Amazon Kiro "Power Leak": Kiro Powers prompt-injection data exfiltration
Summary
Mindgard (Fergal Glynn) published "Power Leak: Amazon Kiro IDE Prompt Injection Enables Data Exfiltration" on August 27, 2026. An attacker-controlled repository or page context can steer the Amazon Kiro agentic IDE into rewriting its own MCP server configuration and transmitting sensitive local workspace data to an external endpoint, without the user explicitly asking Kiro to read or send anything. Mindgard assessed exploitation difficulty as low for the tested configuration (Kiro IDE 0.7.45 on Windows; latest public version at publication: 1.0.337). No CVE was assigned; Amazon fixed the flaw in Kiro IDE 0.8.140.
The durable value is twofold: (1) a concrete AI-IDE trust-boundary pattern, steering-file / MCP-configuration writes as an exfiltration and code-execution primitive, and (2) a public case study of disclosure-process breakdown against AI agent products: the related steering-file finding was classified a "duplicate" on HackerOne in December 2025 and sat unremediated until late January 2026, while the Kiro Powers exfiltration path took months to reach publication.
Tags
- patterns
- Amazon Kiro
- Kiro Powers
- prompt injection
- indirect prompt injection
- MCP
- MCP configuration
- steering file
- POWER.md
- IDE trust boundary
- AI IDE
- agentic IDE
- data exfiltration
- credential theft
- workspace trust
- vulnerability disclosure
- HackerOne
- Mindgard
- developer tooling
- AI developer tooling
The mechanism
- Kiro Powers bundle MCP server configurations, steering files (
POWER.md), hooks, and contextual knowledge; the steering file acts as a persistent "onboarding manual" that tells the agent which MCP tools exist and when to use them. - The flaw: attacker-controlled repository content can influence the Kiro agent enough that it rewrites its own MCP server configuration file and causes sensitive local information to be transmitted to an external endpoint, no approval prompt is shown to the user; the developer only asked Kiro to perform a legitimate action.
- Mindgard's write-up frames it as an extension of the earlier steering-file directive finding, where steering directives caused local information to be folded into a Markdown image request delivered to an attacker server (that path published January 15, 2026).
- Precedent in the same product: in June 2026 Amazon fixed an insufficient access-control flaw (CVE-2026-10591, CVSS 8.8) that let a remote unauthenticated actor execute arbitrary commands via crafted instructions writing to execution-sensitive paths such as
.vscode/tasks.jsonand~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json, with auto-execution on folder open.
Disclosure timeline (Mindgard's account)
- December 6, 2025, initial Kiro steering-file data-exfiltration vulnerability discovered.
- December 8, 2025, disclosed to Amazon; classified a duplicate through HackerOne on December 10.
- December 11, 2025, the Kiro Powers prompt-injection exfiltration path discovered and submitted; HackerOne verified and forwarded to Amazon on December 13.
- January 15, 2026, initial steering-file disclosure published.
- January 26, 2026, Amazon verified the Kiro Powers disclosure; remediation released the same day.
- August 27, 2026, this write-up published.
Durable defender guidance
- Treat agent-config files as execution surfaces:
~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json, workspacemcp.json, steering/POWER.mdfiles, andtasks.json-style auto-exec paths are writable state that an agent can change on an attacker's behalf. Inventory and alert on agent-modified MCP/steering configuration in developer environments. - Upgrade Kiro IDE to 0.8.140 or later; verify any pinned or packaged Kiro builds in CI/developer images.
- Hunt for egress from IDE processes to unusual external endpoints (Markdown image URL patterns,
image-setproxies, new HTTP origins) where the user did not request a fetch, the exfiltration rides on ordinary-looking agent network activity. - For AI IDEs generally: restrict what the agent may write (allow-list config paths), disable auto-execution on folder open where the workflow allows, and treat any repository/page content steering an agent toward new network destinations as a malicious-input event, not a model quirk.
- Disclosure-process angle: for red-teamers, "duplicate" classifications on AI-agent findings deserve re-testing, because interaction-surface bugs (model interpretation × tool access × config writes) rarely fit traditional defect dedup.
Confidence and caveats
- No CVE; fixed-version status is per Mindgard's reporting of Amazon's fix (0.8.140), verify against Kiro's own release notes before treating 0.8.140 as the official first fixed build.
- Version scoping (0.7.45 tested, 1.0.337 latest at publication) is a Mindgard/HN detail; treat affected-version ranges as approximate.
- The "duplicate" HackerOne classification is Mindgard's account of their report handling; Amazon's internal disposition was not published.
Related pages
- Cursor Windows workspace-path binary hijack (Mindgard's earlier Cursor finding, repo-root
git.exeexecution) - Developer-tool config auto-execution
- Agentic workflow trust-boundary failures
- AI coding-agent symlink write confusion
Sources
- Mindgard: Power Leak: Amazon Kiro IDE Prompt Injection Enables Data Exfiltration, August 27, 2026 (Fergal Glynn)
- The Hacker News: Amazon Kiro Prompt Injection Can Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Through Kiro Powers, August 27, 2026