e031ae7cb32fc4b78c7bbb2025aa7a561ea5ae5159.
  5. The second stage fetches its C2 configuration from a second Npoint URL https://api.npoint.io/37c0a0c68bf7a94ed731, which resolves to 103.170.217[.]184:8787 (defanged here).
  6. Beaconing profiles the host (hostname, user, OS, CPU/RAM, local + public IP, geolocation) and tags every install with a numeric campaign ID (10, 12, 44, 79, 95, 99) for server-side victim sorting, the same numeric-ID pattern reflected in the @biz44/idNN-client package names.

Package cluster

@biz44/id10-client, @biz44/id12-client, @biz44/id44-client, @biz44/id79-client, @biz44/id95-client, @biz44/id99-client, @biz44/process-runtime-utils, @biz44/runtime-utils, @railone/image-utils, @vibecheck-polid/process-runtime-utils, engin1 (1.3.99), id79-client, laycot (1.3.10), process-lhpm, process-mite, process-tailwind (1.1.99). First-seen timestamps run Sep 12-16, 2026 for the dated entries.

Live registry check (September 19, 2026, this wiki): the @biz44/* scoped packages, id79-client, process-lhpm, process-mite, and process-tailwind are unpublished/removed from npm; engin1 (1.3.99) and laycot remain present-but-unpublished shells; @railone/image-utils and @vibecheck-polid/process-runtime-utils no longer resolve. OpenSourceMalware's post itself noted engin1@1.3.99 and laycot@1.3.10 were still downloadable at publication. Treat the cluster as largely cleaned but verify lockfiles, the loader fires at import time, so any project that resolved one of these names in a Sep 12-17 window should be treated as exposed.

Why it matters (durable reads)

  1. Import-time execution defeats install-script controls. Nothing in the chain uses preinstall/postinstall hooks, npm ≥ 12's install-script approval gates and ecosystem-scan-on-install heuristics aimed at lifecycle scripts don't see a loader that fires on ordinary import. Detection should key on package code reaching child_process/detached process spawn + fetching api.npoint.io.
  2. Npoint dead drops are recurring DPRK-adjacent tradecraft, NVISO flagged Npoint.io JSON storage use in Contagious Interview context in November 2025. Two-URL architecture (payload + config) means the visible api.npoint.io/<id> references in package code are themselves durable hunting pivots even after the JSON behind them rotates.
  3. Chrome extension storage as a theft target is the wallet-custody attack surface shifting left. Where wallet-extension private state lives (LevelDB Local Extension Settings), wholesale-directory upload is functionally wallet exposure without any wallet-specific code, the "stripped down" framing undersells impact.
  4. The stripped-down fork pattern lowers the floor for copycats. A simplified, self-contained derivative of BeaverTail/OtterCookie with campaign-ID segmentation is a reusable template; expect imitators that keep the Npoint + campaign-ID shape and rotate everything else.
  5. Preserve the attribution caveat. "Suspected DPRK / analytic hypothesis" is OpenSourceMalware's own language. No infrastructure, victimology, or signing evidence yet ties the cluster to a named DPRK unit; treat the 103.170.217[.]184 C2 and the two Npoint IDs as monitoring targets, not attribution artifacts.

October 13 one-hundred-and-sixteenth sweep live re-check: the npoint drop is STILL LIVE and its content has DRIFTED, dead campaigns' config objects are editable, re-read them

Re-read of the second-stage config drop https://api.npoint.io/37c0a0c68bf7a94ed731 at ≈05:4x UTC, ≈26 days after the campaign wave: 200 / 104 B, still serving. The body is NO LONGER what the September chain recorded: current content is {"api_key":"your-api-key-here","server_url":"http://103.170.217[.]184:7777","config_refresh_interval":300}, the server_url port is 7777, while this page's infection-chain step 5 records the C2 as 103.170.217[.]184:8787. Same-host TCP at check: :8787 OPEN (HTTP root answers 404 = listener present, path-gated) and :7777 CLOSED/refused. npoint exposes no last-modified, so the edit time is unmeasurable from outside; two honest readings stand, (a) the operator edited the drop after the September capture and :7777 is a relocated listener currently dark, or (b) the post's :8787 attribution came from observed beacon traffic rather than the drop field, and the field always said 7777. Either way the durable reads are: a live api.npoint.io/<id> read is CURRENT operator configuration, never a historical fossil, diff the body each re-check; and the hunt key for this family is now the HOST on BOTH ports (103.170.217[.]184:8787 open + :7777 referenced-by-config). First-stage drop 24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f re-read same check: 200 / 64,623 B unchanged (27th ledger pass; note the same object is shared with the ltidisafe-page rail watch, shared drop infrastructure across two campaign families is already on-wiki, this re-confirms it survives its nominal campaign's death).

119th-sweep follow-up (~11:2x-12:0x UTC Oct 13): BOTH npoint drops (37c0a0c68bf7a94ed731 and first-stage 24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f) now read 404/0 B, but so does EVERY npoint config token the ledger carries AND known-legit public ids, while fabricated controls 404 identically and the platform's own routes stay live = a SERVICE-LEVEL route blackout, not a campaign-side takedown; drop state is UNKNOWN, not closed, re-probe on route recovery (full write-up → 119th stream section).

Hunt guidance

  • Registry/lockfile audit for the 16 names above, all versions, resolved Sep 12-17, 2026 (audit lockfiles, not "latest").
  • EDR/proxy: node spawning detached child processes from node_modules package directories; any egress to api.npoint.io; beaconing to 103.170.217[.]184:8787 and :7777 (the live Oct 13 drop body names 7777; 8787 observed open at the Oct 13 re-check, see config-drift section).
  • File artifacts: .pid files inside package directories; loader.js/init.js alongside ordinary library code.
  • YARA/supply-chain signal: new Function over Base64-decoded JSON fetch responses; Local Extension Settings path traversal in Node code.
  • Second-stage SHA-256: 7b15605f23b131b3eeea57e031ae7cb32fc4b78c7bbb2025aa7a561ea5ae5159.

Sources