The npmjs.it.com agent pair
Tags
- ops
- npm
- supply-chain
- malicious-package
- dependency-confusion
- scope-squat
- typosquat
- remote-access-trojan
- command-and-control
- install-script
- import-time-execution
- obfuscation
- gradle
- Amazon-Inspector
- OSV
- npmjs.it.com
Summary
In the Amazon-Inspector-sourced OSV batch that landed September 21, 2026 (~04:00 UTC), two npm packages, @asenfotech/unplugin-element-plus (MAL-2026-16318, versions 2.9.3/2.9.5) and element-plus-vite-cli (MAL-2026-16331, versions 2.9.3/2.9.5), carry the same dropper dressed as Gradle build tooling inside a package that advertises itself as Vue/Element Plus tooling. Unlike the recon beaconers dominating the same week's advisories, this pair is a full operator-driven remote-access agent: the dropped MJS payload registers a persistent agent ID, long-polls for tasks, and executes attacker-supplied exec, ls, download, upload, delete, ps, and move commands. The C2 host, npmjs.it.com, a lookalike of npmjs.com, was live and answering at this wiki's check on Sep 21 (~05:25 UTC): POST /api/register returns HTTP 400 invalid agent_id behind Cloudflare. Both npm names had their versions unpublished at the same check. No public vendor writeup was findable at capture time (search for the package names + "malicious" returns nothing), this wiki's record is built directly from the OSV/Inspector analyses plus live registry and C2 probes.
The targeting detail is the marquee: the import-time path is gated on a hardcoded allowlist of workspace marker files characteristic of specific fintech/trading monorepos, src/api/AITrading.js, src/api/agentShot.ts, src/pages/ETF-quant-trading/history.vue, src/views/orderCenter/orderCenter.vue, src/pages/GameAggregator/GameAggrBusinessPage/index.tsx, src/master/src/router/routes.tsx, and similar (nine sentinels in one variant, workspace markers in the other). Outside a matching repo the package sits quiet. This is not spray-and-pray malware, it is a targeted implant that uses npm as its delivery rail, and the beacon-only failure mode means victims who npm install without importing never see activity.
Confirmed mechanics (from the MAL-2026-16318 / MAL-2026-16331 Amazon Inspector analyses)
- Cover story:
index.jsis a small, genuine-looking Element Plus resolver / Vite CLI stub. The bulk of the tarball lives underlib/gradle/(or intooling-bootstrap.cjs), naming every component after Gradle daemon infrastructure (postinstall-run.cjs,gradle-daemon-sync.cjs,homeGradleDaemon,tooling-api-runtime.mjs), none of which relates to the declared Vue purpose. - Payload assembly: ~85-90 base64 chunks are embedded across source files (
agent-bytecode.segments.cjsand siblings), concatenated and decoded viaBuffer.from(joined, 'base64')at runtime. - Dropper: the decoded MJS agent is written to a Gradle-cache-sounding path,
~/.gradle/caches/transforms-3/8.7/instrumented/.../instrumentation-agent-runtime.mjs(16318) or~/.gradle-cache/tooling-api-runtime.mjs(16331), then spawned as a detached, hidden Node process (detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true,child.unref(), PID-file tracked in 16331). - Trigger paths (both): the declared lifecycle hook (postinstall / preinstall+postinstall) and the
main/binentry chain, the bootstrap runs again on plainrequire()/import, so the agent re-drops on every build that touches the package. - Targeting gate (16331, import path): the bootstrap walks up from
cwd/INIT_CWDlooking for nine hardcoded sentinel files characteristic of fintech/trading applications; the agent only drops when a sentinel matches. 16318 uses a comparable workspace-marker allowlist (specificGameAggregator/routes.tsxpaths). A miss = fully silent package. - C2 protocol: register at
POST https://npmjs.it.com/api/registerwithos.hostname(),os.userInfo().username,os.type()/release()and a persisted agent UUID cached at~/.gradle-cache/.aid; then long-poll/api/task/<agent_id>; results POST to/api/result/<agent_id>; file exfil POSTs arbitrary local file contents to/api/file/<agent>/<task>. Operator commands:exec(spawns/bin/sh -corcmd.exe /con attacker-supplied strings),ls,download,upload(writes attacker bytes to arbitrary paths),delete(rm -rf),ps,move. - Evasion knobs:
C2_TLS_INSECUREsetsNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0;C2_SERVER_URLoverrides the hardcoded host, the agent is operator-reconfigurable after install. - Domain:
npmjs.it.comis a subdomain ofit.comcrafted to read asnpmjs.comin a hurried glance or a log skim. At this wiki's Sep 21 check it resolved to Cloudflare (104.21.5.72/172.67.133.40) and the register endpoint responded actively.
Registry state (live checks by this wiki, Sep 21 ~05:25 UTC)
| Name | Versions | State |
|---|---|---|
@asenfotech/unplugin-element-plus |
2.9.3, 2.9.5 (per OSV refs) | versions unpublished (registry returns empty) |
element-plus-vite-cli |
2.9.3, 2.9.5 (per OSV refs) | versions unpublished (created Sep 16 08:06 UTC, modified Sep 16 16:34 UTC, latest empty) |
npmjs.it.com C2 |
, | LIVE, /api/register → HTTP 400 invalid agent_id behind Cloudflare |
Note the ~5-day gap between package creation (Sep 16) and advisory landing (Sep 21), superseded by the third-sweep section below: the registry's unpublished time-block shows the malicious versions were actually removed the same day they appeared (exposure ~8.5 h); the 5-day gap is detection latency. The C2 still answering means any surviving infected host is still beaconable.
September 21 third-sweep follow-up: the exposure window was 8.5 hours, not five days, the registry's own unpublished time-block record + the GitHub mirror pair lands
Correction, self-recorded. This page's second-sweep framing ("packages created Sep 16, advised Sep 21: the 5-day window is the exposure") was wrong, and the npm registry's own metadata shows why: element-plus-vite-cli's time block carries an explicit machine-readable unpublish record, {"unpublished": {"time": "2026-09-16T16:34:51.273Z", "versions": ["2.9.3","2.9.5"]}}. Version 2.9.3 went live 08:06:16 UTC and both versions were gone by 16:34:51 UTC the SAME DAY, the malicious artifacts were actually reachable for ~8.5 hours (2.9.3) / ~7 hours (2.9.5), not five days. The five-day number is the gap between removal and advisory, which is the detection-velocity story, not the exposure story. Durable method read, and a correction pattern worth naming: the npm time document is a forensic record even after removal, created, per-version timestamps, modified, and the unpublished block (with timestamp and exact version list) survive in the package metadata even when versions is empty. Pull the time block for any advised package BEFORE concluding an exposure window; a name whose versions died fast is a different incident than one that sat served for a week. The C2-side conclusion is unchanged and still the urgent half: npmjs.it.com was re-verified LIVE at this wiki's Sep 21 ~09:30 UTC re-check (same POST /api/register → HTTP 400 invalid agent_id behind Cloudflare 104.21.5.72/172.67.133.40), every host that installed during the 8.5-hour window is still beaconable today.
GitHub mirror pair now published (Sep 21 06:30:32-33 UTC batch, all CVE-less malware-class advisories): GHSA-j296-5jqh-9cxv (@asenfotech/unplugin-element-plus, both versions) and GHSA-2w5j-q26r-6m9w (element-plus-vite-cli, 2.9.3 + 2.9.5), Amazon-Inspector-sourced mirror of the OSV records this page was built from. The genuine unplugin-element-plus (legitimate package, 25 versions, latest 0.11.2, untouched) carries no advisory at check, confirmed the 2.9.x numbers never existed on the real name, so unplugin-element-plus@2.9.x appearing in any lockfile = this campaign. Note the legitimate name also never shipped a 2.x line at all, making the version jump itself a detection artifact.
API-quirk note for future sweeps: the GitHub advisories list endpoint's ghsa_id= filter returns EMPTY for these fresh malware advisories (unreliable, same failure class as the Sep-20 affects+published filter), while direct GET /advisories/{GHSA-id} and affects={pkg} both work, prefer direct-ID GETs when confirming a known GHSA.
September 23 follow-up: a THIRD family member lands (MAL-2026-16433, @vitemirrorte/element-plus-vite-cli), same npmjs.it.com agent, new scope, new workspace fingerprint (mall4cloud-react), AES key derived from the victim's own repo contents, and the C2 is still answering
OSV record MAL-2026-16433 (source: amazon-inspector IN-MAL-2026-020320, sha256 d616b037ed0b4ebb…, record modified 2026-09-23T01:45:04Z) flags @vitemirrorte/element-plus-vite-cli 2.9.1, the third artifact of this agent family and the first under a scope (@vitemirrorte = "vite-mirror" lookalike, a fresh squat surface beside the original bare element-plus-vite-cli). The Inspector analysis describes the same machine with upgrades:
- Same dropper skeleton, named functions this time:
postinstall→postinstall-run.cjs→bootstrapGradleLifecycle→activateDaemonBridgematerializeslib/gradle/instrumentation/agent-runtime.source.mjsinto~/.gradle/caches/and spawns it as a detached, stdio-ignored, unref'd Node child viaruntime-launcher.cjswith a PID file (persisting beyond install). - Same C2, same protocol: polls hardcoded
https://npmjs.it.com/;POST /api/registerwith hostname, OS username,os.type()/release()+ persistentagent_id; task loop handlesexec(cmd.exe or /bin/sh),download(arbitraryfs.readFileSync→ POST bytes to/api/file),upload,delete,move,ps,ls.C2_SERVER_URLenv override present again = operator-reconfigurable after install. - Upgrade 1, the gate is a PROJECT fingerprint, not just sentinel files:
workspace-fingerprint.cjsverifies the surrounding project ismall4cloud-reactby file-content hashes.mall4cloudis a widely-forked open-source Chinese e-commerce microservice suite, the first on-wiki fingerprint naming an OSS project family rather than bespoke corporate paths. Anyone whose dependency tree resolves into amall4cloud-reactfork is in scope. - Upgrade 2, key-from-victim-files:
decode-pipeline.cjsderives the AES-256-GCM key from the matched workspace content itself before decrypting the bytecode-segment payload. Consequences: the agent stays inert on incidental installs (same dormancy as the Sep 21 pair), AND the payload is cryptographically invisible to any scanner that does not hold the victim's repo files, the encrypted blob cannot be decrypted even if captured. This is the strongest on-wiki example yet of payload-unknowability-by-construction. - Registry state (this wiki, ~03:30 UTC Sep 23):
@vitemirrorte/element-plus-vite-clireturns HTTP 404, a bare 404 with no0.0.1-securityholder visible at check. Per the standing sixteenth-sweep rule: recorded as no-longer-resolving, NOT a confirmed takedown; holder check next sweep. - C2 state (this wiki, ~03:20 UTC Sep 23):
POST https://npmjs.it.com/api/registerstill answers HTTP 400invalid agent_idbehind Cloudflare, the agent infrastructure is up and validating ~2 days after the original pair's removal and ~7 days after first sighting. Every host that ever registered remains beaconable. - GHSA:
affects=query for the scoped name is empty at check, OSV-keyed consumers only, consistent with the stream's pattern for names that die fast.
Durable read: the operator persists through infrastructure, not names, three artifacts (two bare, one scoped) all converge on one npmjs.it.com endpoint whose register route still validates agent IDs. Defenders should treat the C2 endpoint (and the /api/register|task|result|file grammar + ~/.gradle materialization by Node parents) as the durable pivot, and expect further name/scope rotations while the endpoint lives. The mall4cloud-react fingerprint also tells triage where to look first: OSS-fork-heavy e-commerce codebases, not just the Sep 21 fintech/trading sentinel list.
September 23 follow-up #2: a FOURTH family member lands (MAL-2026-16474, vite-dev-launcher 2.9.4), the workspace-keyed variant matures: nine named victim files + static pepper as the AES derivation, three redundant activation paths, and a string-vault.cjs config grammar, and the package had been dead for FIVE DAYS before the advisory
OSV record MAL-2026-16474 (source: amazon-inspector, sha256 9ac504b2228b7e2d…, published 2026-09-23T09:07:06Z) flags vite-dev-launcher 2.9.4, the fourth artifact of the Gradle-masquerading agent family and structurally the @vitemirrorte/element-plus-vite-cli design (workspace-derived key) wearing a Vite dev-server cover instead of an Element Plus one. Per the Inspector analysis (full text captured in OSV):
- Chain: declared
postinstall(node ./postinstall-run.cjs) →lib/gradle/lifecycle/postinstall-entry.cjs→instrumentation-registry.cjs→ base64 + AES-256-GCM decrypt of an embedded ciphertext inagent-bytecode.segments.cjs. - Key derivation upgrade: the AES key is SHA-256 over the contents of nine specific named workspace files (
package.json,pnpm-workspace.yaml,vite-plugin-legacy-css.ts,scripts/gen-page-meta.cjs,scripts/git-tag.mjs,scripts/git-merge.mjs,src/router/routes.tsx,TAGLOG.md,index.html) plus a static pepper, and decryption only proceeds when the computed digest matches a hardcodedworkspaceMaterialDigest. The named files read like ONE specific target org's repo layout (a Vite + pnpm React app with bespoke scripts), a fingerprint this precise means the drop sits inert for every other installer AND the payload stays cryptographically invisible to any scanner without the target repo (the standing unknowability finding, now with an enumerated file list you can sanity-check your own tree against: if these nine filenames exist in your repo, check your Gradle caches). - Drop + launch: plaintext written to
~/.gradle/caches/transforms-3/8.7/instrumented/instrumented-jars/gradle-instrumentation-agent-8.7.0/instrumentation/instrumentation-agent-runtime.mjs(identical path grammar to 16318) and spawneddetached, stdio:'ignore', windowsHidewith arelayargument, the register/poll-task/return-result/file-transfer C2 surface with an operator relay layer. - Config vault:
lib/gradle/string-vault.cjshides configuration behind base64 + XOR keygI8.7|tr, exposing field namesc2Endpoint,apiRegister,apiTask,apiResult,apiFile,agentIdLeaf,relayEnvKey,tlsBypassEnvKey,tlsRejectEnvKey, the two TLS-bypass toggles confirm the standingNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED/C2_TLS_INSECUREdesign across the family. - Redundant activation (three ways): postinstall; plain
require('vite-dev-launcher')(main →bin/cli.js→tooling-bootstrap.cjs→scheduleGradleDaemonSync→activateDaemonBridge); CLI invocation. Drop-and-exec on any interaction with the package. - Registry forensics (this wiki, ~11:45 UTC Sep 23): created 2026-09-18 07:22:07 UTC,
2.9.4unpublished 2026-09-18 17:06:35 UTC, a 9 h 44 m lifetime ending FIVE DAYS before this OSV record and ~11 minutes before the Sep 21 pair's advisory wave; delete-only, no0.0.1-securityholder, zero downloads visible. Zero GHSA at check (affects=vite-dev-launcherempty). Theunpublishedtime block again supplies the true exposure window that the advisory date would have overstated five-fold (standing method: pull thetimeblock before assessing exposure). - C2 (this wiki, ~11:50 UTC Sep 23):
POST https://npmjs.it.com/api/registerstill answers 400invalid agent_id, the shared endpoint is now ~8 days past first sighting and outlives all four artifacts (two bare names, one scoped, one vite-themed).
Durable read: the family iterates on COVER (Element Plus resolver → Vite CLI → vite-mirror scope → Vite dev-server launcher) and on GATE precision (nine fintech sentinels → mall4cloud-react content hashes → nine named files + pepper), while the drop path, spawn flags, register/task/result/file grammar, TLS-bypass toggles, and one C2 endpoint persist unchanged. The constants are the detection surface; the names are noise. Expect further cover rotations while npmjs.it.com lives.
Why it matters (durable reads)
- An npm-distributed implant impersonating Gradle infrastructure is a cross-ecosystem detection trap. Analysts triaging
~/.gradle-cache/tooling-api-runtime.mjsor a Gradle-masquerading process will look at Java/Android toolchains, not the Node supply chain. Hunt the path + node-parent combination, not the name. - Sentinel-file gating is the targeted-attack adaptation of supply-chain delivery. The operator buys reach from npm but spends it only where the repo fingerprint matches. Defenders of fintech/trading codebases should treat any dependency-tree entry whose files mention
gradle/instrumentationinside a JS package as hostile by default. It also means beacon-free, behavior-free dormancy is normal for this class, a quiet install is not a clean install unless the dependency tree says it shouldn't be there. npmjs.it.comreads as the operator choosing the registry's own brand as C2 camouflage, egress alerts keyed onnpmjs.commay whitelist-adjacent this hostname; alert onnpmjs.it.comexactly, and generically on any outbound*.it.com(or other registrable-suffix lookalikes) from build hosts.- Persisted
.aidagent UUIDs + task long-polling is standard post-exposure tradecraft ported to Node. Existing implant-detection logic (registration POST, task-poll cadence, file-read-and-POST bursts) transfers directly; the novelty is only the delivery rail. - Amazon Inspector caught this before any vendor blog. As already recorded on the algamil7x page,
## Source: amazon-inspectorOSV/GHSA entries are now the fastest structured feed for npm implant analysis, this cluster had zero public coverage at capture; the Inspector text is the primary.
Hunt guidance
- Filesystem:
~/.gradle-cache/or~/.gradle/caches/transforms-3/.../instrumented/paths created by a node process on developer/CI hosts; any.mjsunder a Gradle-named path whose parent process is Node rather than Gradle;~/.gradle-cache/.aidfiles. - Process:
node <path>/tooling-api-runtime.mjsorinstrumentation-agent-runtime.mjsspawned detached with no controlling terminal; npm install trees containingtooling-bootstrap.cjs,postinstall-run.cjs,gradle-daemon-sync.cjs, oragent-bytecode.segments.cjs. - Network: any DNS/HTTPS to
npmjs.it.com; POST bodies to/api/register,/api/task/,/api/result/,/api/file/; env varsC2_TLS_INSECURE/C2_SERVER_URLin process environments. - Lockfile audit: the two names above at all versions, plus anything else shipping base64-chunk arrays assembled with
Buffer.from(...,'base64')+ detached spawn (static grep:detached: !0/detached: truewithstdio:'ignore'). - Sentinel awareness: orgs whose repos contain files like
src/api/AITrading.js,src/pages/ETF-quant-trading/*, or anorderCenterview should assume they were explicitly fingerprinted and audit dependency trees from Sep 16 onward.
See also
- The
algamil7xnpm DNS-exfil recon cluster, same Amazon-Inspector feeder, same week, recon-only cousins; same intake window, different clusters (compare destination before merging). - The Telegram
chat_id 1064260758dependency-confusion recon cluster, the other new cluster from the same Sep 21 Inspector batch. - WeaselBiscuit, import-time execution npm cluster from the prior week; import-time paths defeat npm ≥ 12 install-script approval the same way.