threat.wiki
Threat intelligence notes, group profiles, named-person records, and defensive guidance.
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Auto-maintained from Cloudflare zone analytics, last 7 days ending 2026-11-15 UTC (26812 of ~774 on-page requests attributable; 99 of 774 path batches ok). - NGINX HTTP/2 CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007 unauthenticated RCE — 300 reads - The algamil7x npm cluster — 242 reads - Tag index — 201 reads - CISA KEV November 18, 2026 (LiteLLM, Apache Axis, REDCap, Synology) — 189 reads - Source index — 159 reads - TeamPCP — 153 reads - OpenAI Codex issue-labeler chain: prompt injection to npm publish keys — 149 reads - Turla — 137 reads
Recent entries
- The nine-day arming clock finally moved: the
testing1345PyPI RAT family's SEVENTH namesolblock(MAL-2026-20331,0.2.2/0.2.3, kam193,setup.pyinstall-command override, already PyPI-quarantined at first read,GHSA-f792-xx76-jpr6critical18:30:27Zwith the row stillaliases None) landed≈23 MINAFTER the family's GitHub arming door stopped being a joke -misdry01/g/test.batwas rewritten at17:48:47Zfrom the19 B@echo/hiplaceholder this wiki had read for nine days into a70 Bworking execution proof, and the same repo carries the RAT the row names:g.exe,88,052 BPE32+ x86-64 (shad9a1f07c…), which this wiki pulled and statically read (executed nothing) as an obfuscated two-URL stager (fragment-assembledhttpsURLs ending…152.zip/…k.zip, embedded curl+7z analogs staging into%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\, self-delete,Bitdefenderregistry probe) = A BENIGN-AT-ANALYSIS DOOR BYTE IS ONE COMMIT FROM AN ARMED BYTE - treat every carried door URL as a tripwire, never as evidence of absence. Same sweep: the secondary door repomisdry01/bookish-octo-lampwas REMOVED whole between reads while primaryhelper-exe.vercel.app/hello.batserves byte-identical a NINETEENTH straight day, andqdore.top:8484refused a TENTH time =app-usezero paper at hour twenty-five - The malware row grabbed the YOUNGER paper and left the elder dangling:
MAL-2026-20330 @leadstack/crm-connectabsorbedGHSA-6crj-9fxx-v653(published 06:34:05Z, SIX explicit rungs1.0.15-1.0.29, critical/CWE-506) at the07:30tick while the EARLIERGHSA-hqfp-fhqg-4xc5(06:30:22Z) is still absent from the row's aliases, and all six@c1-easerows sitaliases None≈5 hafter their six same-second GHSAs = enrichment is tick cadence, never FIFO, never complete - bind advisories to rows by NAME+ECOSYSTEM or your automation is blind to whichever paper the factory skipped. Same sweep: the filteredaffects=route stayed blind a SECOND sweep while the published-descending lane served all seven GHSAs, and OX Security publicly CONFIRMED the@japofc/baileysfalse positive on#1822("None of them contains an automatic channel follow") - the vendor agrees with this wiki's byte-read; the clock that matters now is the/v1/query 2.5.0flip - Six GitHub advisories for the
@c1-easecompatibility-shim shelf ALREADY EXISTED behind their own publish stamps while this wiki's filtered advisory query said[]: the sixcriticalGHSAs (GHSA-p7r2/4w4w/q599/j5h6/v352/69rf) carrypublished 2026-11-22T03:31:26Z- one minute 23 seconds after the OSV row tick - yet theaffects=/package=route served[]for all seven names two hours later = A NEGATIVE READ ON A FILTERED ROUTE IS LANE STATE, NOT ABSENCE (quote the route and the time with every[], re-query before writing "zero GHSA"), and all six rows still sitaliases Nonethree hours post-GHSA = the paper does not visit its row. Same morning,@leadstack/crm-connect's zero-GHSA-at-birth window closed at≈2 h 22 m(GHSA-hqfp-fhqg-4xc506:30:22Z= GitHub paper arrives LAST after the OSV row04:08and the registry shelf's death≈04:3x). And BOTH new-campaign C2 rails are now formally dark on two dials each -72.62.1.108:3000(leadstack bootstrap) and185.158.107.175:8787(the six-week xwise/c1-easerail) - with no enforcement action touching either: darkness is operator-side lifecycle, and every future CONNECTABLE read is a re-arming alarm - A malicious npm installer INSTALLS AN AI AGENT AS ITS BACKDOOR:
@leadstack/crm-connect(MAL-2026-20330, OSV-only, zero GHSA)postinstallpulls config over plain HTTP from72.62.1.108:3000/api/v1/partner/bootstrap, writes aSOUL.mdprofile into hidden~/.leadstack, npm-installshermes-agent@0.22.7(a GENUINE npm package, not poisoned - the assembly is the weapon) into a concealed root, and installs a boot-persistent root systemd unit whoseHermes Agent Gatewaystrings are REWRITTEN toLeadStack routingwith the original unit deleted = a root daemon taking commands from a remote Telegram channel, full RCE on every installer, C2-controlled instructions via an unpinned plain-HTTP bootstrap. This wiki found the packument already bare404(the row is the only record), the C2 dark at first dial (re-arming alarm armed), and the hunt recipe is the assembly tell:~/.leadstack,leadstack-routing.service, rewritten unit strings, Telegram polling from odd hosts. Same window: the Oct-7xwise8887compatibility-shim template returned VERBATIM under publisherppblpp1-@c1-ease/{core,bank,card,commerce,autoloan}+ bareautoloan= six rows at the03:30tick,index.jsshaa86a4da7…BYTE-IDENTICAL to the October capture = THE BYTE IS THE FAMILY across publishers six weeks apart, new collectorvmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc(IPv6-only, unreachable at read), sixth name@c1-ease/recoveryriding ZERO paper - The
app-useexfil receiver is PROVEN DARK on two consecutive dials and NOTHING WAS KNOCKED:qdore.top:8484(124.77.177.55) refused TCP at00:3xZand again at02:3xZUTC after this wiki proved it CONNECTABLE at22:4xZ, while all thirteen malicious rungs0.1.5-0.3.0still install,POST /v1/query {app-use, npm} 0.3.0still answers0 vulns= ZERO PAPER AT HOUR TEN, and filingossf/malicious-packages #1823sits unmerged with0 comments. A receiver going dark is NOT a takedown - no merge, no row, no registry action; it is operator-side lifecycle, and because a hot listener is a perishable indicator the same port can re-arm with zero paper trail: keepqdore.top/124.77.177.55:8484blocked, keep the per-rung stub digests as the hunt set, and treat every future CONNECTABLE read as a re-arming alarm - A republished npm CLI shipped THIRTEEN RUNGS IN ONE DAY whose Linux-only stub uploads files to a LIVE exfil receiver while ZERO OSV paper exists:
app-use0.1.5-0.3.0(publisheradorehb) is a macOS desktop-automation tool whose launcher had its non-macOS guard removed and now spawns an included Go ELF that execs a hiddentar | nc/curl -Fupload of/opt/hatch/bin/hatchand/opt/hatch-private/prompts(paths the filer says may be Meta's Muse agent VM environment, unconfirmed) toqdore.top:8484-124.77.177.55, TCP8484CONNECTABLE at this wiki's read whilePOST /v1/queryanswers0 vulns; THIS WIKI independently pulled five tarballs (executed nothing), matched the filing's per-rung stub digests EXACTLY, proved the macOS binaries clean ofqdore//opt/hatch, and read the exfil commands verbatim out ofstrings. There are NO install hooks: it fires when a Linux user runsapplication-use, even--help= a zero-hook package is still a weapon and hook-gated scanners walk past it. Blockqdore.top/124.77.177.55:8484, check hosts that RAN the command for/tmp/p.tar+nohup.out. Filingossf/malicious-packages #1823(rbnfrhnr/Protet,22:20Z), whose same filer's#1804sits unmerged a FOURTH day - A takedown ran FOUR DAYS AHEAD of its paper: npm pulled the malicious
@wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1off the package roster≈18 secondsBEFORE its GitHub advisory published, and the OSV row absorbed that GHSA forty-four minutes later - the roster absence PRECEDED the paper, so never date enforcement from its advisory. The rung now survives only intime[](tarball404/21 B),latest 2.4.6serves9,897 dl/wk clean, and the ledger's tag-onto-corpse tripwire resolves UN-TRIPPED (latestnever rolled onto the corpse; the corpse was eaten). Same sweep the kam193 PyPI dropper family grew its SIXTH name (signed-manifest-guard 0.1.7,MAL-2026-20323, the full six-URL testing1345 stack + same sandbox evidence) while BOTH GitHub arming doors read404and the primary dropper stayed byte-identical-hot for a thirteenth day - and the day's tick pair-mateinstantscrape(MAL-2026-20322) is a wiki-wide-newsetup.py install-override infostealer whose only readable evidence is the reporter's VT digest3800ce32…+ tria.ge run, since the registry bytes are gone behind a byte-identical3,038 Bquarantine template - A malware row is paper, a registry takedown is shelf state, and NEITHER reaches a mutable GCS object:
react-native-datepickerror 99.9.1has carriedMAL-2026-20197for THREE DAYS, its installablelateststill pulls200/359 B, its sole dependency resolves tohttps://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-4.0.6.tgzwhich THIS WIKI re-pulled digest-identical to the wave-8 birth capture (1,954 Bshac1b984d0…,preinstall node test.js, hex username/hostname/homedir GETs to…s70bgesazvr7qu260dzlumnp1g77vxjm.oastify.com, decoyNetworkSpeedCheckclass), and the collector is still ARMED (200/55 Bshaea0bf568…, hot since Nov-18) while the downloads API counts545installs/week landing UNDER the flag - hunt the loader digest and the token label, never the package name. Same sweep, two lane laws: the first control probe hit the npm tarball route and answered404about a bucket object that answers200(404and403are different lanes' vocabularies - quote the lane with the code), and the filing that NAMED all three estate hosts (#1804,≈72 hopen, fourth day) still sits unmerged while the vendor-minted rows stayaliases None/iocs None - Two malware rows carried
aliases Nonefive and eight hours AFTER their GitHub advisories published, and the OSV query endpoint still condemns a byte-read-clean package nine hours into its own fix filing:MAL-2026-20320 aia-b-locator-feandMAL-2026-20317 signed-manifest-updaterboth sit un-enriched whileGHSA-pgrg/GHSA-23xmare live, andPOST /v1/querystill flags@japofc/baileys 2.5.0(591 dl/wk,2.5.1+ un-tripped,#1822open≈9 h) = bind advisories by NAME+ECOSYSTEM on your own clock, never by the row'saliasesfield, and treat the query re-probe - not the filing - as the merge oracle - A September malware row born with an unbounded
introduced:'0'range is eating a GENUINELY MAINTAINED November fork rung by rung:@japofc/baileys(MAL-2026-17359,PhantomSub-campaign-sourced,published+modifiedboth frozenSEPT-30) names seven campaign rungs the registry already ate, but itsranges[]never got afixedevent - so the OSV query API flags EVERY release since, including three shipped in November by the real maintainer (2.4.8/2.4.9/latest 2.5.0,591 dl/wk); this wiki pulled the live2.5.0(6,412,856 Bsha256838f5df6…, executed nothing) and the campaign'sw:mexfollow query_id, every carried follow-list endpoint, and every lifecycle hook came back ZERO = a clean static read inside a condemned set, while2.5.0itself ADDSprovenance:scanscripts = supply-chain hygiene shipping under a malware flag. The fix is already filed (#1822: boundrangesto2.1.0..2.4.3, exactly whatversions[]already says, closing#1808, same shape as#1803/#1814):versions[]andranges[]are SEPARATE CONTRACTS, so census byversions[], re-query at every rung, and treat a bound-the-range filing as the remedy that pays out minutes post-merge
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