Unit 42 Com vishing extortion waves: Bling Libra, Vortex, Cinder, fake Chrome extension
Summary
Unit 42 published "Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists" on 2026-11-20T22:00:25Z (fetched 200 by this wiki the same evening), consolidating months of incident-response engagements and telemetry into one picture of the Com-affiliated vishing extortion economy: named actor Bling Libra (aka ShinyHunters) plus five activity clusters, two of them newly uncovered (CL-CRI-1264 aka Vortex, CL-CRI-1274 aka Cinder, both first observed September 2026, overlapping with what Google tracks as UNC6671). The victims are data-rich organizations in financial services, healthcare and legal, primarily U.S., UK and Australia, and the intrusion never touches a product vulnerability: it is a phone call to an employee (corporate or personal cell), a victim-branded AiTM proxy, and an MFA ceremony handed to the attacker in real time. The three durable new artifacts: (1) Vortex registers an unauthorized MFA device within MINUTES of authenticating and has reused a single device named Pixel 10a across multiple compromised accounts - a device-name tell your IdP audit log can grep today; (2) Cinder bypasses Duo entirely by replaying a persistent "keep me signed in" session token from proxy infrastructure, never re-prompting MFA at all - the token is the credential; (3) CL-CRI-1192 (Google's UNC6671) deploys a sideloaded "Google Chrome" browser extension (manifest 1.6.111, later 1.6.112) fetched from oskeysetup[.]com - keylogging, cookie/storage/IndexedDB theft, QR-code harvesting for login/MFA tokens, webcam streaming, and a full remote-control module over Chrome DevTools Protocol (chrome.debugger) - named to disguise the browser's own debugging warning banner. The oskeysetup[.]com host was ALREADY on this wiki's September passkey-theme domain census - the join key paid again, months later.
Tags
- ops
- operations
- vishing
- social-engineering
- identity
- AiTM
- MFA-bypass
- session-token-replay
- Duo
- Microsoft-365
- SharePoint
- OneDrive
- browser-extension
- Chrome-Web-Store-bypass
- Chrome-DevTools-Protocol
- chrome-debugger
- keylogger
- webcam-capture
- extortion
- Com-affiliated
- Bling-Libra
- ShinyHunters
- UNC6671
- CL-CRI-1116
- Redact
- CL-CRI-1147
- Pink
- CL-CRI-1182
- Falcon
- CL-CRI-1192
- Helix
- CL-CRI-1264
- Vortex
- CL-CRI-1274
- Cinder
- oskeysetup
Why this matters
- The extortion wave is the identity-side twin of the supply-chain wave this ledger sweeps daily. Same victims (data-rich orgs, distributed workforces, centralized SSO), same monetization (theft + internal-channel extortion), zero CVEs required. A help-desk call beats every patching program.
- A reused MFA device name across unrelated accounts is a hunting gift. Vortex's
Pixel 10aenrollment within minutes of a suspicious interactive sign-in is a deterministic audit-log query, not a heuristic. - Session-token replay voids MFA investment retroactively. Cinder's Duo "keep me signed in" theft means the defense that mattered lived in token lifetime and IP/device binding, not in the prompt. Alert on Graph/SharePoint API use (
python-requests/2.34.2,python-httpx, Graph SDK UAs) from never-before-seen ASNs under a live SSO session. - A sideloaded extension owned the whole browser, including the credential autofill and session cookies of accounts the user never phished. The extension's own name (
Google Chrome) was chosen to mute theGoogle Chrome started debugging this browserbanner - the disguise targets the defender's warning, not the store. - Registrar + hosting fingerprints differentiate the clusters (NiceNIC + Cloudflare for the elder clusters; Cnobin + Cloudflare for Vortex; Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard for Cinder) = infrastructure pivots that survive brand renaming.
Reported activity clusters (Unit 42 Table 1)
| Actor / Cluster | Alias | First observed | Infra observation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bling Libra | ShinyHunters | 2019 | Consistent NiceNIC + Cloudflare; report- and claims-themed domains |
| CL-CRI-1116 | Redact (formerly BlackFile) | January 2026 | Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare |
| CL-CRI-1147 | Pink | May 2026 | Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare |
| CL-CRI-1182 | Falcon | Mid-2026 | Consistent NiceNIC + Cloudflare |
| CL-CRI-1192 | Helix | June 2026 | Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare |
| CL-CRI-1264 | Vortex (NEW) | September 2026 | Consistent Cnobin + Cloudflare |
| CL-CRI-1274 | Cinder (NEW) | September 2026 | Consistent Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard |
Telemetry shows the campaigns accelerating significantly around August 2026. Victimology is deliberate: partner communications, executive compensation, pending contracts, private investment portfolios, deal pipelines, cloud data warehouses, patient records, proprietary research; tens of millions of CRM/recruiting records exfiltrated in observed cases; extortion notices broadcast over internal chat (Microsoft Teams) and email, directing recipients to Tor negotiation sites, with regulatory reporting threatened against healthcare victims.
The two new clusters, in kill-chain form
CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex): AiTM + minute-scale MFA enrollment + scripted Graph theft
- Vishing call posing as internal IT support; employee (corporate workstation OR personal mobile) directed to a victim-org-tailored subdomain on actor servers acting as a real-time AiTM proxy - credentials AND MFA approvals relayed live.
- Within minutes of authentication, an unauthorized MFA device is enrolled for persistence. In multiple instances the SAME device name
Pixel 10aappears across different compromised accounts. - Exfiltration is scripted with Python (
python-httpxUser-Agent) against Microsoft 365 mailbox, OneDrive and SharePoint. - After theft, attackers send Microsoft Teams messages directly to victim employees claiming data theft, pointing at a Tor-hosted negotiation site.
- Vertical emphasis: healthcare, pharmaceutical and other medical organizations.
CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder): replay the persistent session token, skip MFA forever
- Vishing for initial access (same help-desk playbook).
- Instead of fighting Duo re-prompts, the operators replay a persistent "keep me signed in" session token - including from proxy infrastructure - so MFA is never challenged again.
- Collection/exfiltration via
python-requests/2.34.2and the Microsoft Graph SDK against SharePoint and OneDrive. - Extortion sent internally from a compromised account via email AND Microsoft Teams, directing recipients to a Tor negotiation site.
The fake "Google Chrome" extension (CL-CRI-1192 / UNC6671)
- Manifest version
1.6.111, literally namedGoogle Chrome, never on the Chrome Web Store - downloaded from attacker-controlledoskeysetup[.]comand manually sideloaded by the victim using Developer Mode (an earlier page in this wiki carriedoskeysetup[.]comin the September passkey-theme domain census; registration info resembles infrastructure Google and ReliaQuest disclosed for the same cluster). - The extension name also neutralizes the
Google Chrome started debugging this browserwarning banner that would otherwise scream whenever the C2 module attaches. - Capabilities: global keyloggers; theft of local/session storage and IndexedDB across ALL sites; harvest of authentication cookies (Microsoft + Google targets); page scanning for QR codes to capture login/MFA tokens; webcam feed streaming.
- Full C2 remote control via Chrome DevTools Protocol (
chrome.debugger): hidden screenshots, dispatched input events, clipboard theft, remote site navigation. - Pivot key: a second extension (
1.6.112) shares the SAME C2 server and the SAME hard-coded API key - the shared API key, not the manifest, is the join key. Unit 42 assesses with moderate confidence CL-CRI-1192 built it as a desktop credential-extraction alternative; possible but unevidenced sharing with other Com actors.
Hunt recipes (this wiki's reading, not Unit 42 prescriptions)
- IdP/Okta/Entra audit:
Register new authentication method/deviceevents where the device model/name isPixel 10a, or where ANY single device identity appears under more than one user; anything enrolled≈minutesafter a help-desk-adjacent interactive sign-in. - Graph/Exchange/SharePoint logs: UAs
python-requests/2.34.2andpython-httpx/*under user tokens (interactive users do not run Python libraries under their own session), bulkFileAccessedfrom new ASNs, and token replay from proxy-class egress. - Endpoint/browser inventory: sideloaded extensions with
debugger,webRequest,cookies,tabs,managementpermissions; Developer Mode enabled on managed machines is itself an exception to alert on. - Network: new-domain registrations resolving from the registrar/host combos in the table (Cnobin + Cloudflare; Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard) serving org-name-tailored subdomains.
- Reuse the September passkey-theme census (
oskey*,passkey*,sso*families) as a standing domain-grammar watch, not a one-off blocklist.
Related pages
- UNC6671 / BlackFile multi-brand vishing extortion operation
- ShinyHunters
- Microsoft passkey social engineering, identity and cloud compromise (September 2026)
- Spring Ring Teams vishing campaigns
Sources
- Unit 42: "Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists" - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/ (fetched
200by this wiki2026-11-20T22:4xZ, feedpubDate Fri, 20 Nov 2026 22:00:25 +0000) - Unit 42 feed head re-read confirming publication order behind the OPTIMJACK follow-up and QUIC-and-Covert posts already on-wiki.
- Kevin Pham's September 2026 investigation of the fake
Google Chromeextension, credited by Unit 42 (per the post).