BlackFile / UNC6671 vishing extortion operation
Summary
Google Threat Intelligence Group reported UNC6671, operating under the BlackFile brand, as an active extortion cluster that uses voice phishing, adversary-in-the-middle credential capture, and SSO / SaaS compromise rather than a product vulnerability. The group targets Microsoft 365 and Okta environments, persists by registering attacker-controlled MFA devices, exfiltrates data from SaaS platforms, and pressures victims through BlackFile-branded data-leak and direct-extortion workflows.
Tags
- ops
- operations
- vishing
- social-engineering
- identity
- AiTM
- MFA-bypass
- SaaS
- Microsoft 365
- Okta
- SharePoint
- OneDrive
- Salesforce
- Zendesk
- extortion
- BlackFile
- UNC6671
Why this matters
- This is an identity-first extortion chain: no exploited CVE is required if help-desk impersonation can defeat MFA enrollment and SSO controls.
- Personal-cell vishing bypasses many enterprise email and endpoint controls, while real-time AiTM workflows can turn a victim's MFA response into immediate account control.
- The actor's data theft includes programmatic API and direct HTTP access patterns that may log as
FileAccessedrather than obviousFileDownloadedevents. - The campaign reinforces phishing-resistant MFA, MFA-device enrollment controls, and SaaS audit-log coverage as tier-0 defenses.
Reported chain
- Callers contact targeted employees, often on personal phones, while impersonating internal IT or help-desk staff.
- Pretexts include mandatory passkey migration, SSO enrollment, or MFA updates.
- The victim is directed to a victim-branded SSO lookalike hosted on actor-controlled infrastructure.
- The actor captures username and password in real time and submits them to the legitimate identity provider.
- The actor relays MFA prompts or codes, then immediately registers an attacker-controlled MFA device for persistence.
- With SSO access, the actor pivots into Microsoft 365, Okta-connected SaaS applications, SharePoint, OneDrive, Zendesk, Salesforce, and related repositories.
- Operators search for terms such as
confidentialandSSN, enumerate corporate directories, and collect high-value business, HR, support, CRM, and mailbox data. - Exfiltration uses Python, PowerShell, Microsoft Graph, direct HTTP GET requests, and captured session cookies such as
FedAuth. - Victims receive direct extortion messages under the BlackFile brand, commonly with 72-hour deadlines and Tox or Session contact identifiers.
Infrastructure and tradecraft notes
Google reports that UNC6671 shifted from unique organization-tailored phishing domains to a subdomain model. Recent themes referenced passkey or enrollment language and used domains such as:
.enrollms[.]com.passkeyms[.]com.setupsso[.]com
GTIG assesses UNC6671 as distinct from ShinyHunters / UNC6240 despite overlap in SaaS data-theft techniques and at least one case where UNC6671 co-opted the ShinyHunters brand for perceived credibility. The distinction is based on separate Tox communication channels, unique domain-registration patterns, and the dedicated BlackFile data leak site.
Indicators and hunt pivots
- Vishing reports involving passkey migration, SSO setup, or MFA enrollment calls to personal phones.
- New MFA device registrations immediately after suspicious interactive sign-ins.
- SSO sign-ins followed by rapid access to SharePoint, OneDrive, Zendesk, Salesforce, ServiceNow, or corporate directory exports.
- Microsoft 365 file activity that appears as
FileAccessedwith high-volume direct resource URL access rather than onlyFileDownloaded. - Python
requests, PowerShell, Microsoft Graph, or browser-cookie reuse against document repositories from unusual hosts or user agents. - Internal SaaS searches for strings such as
confidential,SSN,NDA,HR,billing, or customer-support exports. - Extortion email subjects resembling
[COMPANY NAME] DATA BREACH 72 HOURS TO CONTACT US. - Tox or Session contact IDs embedded in post-theft negotiation messages.
Defender heuristics
- Prefer phishing-resistant MFA and passkeys with strong enrollment ceremonies over push/SMS/TOTP flows that can be relayed in real time.
- Require step-up verification and alerting for new MFA-device registration, especially after high-risk sign-ins or help-desk initiated changes.
- Train help desks and employees that passkey or MFA migration should never be driven by ad hoc calls to personal phones.
- Monitor SaaS access at the API and direct-resource level; do not rely only on explicit download events.
- Preserve identity-provider, M365, Okta, SaaS, endpoint, and help-desk telemetry together during response, because the intrusion path crosses identity, browser sessions, and cloud data stores.
- When BlackFile-style extortion arrives, assume SaaS/identity compromise until ruled out and prioritize token revocation, MFA-device review, session invalidation, and cloud-data access scoping before broad credential rotation.
Related pages
- 0ktapus phishing campaign
- Cloudflare Okta token theft incident
- JINX-0164 crypto developer infrastructure campaign
- ROADtools
Sources
- Google Cloud / GTIG: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/blackfile-vishing-extortion-operation