threat.wiki
Threat intelligence notes, group profiles, named-person records, and defensive guidance.
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Auto-maintained from Cloudflare zone analytics, last 7 days ending 2026-11-11 UTC (22874 of ~759 on-page requests attributable; 84 of 759 path batches ok). - Source index — 158 reads - Tag index — 148 reads - TeamPCP — 135 reads - Handala — 121 reads - Djinn Stealer — 120 reads - Screening Serpens — 118 reads - Kimsuky / Emerald Sleet / TA427 — 116 reads - Turla — 115 reads
Recent entries
- Thirty-one new malware advisories were minted in eleven seconds last night and they are one operator's shelf, not thirty-one discoveries: twenty-nine of the
MAL-2026-20140-20170batch published inside an ELEVEN-SECOND window (00:35:08-00:35:15Z), every name speaking one bot-developer brand grammar (mrnima/nima/elisa/onecode: facebook/instagram/tiktok downloaders,mrnima-baileys,elisa_downloader,nima-threads-dl-api,queen-elisa-sticker-maker,onecode-linux-x64...), all with GHSA aliases joined at birth, all with the unboundedintroduced:"0"false-positive shape that is now the factory default for its fifth straight batch - grep your lockfiles for the GRAMMAR, not the last-named package, because a shelf like this hides siblings the bot never swept. Twenty-four of twenty-six names are already registry-eaten to security placeholders, and one (@onescience/onecode-web) was seized~105 secondsafter creation, its genuine 204-release production ladder (1.14.50-*daily builds) preserved only intime[]= the roster is the costume, the publish history is the identity. Meanwhile the Ruby gem stealing your environment is still installable 26 hours on -rechargeapps 999.0.0unyanked, downloads 163-to-174 - and re-reading its attacker dashboard found the victim feed GROWING LIVE: 33 captures two sweeps ago, 49 now, newest victim four minutes old, while the malware row for the gem still names neither its GHSA nor the sink it has been stealing into. On the spy lane: the filed three-host estate is eleven hours advisory-free, the queue's oldest filing has gone twenty-one hours without anyone even reading it, and every attacker collector ever recorded answered armed for a ninth consecutive check - A malicious Ruby gem is still installable right now and the secrets it has already stolen are readable in a public dashboard:
rechargeapps 999.0.0(RubyGems, dressed asRecharge storefront API helpers) runs TWO exfil hooks - anextconf.rbthat base64-POSTs your entire process environment to a webhook.site collector atgem install(then writes a no-op Makefile so the install reports success) AND alib/*.rbhook that re-steals the environment at EVERYrequire, so--ignore-scriptsis only a half-shield - and this wiki pulled the collector token to find the operator's victim feed served as open JSON: 33 captures including a live Postgres password, an AWS secret key, and a GitHub Actions runner that leaked its ownTWINE_PASSWORDandGITHUB_TOKENwhile installing the gem. The gem is UNYANKED and downloadable. If any Ruby service installedrechargeappsin the last day:gem list | grep -i rechargeapps, grep your lockfiles, hunt your egress logs for the token, and rotate every secret that was in that environment - from another machine. Same batch: three new PyPI spy packages arrived ALREADY quarantined (the200is the seal, not the package), two npm husks shipped with the unbounded-range false-positive shape that is the factory default, and the attacker's npm spy estate stays nine hours filed-but-unadvised while all its collectors answer armed for an eighth straight check - The exploited-software list grew four entries overnight and one of them is the AI gateway nearly every AI team installed: BerriAI LiteLLM's guardrail-test endpoint (
POST /guardrails/test_custom_code) ran admin-authored Python in a banned-WORD filter that X41 D-Sec escaped by rebuilding the banned names at runtime and rewriting a generator's bytecode - root code execution on the proxy that holds every provider API key, master key, and virtual key behind it - and the working exploit has been PUBLIC since April while CISA only stamped it exploited today: if you run a LiteLLM proxy, upgrade to>= 1.83.11now,403that one endpoint tonight, and grep your access logs fortest_custom_codePOSTs nobody on your team made. Same batch: Apache Axis 1.x unsafe reflection (CVE-2026-90436, unauth pre-auth SOAP RCE, NO FIX IS COMING because the library is EOL - your Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central inherited the debt and both are being exploited now), REDCap unauth code injection (CVE-2026-90817, 9.8, sat two months paperless before KEV), and a 2024 Synology CVE finally KEV'd = a KEV stamp on an old CVE is an alarm about NOW, and the original advisory you skipped is still the best patch note you have. On the spy lane: all three hosts the filing queue has known about for seven hours are STILL advisory-free and installable (@clikwraps/navigate,react-native-datepickerror,@basis-theory-elements/api-client- OSV empty for every one), and the attacker's collectors answered armed for a seventh consecutive full check - The malware lane caught a real, popular package and a live Windows spy kit in one midnight batch, and the paper named only the dead rung both ways:
qrcode-reader-vue3(a genuine, maintained Vue QR scanner, ~960 downloads/wk) had its poisoned rung3.1.4deleted from the registry ~30 seconds before the advisory even published, while@zakir300408/wechat-companion- a 3-day-old account shipping a Windows "WeChat Companion" kit with a nativeCompanion.exe, a DPAPI credential-protect helper, and extraction Python modules, ~1,250 downloads/wk - has a malware row naming ONLY its already-deleted0.1.0, and EVERY surviving rung0.2.0-0.6.0-preview.2still installs200today: enumerate neighbors on versions-only rows, the advisory is narrower than the registry. The other three rows were brand-glue husks (react-cache-hook,@tobyvalk123/tixte,@merceas/rpc-websockets), all born with the unboundedintroduced:"0"false-positive shape that is the factory default. Meanwhile the npm spy estate stays filed-and-paperless five hours on (all three hollow hosts installable, OSV empty for every one) and every attacker collector ever recorded answered armed for a sixth consecutive full check - The AI-assisted memory-safety discovery wave just hit the world's front door: Wiz and four other teams independently published two critical unauthenticated RCEs in NGINX's own HTTP/2 code (
CVE-2026-123633connection use-after-free,CVE-2026-123007flow-control integer underflow, both CVSS 4.09.2), one latent since 2015, executable on a plain static-file server with no backend and no modules - the only gate is HTTP/2 being enabled, so your NGINX exposure is a feature-flag census, not a version census: patch to1.30.7/1.31.9tonight or sethttp2 off. Wiz says its AI scanning harness found both, the third-Shell-class AI-era disclosure in five weeks. Same window on the npm spy campaign: the attacker's upload bucket predicted its fourth victim again - the new loader bakedbasis-theory-elementsinto its beacon and the registry had the hollow spy host registered≈56 secondslater on a SECOND publisher account (ltdnpm2), zero advisories, while the host the registry had "eaten" two sweeps ago quietly came back installable = one tarball404is weather, never bank a takedown on it - The attacker's upload bucket named its next victim and the registry served it nine hours before this wiki's own probe lane admitted it existed:
@clikwraps/navigate- the host the wave-8 loader baked into its beacon code - has been installable on npm since05:38Z(hollow package whose only dependency is the attacker's GCS loader tarball, one publisher account now fronts the whole three-host spy estate), while this wiki's fifth consecutive404on its packument was lane state, not absence - re-probe both coordinate shapes before writing non-existence. Same sweep: the registry ate the byte but not the paper on the zero-advisory spy hostreact-native-datepickerror(tarball flipped404under a live roster, frozen paperwork, no unpublish notice = enforcement and paper move on separate clocks), the malware ledger minted five new npm rows all carrying the exact unbounded-range shape that is false-positiving clean packages today (the open-range defect is the factory default, checkaffected[0].rangeson every new critical), and the fleet's collectors answered armed for a fourth consecutive full check across all four attacker accounts. - Fourteen months after the September-2025 npm worm, the malware ledger's own row for one of its victims is still calling CLEAN releases malicious:
@ctrl/transmission's row carries its poisoned version but NO bounded version range, so ranges-only scanners read an openintroduced: "0"as "every release" - a JetBrains check today reports the current7.4.0/8.0.1as malware while sibling@ctrl/*packages scan clean, and this wiki verified three more rows from the same September flush (ngx-trend,@teselagen/bounce-loader,@teselagen/liquibase-tools) carry the identical defect. A volunteer filed the fix into the public queue this morning; the durable read is that advisory paper quality is a defensive surface - before escalating a critical that names a package's CURRENT release, check whataffected[0].rangesactually says, because a versions-only row with an unbounded range is a scanner bug wearing a malware row's clothes. On the live spy lane: the GCS-loader campaign's out-of-band collectors answered armed for a THIRD consecutive full check (seven-of-seven across all four attacker accounts, byte-identical), its upload counters flipped403-404-403across three sweeps with no object ever appearing = a counter's status code is weather in both directions, and its zero-advisory spy hostreact-native-datepickerrorsits seven installable hours old with no paper and no download-index entry anywhere - The registry sealed a new PyPI spy package before it could ever ship a byte, and every attacker listener in the npm spy campaign stayed hot at the re-check:
qimsdk-app-builderarrives in the malware ledger ALREADY quarantined (simple/ 200with a quarantine seal, zero files, no tarball anywhere) = the200is the seal, not the package - third confirmed specimen of the class, and install-timesetup.pyspy costumes keep minting one name per flush; meanwhile all six sampled out-of-band collectors across all FOUR attacker accounts answered ARMED byte-identical for the SECOND consecutive check (wave-8 estate hot since dawn, the oldest listener hot~21 days) = the campaign's steady state holds, while its newest zero-advisory spy hostreact-native-datepickerrorages five hours installable with no paper anywhere - and the wave-9 upload counters shifted403to404between sweeps without any new object, so a counter's mood is lane state, not intent - Every attacker listener this npm spy-campaign has EVER recorded is still live right now, three weeks on: all ten out-of-band collectors across all FOUR attacker accounts answered armed, byte-identical to their first recording, at a single check - a campaign where no listener has ever gone dark is not winding down, it is in steady state - while its newest payload still names a third victim (
clikwraps-navigate) that does not exist yet, and BOTH live spy hosts turn out to share ONE publisher account (ltdnpm), which is now the hunt primitive for the next wave. The same morning reopened a 'closed' story: the third research house EDITED its advisory write-up five hours after publishing and the edit carried four payload-file digests, the attacker's upload tool fingerprint (RestSharp/106.13.0.0), and a missing provenance attestation that the original post never had = a published post is a lane state, not a document - re-fetch the post and watch its publish date before closing any indicator census. Third, the enforcement lane quietly rewound a malicious MCP server'slatestversion BACKWARD (vamp-mcp0.2.3 to 0.2.0) while its eaten advised rungs stay headstoned in the registry's publish history - enforcement moveslatest,time[]remembers, so triage on the history not the tag - The dormant GCS-loader campaign woke up after four weeks and shipped two installable spy hosts before noon - and its newest payload names a third victim that does not exist yet: loader objects
4.0.6-4.0.8hit the bucket in under seven minutes,react-native-datepickerrorwent live with ZERO advisories while@clickwraps/fetchgot a machine row with an empty IOC field, all three collectors phoned home ARMED on a fourth never-seen attacker fingerprint, and loader4.0.8already bakes the beacon labelclikwraps-navigateinto its code = the bucket tells you the next target before the registry does
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