orderly-plugin-liquidity-heatmap, a DEX-plugin costume whose postinstall profiles GitHub Actions…
TL;DR: npm package orderly-plugin-liquidity-heatmap (publisher dumtban, DEX "liquidity heatmap" costume) iterated 0.0.0-stage → 1.0.6 in a 3-hour window (13:11-16:05 UTC Oct 11) while its postinstall (scripts/setup.js) ran a full GitHub-Actions-runner reconnaissance battery: CI-gated snapshot of hostname/user/repo/workflow/GITHUB_* key inventory, hasGithubToken/tokenLen, OIDC mint probe through ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL, live egress probes to four GitHub endpoints, tool-version inventory, then writes the snapshot INTO the victim's repository via the workflow's own GITHUB_TOKEN (PUT /repos/{repo}/contents/) and force-pushes a heatmap-setup-<ts> git tag impersonating github-actions[bot] (email 41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com). The self-commentary frames every step as a proof-of-execution instrument ("proves both script execution and token reachability from a package install script", "unconditional trace … before any branching", pushing through GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY "so it is visible via the public API even though yarn 1 swallows dependency-script stdout"), the author is demonstrating supply-chain reach, not hiding it. Zero registry action, zero OSV, zero GHSA; curated ossf/malicious-packages PR #1621 (opened 15:22:17Z Oct 11) is the only public record and is still OPEN. Its README cites a companion repo hashimubadiya14-rgb/asset-tracker-q4vw, same-persona test-harness grammar as the heatmap-setup-* tags it mints.
Artifact forensics (this wiki tarball pulls, no execution)
0.0.0-stage2026-10-11T13:11:40.439Z, then1.0.013:12:56Z (76 s staging grammar),1.0.113:53:05Z,1.0.214:05:49Z,1.0.314:20:01Z,1.0.414:47:15Z,1.0.616:05:29.590Z (1.0.5absent, version churn mid-iteration). Maintainer: single accountdumtban.latest = 1.0.6LIVE at this check, installable, tarball200.- Tarball (1.0.6, sha256
36c24c45…, 5 files):package.jsondeclaresscripts.postinstall: node ./scripts/setup.js;dist/index.js+README.mdcarry the costume (an "Orderly DEX liquidity heatmap plugin" with anOrderlyAppProviderregistration snippet); the substance isscripts/setup.js. - The runner-profile snapshot (CI-gated: only fires with
CI+GITHUB_WORKSPACEset):hostname,os.type/release,userInfo().username,cwd,GITHUB_REPOSITORY,GITHUB_WORKFLOW,RUNNER_ENV,ImageOS, the SORTED LIST of everyGITHUB_*/ACTIONS_*/RUNNER_*environment KEY (names, not values),hasGithubToken+tokenLen,ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL+ presence of the request token,npm config get registryviaexecSync, curl status probes againstregistry.npmjs.org/api.github.com/github.com/objects.githubusercontent.com, and versions of git/node/npm/yarn/python3/docker/gh. - OIDC mint probe: if
ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN+_URLare present itcurls the runner's OIDC endpoint with&audience=api.github.comand records only the HTTP status (oidcMintProbe: "attempted"), self-commented as "audience probe only, token content is NOT read or transmitted, we only record whether minting succeeds". The probe still CONSUMES a real mint against the victim repo's identity, and it maps which federated-identity rails the runner exposes. - Local trace: appends
heatmap-exec-trace.logto the temp dir (timestamp, pid, node version, cwd, CI/GITHUB flags) = an on-disk execution marker; on CI it also appends toGITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY. - The write-back (the durable harm):
PUT https://api.github.com/repos/{GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/contents/heatmap-setup-report.jsonwithAuthorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}, commits the runner snapshot to the victim's default branch with messagechore: liquidity-heatmap setup cache refresh [skip ci], reusing the fileshafor overwrite. This turns any workflow that installs the package into a repo-writer: the token the checkout action grants (typicallycontents: write) is USED, not stolen. - The tag push (persistence-of-proof):
git configtogithub-actions[bot]name + email41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com, thengit tag -f heatmap-setup-<epoch-ms>andgit push -f origin <tag>through the credential helper header actions/checkout writes into.git/config(http.extraheader). Result: attacker-influenced tags standing in the victim repo masquerading as the runner bot itself.
Read: proof-of-reach instrument, defender-relevant either way
The script's own comments argue this is an authorized-reach demonstration (everything is made publicly visible on purpose: step summaries, tags, committed reports, the opposite of exfil), and there is no secret-value theft in the artifact: key NAMES are inventoried, values are not read; the OIDC token is not captured. Three durable reads anyway:
- The capability map is a purchase-ready product. One
npm installinside a victim CI job: reads runner topology, proves OIDC mintability, writes to the default branch with the workflow token, and mints bot-attributed tags. A malicious variant of this exact file changes two lines (PUT body → sensitive content; tag → persistence marker) and keeps every detection signature this benign build already passes, this is the living demonstration of whypostinstall+GITHUB_TOKENis a code-execution boundary, not a build detail. - The iteration clock tracks the curated lane, not the registry: six versions in ~3 h, PR #1621 opened 15:22Z mid-iteration (after
1.0.4, before1.0.6), the author kept shipping AFTER being publicly filed, and the registry did nothing: at this check the name is LIVE at flagged-adjacent1.0.6, ZERO OSV + ZERO GHSA. This is the advisory-as-build-trigger costume shape (malfex, kafka-roller) measured on the CI-recon class. - The bot-identity write is the quietest artifact.
github-actions[bot]commits and force-pushed tags are invisible to humans who only watch PRs; detection needsheatmap-setup-*tag patterns,heatmap-setup-report.jsonpath hits, andchore: liquidity-heatmap setup cachecommit messages in repo/webhook logs.
IoCs
- npm:
orderly-plugin-liquidity-heatmapall versions (0.0.0-stage,1.0.0-1.0.4,1.0.6), publisherdumtban; tarball 1.0.6 sha25636c24c456158bad255c5a6adc83247b02e2cda8561ebfe2860ccd1340472e2a2. - Files/paths:
scripts/setup.js,heatmap-setup-report.json,heatmap-exec-trace.log(temp dir), step-summary header## Liquidity Heatmap setup cache. - Git: tag pattern
heatmap-setup-<epoch-ms>force-pushed with committer namegithub-actions[bot]/ email41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com(the bot's REAL noreply address, the impersonation is in the actor name, indistinguishable from a real runner write except by provenance). - Commit message:
chore: liquidity-heatmap setup cache refresh [skip ci]; User-Agentliquidity-heatmap-setup. - Companion repo cited in README:
hashimubadiya14-rgb/asset-tracker-q4vw(persona +<slug>-<4rand>grammar shared withheatmap-setupnaming).
Status & monitor
- At 23:3x-23:5x UTC Oct 11: name LIVE
latest 1.0.6, zero OSV (v1/query{}), zero GHSA, no registry action; PR ossf/malicious-packages #1621 OPEN (the only record); companion repo not probed beyond the README reference. - OCT 12 one-hundred-and-fifty-third sweep re-check (~01:3x UTC):
latest 1.0.6UNCHANGED ≈9.5 h after PR #1621, no1.0.7,modifiedfrozen at16:05:29Z, zero OSV ({}) + zero GHSA, registry still inert, post-PR iteration-or-silence clock open; the silence-so-far is itself data vs the malfex/kafka-roller same-day re-fire shape.
OCT 13 one-hundred-and-seventeenth sweep (~07:2x-07:4x UTC): THE ADVISORY CHAIN LANDS, QUEUE-MERGE→GHSA IN 2 m 40 s, REGISTRY STILL AT ZERO ≈1 h LATER
#1621MERGED by maintainercalebbrownat2026-10-13T06:27:48Z, ≈39 h after filing. Within the same import cycle:MAL-2026-17848LIVE (modified 06:30:05.184Z) andGHSA-fp2f-2254-46g7critical published06:30:28Z, listing head moved. Scope: six EXPLICIT version entries (= 1.0.0-= 1.0.4,= 1.0.6), hand-scoped, no>=0boilerplate;0.0.0-stageNOT covered (staging-stub blind spot reproduced on the curated lane).aliasesstillNone≈1 h post-mint (forward-key/cache read, standing rule).- THE PUBLISHED FIELD IS BACKDATED: the OSV record reads
published 2026-10-11T13:13:56Z, ≈72 h BEFORE the merge that minted the id (it sits between the package's own1.0.013:12:56Zand1.0.113:53:05Zpublishes). Same backfill grammar as the 148th's RubyGems fleet. DURABLE:publishedon the curated lane is the queued-PR-era claim; themodifiedflip is the mint event. Any exposure clock computed frompublishedon a curated-lane record is measuring the queue, not the attacker. - THE 42-HOUR FALSE-CLEAN WINDOW IS NOW A MEASURED FACT: from PR filing (Oct 11 15:22Z) to advisory (Oct 13 06:30Z), every OSV/GHSA-keyed consumer, Dependabot included, read CLEAN on a name the curated queue, this ledger, and the record's own summary text all described as malicious. The advisory text is word-for-word the analysis that sat in the OPEN PR for two days. Queue latency is exposure, end to end.
- Registry disposition at ≈1 h 05 m post-GHSA: ZERO. npm doc UNCHANGED (
latest 1.0.6,modifiedfrozen2026-10-11T16:05:29Z), tarball200/3,321 B installable, no holder, no unpublish,0.0.0-stagelive. Advise-then-installable reproduces on the curated-merge lane exactly as on the kam193 direct lane (npp-ml, ≈11 h and counting). The advisory is the consumer-visible layer; enforcement is not on any guaranteed clock. - Watch dispositions: zero-record watch CLOSED (advisory arrived); post-#1621 iteration watch CLOSED with a NEGATIVE result (no
1.0.7ever shipped, six versions total, the author went silent after1.0.6); NEW watches open: npm disposition,dumtbanaccount activity, re-registration/re-arm per the re-publish-triggered enforcement rule,heatmap-setup-*tag sightings,17848alias join (does a curated-merge-minted record mirror its GHSA alias faster than the direct-analyst lane? the 115th's tail-not-band question gets a second subject). - Monitor:
1.0.7+ or any post-#1621 iteration (build-trigger confirmation); npm abuse-lane disposition (delete vs0.0.1-securityholder vs nothing); OSV/GHSA arrival clock vs the curated PR; re-registration under the same publisher; whether the runner-profile→repo-write pattern is adopted by other names (hunt:postinstallscripts that referenceGITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY,ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL, or PUT/contents/);heatmap-setup-*tag sightings in public repos via fork/gitleaks-class crawls;dumtbanaccount recovery/action.
Related pages
- Wix/Thunderbolt dependency-confusion recon fleet, same-week costume-class sibling (
util-foriepft); CI-recon vs module-load-recon, one ledger week apart - Contagious-Interview Tailwind/Animate.css private-dependency campaign, the plugin-costume class that weaponizes the same install-time trust boundary for theft rather than proof
- algamil7x npm DNS-exfil recon cluster, the standing stream ledger; this sweep's section carries the sweep-wide view
- LTIDISAFE npm dependency-confusion fleet,
0.0.0-stage+99.x staging grammar kin; CI-gated vs install-gated execution