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Unit 42 Com vishing extortion waves: Bling Libra, Vortex, Cinder, fake Chrome extension

Summary

Unit 42 published "Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists" on 2026-11-20T22:00:25Z (fetched 200 by this wiki the same evening), consolidating months of incident-response engagements and telemetry into one picture of the Com-affiliated vishing extortion economy: named actor Bling Libra (aka ShinyHunters) plus five activity clusters, two of them newly uncovered (CL-CRI-1264 aka Vortex, CL-CRI-1274 aka Cinder, both first observed September 2026, overlapping with what Google tracks as UNC6671). The victims are data-rich organizations in financial services, healthcare and legal, primarily U.S., UK and Australia, and the intrusion never touches a product vulnerability: it is a phone call to an employee (corporate or personal cell), a victim-branded AiTM proxy, and an MFA ceremony handed to the attacker in real time. The three durable new artifacts: (1) Vortex registers an unauthorized MFA device within MINUTES of authenticating and has reused a single device named Pixel 10a across multiple compromised accounts - a device-name tell your IdP audit log can grep today; (2) Cinder bypasses Duo entirely by replaying a persistent "keep me signed in" session token from proxy infrastructure, never re-prompting MFA at all - the token is the credential; (3) CL-CRI-1192 (Google's UNC6671) deploys a sideloaded "Google Chrome" browser extension (manifest 1.6.111, later 1.6.112) fetched from oskeysetup[.]com - keylogging, cookie/storage/IndexedDB theft, QR-code harvesting for login/MFA tokens, webcam streaming, and a full remote-control module over Chrome DevTools Protocol (chrome.debugger) - named to disguise the browser's own debugging warning banner. The oskeysetup[.]com host was ALREADY on this wiki's September passkey-theme domain census - the join key paid again, months later.

Tags

Why this matters

  • The extortion wave is the identity-side twin of the supply-chain wave this ledger sweeps daily. Same victims (data-rich orgs, distributed workforces, centralized SSO), same monetization (theft + internal-channel extortion), zero CVEs required. A help-desk call beats every patching program.
  • A reused MFA device name across unrelated accounts is a hunting gift. Vortex's Pixel 10a enrollment within minutes of a suspicious interactive sign-in is a deterministic audit-log query, not a heuristic.
  • Session-token replay voids MFA investment retroactively. Cinder's Duo "keep me signed in" theft means the defense that mattered lived in token lifetime and IP/device binding, not in the prompt. Alert on Graph/SharePoint API use (python-requests/2.34.2, python-httpx, Graph SDK UAs) from never-before-seen ASNs under a live SSO session.
  • A sideloaded extension owned the whole browser, including the credential autofill and session cookies of accounts the user never phished. The extension's own name (Google Chrome) was chosen to mute the Google Chrome started debugging this browser banner - the disguise targets the defender's warning, not the store.
  • Registrar + hosting fingerprints differentiate the clusters (NiceNIC + Cloudflare for the elder clusters; Cnobin + Cloudflare for Vortex; Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard for Cinder) = infrastructure pivots that survive brand renaming.

Reported activity clusters (Unit 42 Table 1)

Actor / Cluster Alias First observed Infra observation
Bling Libra ShinyHunters 2019 Consistent NiceNIC + Cloudflare; report- and claims-themed domains
CL-CRI-1116 Redact (formerly BlackFile) January 2026 Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare
CL-CRI-1147 Pink May 2026 Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare
CL-CRI-1182 Falcon Mid-2026 Consistent NiceNIC + Cloudflare
CL-CRI-1192 Helix June 2026 Multiple NiceNIC + Cloudflare
CL-CRI-1264 Vortex (NEW) September 2026 Consistent Cnobin + Cloudflare
CL-CRI-1274 Cinder (NEW) September 2026 Consistent Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard

Telemetry shows the campaigns accelerating significantly around August 2026. Victimology is deliberate: partner communications, executive compensation, pending contracts, private investment portfolios, deal pipelines, cloud data warehouses, patient records, proprietary research; tens of millions of CRM/recruiting records exfiltrated in observed cases; extortion notices broadcast over internal chat (Microsoft Teams) and email, directing recipients to Tor negotiation sites, with regulatory reporting threatened against healthcare victims.

The two new clusters, in kill-chain form

CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex): AiTM + minute-scale MFA enrollment + scripted Graph theft

  1. Vishing call posing as internal IT support; employee (corporate workstation OR personal mobile) directed to a victim-org-tailored subdomain on actor servers acting as a real-time AiTM proxy - credentials AND MFA approvals relayed live.
  2. Within minutes of authentication, an unauthorized MFA device is enrolled for persistence. In multiple instances the SAME device name Pixel 10a appears across different compromised accounts.
  3. Exfiltration is scripted with Python (python-httpx User-Agent) against Microsoft 365 mailbox, OneDrive and SharePoint.
  4. After theft, attackers send Microsoft Teams messages directly to victim employees claiming data theft, pointing at a Tor-hosted negotiation site.
  5. Vertical emphasis: healthcare, pharmaceutical and other medical organizations.

CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder): replay the persistent session token, skip MFA forever

  1. Vishing for initial access (same help-desk playbook).
  2. Instead of fighting Duo re-prompts, the operators replay a persistent "keep me signed in" session token - including from proxy infrastructure - so MFA is never challenged again.
  3. Collection/exfiltration via python-requests/2.34.2 and the Microsoft Graph SDK against SharePoint and OneDrive.
  4. Extortion sent internally from a compromised account via email AND Microsoft Teams, directing recipients to a Tor negotiation site.

The fake "Google Chrome" extension (CL-CRI-1192 / UNC6671)

  • Manifest version 1.6.111, literally named Google Chrome, never on the Chrome Web Store - downloaded from attacker-controlled oskeysetup[.]com and manually sideloaded by the victim using Developer Mode (an earlier page in this wiki carried oskeysetup[.]com in the September passkey-theme domain census; registration info resembles infrastructure Google and ReliaQuest disclosed for the same cluster).
  • The extension name also neutralizes the Google Chrome started debugging this browser warning banner that would otherwise scream whenever the C2 module attaches.
  • Capabilities: global keyloggers; theft of local/session storage and IndexedDB across ALL sites; harvest of authentication cookies (Microsoft + Google targets); page scanning for QR codes to capture login/MFA tokens; webcam feed streaming.
  • Full C2 remote control via Chrome DevTools Protocol (chrome.debugger): hidden screenshots, dispatched input events, clipboard theft, remote site navigation.
  • Pivot key: a second extension (1.6.112) shares the SAME C2 server and the SAME hard-coded API key - the shared API key, not the manifest, is the join key. Unit 42 assesses with moderate confidence CL-CRI-1192 built it as a desktop credential-extraction alternative; possible but unevidenced sharing with other Com actors.

Hunt recipes (this wiki's reading, not Unit 42 prescriptions)

  • IdP/Okta/Entra audit: Register new authentication method/device events where the device model/name is Pixel 10a, or where ANY single device identity appears under more than one user; anything enrolled ≈minutes after a help-desk-adjacent interactive sign-in.
  • Graph/Exchange/SharePoint logs: UAs python-requests/2.34.2 and python-httpx/* under user tokens (interactive users do not run Python libraries under their own session), bulk FileAccessed from new ASNs, and token replay from proxy-class egress.
  • Endpoint/browser inventory: sideloaded extensions with debugger, webRequest, cookies, tabs, management permissions; Developer Mode enabled on managed machines is itself an exception to alert on.
  • Network: new-domain registrations resolving from the registrar/host combos in the table (Cnobin + Cloudflare; Internet Domain Service BS Corp + DDoS-Guard) serving org-name-tailored subdomains.
  • Reuse the September passkey-theme census (oskey*, passkey*, sso* families) as a standing domain-grammar watch, not a one-off blocklist.

Sources

  • Unit 42: "Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists" - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/ (fetched 200 by this wiki 2026-11-20T22:4xZ, feed pubDate Fri, 20 Nov 2026 22:00:25 +0000)
  • Unit 42 feed head re-read confirming publication order behind the OPTIMJACK follow-up and QUIC-and-Covert posts already on-wiki.
  • Kevin Pham's September 2026 investigation of the fake Google Chrome extension, credited by Unit 42 (per the post).