LMCache CVE-2026-105192
Summary
JFrog Security Research (Yuval Moravchick, published October 7, 2026, JFSA-2026-001694382) documents CVE-2026-105192 (CVSS 9.8, critical, no fixed release as of capture) in LMCache (github.com/LMCache/LMCache, the KV-cache layer used with vLLM serving stacks): multiprocess/"distributed" mode opens an unauthenticated ZeroMQ ROUTER socket (default port 5555) for sibling worker processes to register and share KV cache blocks, with no CURVE, no ZAP, no password, no message authentication of any kind, and the msgpack extension hook (ext code 1 → DeviceIPCWrapper.Deserialize → pickle.loads) fires while the server is still decoding REGISTER_KV_CACHE arguments, before the handler runs. One unauthenticated ZMQ DEALER message therefore executes code as the LMCache process user, root on the official container images. The 9.8 is scored for the documented multi-node configuration where the operator sets --host to a routable address; stock single-host installs stay on localhost. The vulnerable decode path shipped in v0.3.9 and is still present in the latest PyPI release v0.5.5, in v0.5.6rc1-rc3, and on the dev branch as of 2026-10-07, the same week this ledger swept the serving-stack supply chain daily. Same researcher, same class, and one registry-generation after Bifrost CVE-2026-90898: an AI-serving component ships a network surface whose parser executes attacker-controlled objects with authentication left off by design. Unlike Bifrost (fixed in transports/v2.1.0, not backported), LMCache has no fix at all, mitigation is configuration-only.
Tags
- tools
- LMCache
- vLLM
- CVE-2026-105192
- JFSA-2026-001694382
- ZeroMQ
- ZMQ
- pickle deserialization
- msgpack
- unauthenticated RCE
- CVSS 9.8
- JFrog Security Research
- AI serving infrastructure
- LLM serving
- KV cache
- unpatched
Vulnerability mechanics
- Surface: LMCache multiprocess mode (
python -m lmcache.v1.multiprocess.http_server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5555). The ZMQ ROUTER listens for worker registration; the documented multi-node setting binds it to a routable address. - Boundary failure: no transport authentication exists, no CURVE/ZAP/password, and no per-message MAC. Anyone who can open a TCP connection is a trusted sibling process.
- Execution primitive: msgpack extension code 1 is registered to
DeviceIPCWrapperand handed topickle.loadsinlmcache/v1/platform/base/ipc_wrapper.py, called fromext_hookinlmcache/v1/multiprocess/custom_types.pyduring argument decode ofREGISTER_KV_CACHE. The published PoC sends one DEALER multipart frame withpayloads[1] = msgpack.encode([msgpack.Ext(1, pickle.dumps(EvilPayload("id > /tmp/zmq_pwn"))))],__reduce__ → os.systemfires before the handler ever runs; the server's follow-on type-error log is post-exploitation noise. On official images the proof landsuid=0(root). - Affected:
= 0.3.9advisory-scoped; vulnerable decode path verified present by JFrog in latest PyPIv0.5.5,v0.5.6rc3, and dev branch as of 2026-10-07. - Fix status: NONE published. JFrog's remediation is replace-the-serializer (never
pickle.loadsnetwork bytes), authenticate the transport (CURVE or per-message HMAC), and refuse routable binds without auth. Interim: keep port 5555 localhost-only or on a trusted cluster network, noting firewalling limits reach but does not authenticate: any host that can connect still gets code execution as the service user.
Defender heuristics
- Inventory the routable binds first:
grepyour serving deploy forlmcache--hostvalues that are not127.0.0.1/localhost, and for exposed TCP/5555 on serving nodes. The single-host default is NOT exploitable remotely; the multi-node convenience setting is the vulnerability. - The parser-is-the-exploit-class is back: pickle/Java-serialized/
yaml.loadhooks reachable from an unauthenticated transport should be treated as pre-auth RCE by design, not as deserialization "risk." Grep any service that registers msgpack/cbor/py-serial extension hooks:pickle.loadsfed from socket bytes = page your on-call. - Root-by-container-default is a privilege bug on its own: LMCache official images run the process as root, converting every parser bug into host-root. Run serving components with a non-root user regardless of vendor fixes.
- Unpatched-window rule: with no fix on any branch, patch-based tracking is useless, track the config posture (bind address, network ACL, container user) and re-check upstream
ipc_wrapper.pyon every release; the fix will land as a serializer swap, not a version bump teams can blind-follow. - Cluster pattern: this is the third entry in the AI-serving unauthenticated-RCE line this wiki tracks, Bifrost stdio-MCP launch-on-registration (CVE-2026-90898, fixed not backported), Chainlit's sibling flaw, and now LMCache pickle-ZMQ (unfixed). The common failure is "intended clients are sibling processes" standing in for authentication; sibling-trust designs on routable binds are the audit target.
Related pages
- Bifrost CVE-2026-90898 MCP stdio unauthenticated RCE, same researcher, same week-family, same sibling-trust/no-auth class, but fixed (not backported)
- Internet-exposed unauthenticated MCP servers, the standing pattern page for management-plane-by-design defaults
- algamil7x npm DNS-exfil recon cluster, the hundred-thirtieth-sweep ledger entry that carried this advisory above the bar