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Glassworm developer supply-chain botnet

Summary

CrowdStrike reported a coordinated 2026-05-26 takedown of Glassworm command-and-control infrastructure in partnership with Google and the Shadowserver Foundation. Glassworm is a developer-targeting supply-chain campaign active since at least early 2025, using malicious VS Code / OpenVSX extensions, npm and Python packages, and poisoned GitHub repositories to harvest developer credentials and maintain a botnet of compromised workstations.

CrowdStrike says the disruption simultaneously hit four C2 channels: Solana blockchain dead drops, BitTorrent DHT configuration lookups, Google Calendar dead drops, and direct VPS-hosted server infrastructure. The Hacker News summarized the same reporting and noted prior public Glassworm activity across VS Code marketplaces, npm, and Python package paths.

Tags

Why this matters

  • Glassworm targets developers rather than only end users, so one workstation compromise can expose source repositories, package-registry tokens, cloud accounts, CI/CD pipelines, and downstream software consumers.
  • The campaign spans multiple developer ecosystems: VS Code and VS Code forks, OpenVSX, npm, Python packages, and GitHub repositories.
  • The C2 design used several resilient dead-drop and discovery layers, forcing defenders to coordinate simultaneous action instead of removing only a single server or domain.
  • The takedown does not automatically remediate infected endpoints; it primarily prevents compromised machines from receiving new instructions or payloads while defenders identify hosts, rotate secrets, and rebuild trust.

Initial-access and propagation paths

CrowdStrike and secondary reporting describe a multi-pronged developer compromise chain:

  • Trojanized VS Code extensions published to OpenVSX and the Microsoft VS Code Marketplace, including extensions disguised as common developer utilities such as time trackers and code formatters.
  • Targeting of VS Code forks and compatible editors, including Cursor, Positron, Windsurf, VSCodium, and similar OpenVSX-consuming environments.
  • Compromised npm and Python packages that executed malicious code through normal install or setup workflows.
  • More than 300 GitHub repositories poisoned with stolen developer credentials, including malicious code force-pushed into default branches.

Payload behavior

Reported Glassworm capabilities include:

  • developer credential harvesting, including GitHub, npm, and OpenVSX tokens;
  • crypto-wallet theft and browser-data collection;
  • host and environment profiling;
  • conversion of infected hosts into covert infrastructure, including SOCKS proxies, hidden VNC servers, and remote-execution nodes;
  • a WebSocket-based JavaScript RAT tracked as GlassWormRAT;
  • arbitrary code execution through WebRTC or spawned Node.js processes;
  • installation of a Chrome extension for screenshots, keystrokes, clipboard collection, and other browser-side theft.

June 2026 GlassWASM Open VSX extension wave

Socket's June 15, 2026 report described a related Open VSX wave it named GlassWASM and attributed with medium confidence to the GlassWorm developer. The two reported malicious extensions were impersonated Open VSX copies of legitimate VS Code Marketplace listings:

  • exargd/vsblack@0.0.1
  • noellee-doc/flint-debug@0.1.1

Key differences from earlier plain JavaScript extension malware:

  • The malicious Open VSX packages embedded snqpkebiwrxmoivl.wasm, a TinyGo-built js/wasm module loaded by an appended bootstrap that called go.run() when the extension activated.
  • Strings, URLs, and commands were encrypted in the WebAssembly module with ChaCha20 and reconstructed only at runtime, reducing value from simple static string scans.
  • The module queried https://api.mainnet.solana.com for transactions sent to attacker-controlled wallet 6ExrZayPZzMMSnszc42cH81DpuKT8FhCX9H6Sesn6rpz, then read SPL Memo instructions to build the next-stage download-and-execute command.
  • Socket reported memo-program IDs MemoSq4gqABAXKb96qnH8TysNcWxMyWCqXgDLGmfcHr and Memo1UhkJRfHyvLMcVucJwxXeuD728EqVDDwQDxFM in the chain.
  • The second-stage templates used OS-specific paths under https://dodod[.]lat/, including /win32/i/_, /darwin/i/_, and /linux/i/_, executed through Node's child_process path.
  • Socket said the legitimate VS Code Marketplace listings for ExarGD.vsblack and noellee-doc.flint-debug were clean older originals; scope removal to the malicious Open VSX copies and installations sourced from Open VSX.

Reported hashes for the WebAssembly payload and extension artifacts include:

  • 558b4f1d9a263c13756ab0126c09dd080c85ba405b29488e1c4e6aa68b554f1f
  • 1e283327ad048bea39f4a8501770858a20f3555e87fe3e202274f2e87f8a3c25
  • 3aa31999398e7f80231c03d7137ffdb554a84b83dbcffc59ce16c9a65f9e5d58

Resilient C2 design

Glassworm used four reported command-and-control paths:

  1. Solana blockchain dead drops, C2 server addresses stored in memo fields of Solana transactions.
  2. BitTorrent DHT, peer-to-peer configuration retrieval through hardcoded public keys.
  3. Google Calendar dead drops, Base64-encoded C2 paths placed in calendar event titles.
  4. Direct VPS C2, traditional server infrastructure for payload delivery and tasking.

The combination let operators reconstitute from alternate discovery layers if defenders removed only one channel. CrowdStrike states that the 2026-05-26 action disrupted all four simultaneously, preventing infected machines from receiving new tasking or payloads.

Attribution notes

CrowdStrike assesses the operators as likely Russia-based cybercriminals. Public evidence cited in the report includes runtime checks that exit on CIS-country systems, victim locale / language / timezone checks, and Russian-language source-code comments. Treat this as cluster-level cybercrime attribution rather than a state-actor finding.

Defender heuristics

  • Inventory VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium, Positron, and OpenVSX extension installs on developer workstations and CI/devcontainer images.
  • Hunt for unexpected VS Code extensions, recently changed extension directories, and extension code that reaches Solana, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, or unfamiliar VPS endpoints.
  • For the GlassWASM wave, inspect extension directories such as ~/.vscode/extensions, ~/.vscode-oss/extensions, ~/.cursor/extensions, and ~/.windsurf/extensions for ExarGD.vsblack@0.0.1, noellee-doc/flint-debug@0.1.1, unexpected .wasm files next to JavaScript loaders, TinyGo gojs.syscall/js imports, and outbound Solana JSON-RPC access from editor processes.
  • Treat WebAssembly inside editor extensions as executable code requiring disassembly and behavior review, not as a harmless packaged asset.
  • Search workstations and CI runners for unexpected npm/Python lifecycle execution, WebSocket RAT behavior, SOCKS proxy listeners, hidden VNC processes, spawned Node.js remote-execution processes, and suspicious browser extensions.
  • If Glassworm exposure is suspected, isolate affected developer hosts before rotating credentials. Assume GitHub, npm, OpenVSX, package-registry, cloud, SSH, browser, and crypto-wallet secrets may be compromised.
  • Review GitHub default-branch force pushes, unusual commits, package-publish events, token use, workflow changes, and repository access from developer accounts after suspected infection windows.
  • Treat a C2 takedown as a containment opportunity, not proof of endpoint cleanup; rebuild or deeply inspect developer machines before restoring trust.

October 24: the OVHcloud CLI release swap, the IDE-extension playbook lands on a vendor CLI (StepSecurity replay)

StepSecurity published (Oct 24) a full chamber replay of the October 19, 2026 compromise of the official ovh/ovhcloud-cli GitHub releases, tying it directly to GlassWorm's documented playbook. Between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC, the GitHub account HassenBF, belonging to an OVHcloud contributor, replaced release binaries on five published releases (v0.11.0 through v0.15.0, newest-first over ~25 minutes, checksums.txt rewritten last so the published hashes matched the swapped files). No tag was moved, no CI workflow ran, the source repository was never touched: locally built stripped binaries were uploaded straight onto existing releases. The swapped assets stayed live ~94 minutes, drew ~250 downloads, and were deleted before anyone outside OVHcloud archived a copy; OVHcloud shipped a clean, immutable, attested v0.16.0 and published GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw. - Initial access was the GlassWorm IDE-extension path itself: per OVHcloud's postmortem the contributor installed the malicious VS Code extension color-picker-universal 2.8.91 on a personal MacBook on October 20, 2025, which registered a persistent NodeJS service (plist) beaconing to 162.33.177.177, a ~12-month dwell before the swap. The personal account kept landing ordinary PRs through mid-2026 (CI-trigger probing four days before the swap); on March 5-6, 2026 four of its repos were amend-force-pushed with hidden loaders, then force-pushed BACK to pre-compromise history on October 21, history rewrite as anti-forensics, with the loaders recovered by StepSecurity from orphaned commits. - The loader carries the GlassWorm signature: variation-selector steganography (U+FE00-FE0F / U+E0100-E01EF decoding to an AES-256-CBC wrapper with hardcoded key/IV), Russian-locale/timezone geofence exit, a 48-hour ~/init.json re-run throttle, and a Solana-RPC dead-drop C2, getSignaturesForAddress polled across nine public RPC providers, newest transaction memo carrying {"link": <base64 URL>} = on-chain, unseizable C2 configuration; the operator can re-arm the drop at any time with one new memo transaction even after the May 26 takedown. - The credential stealer stage (detonated against a controlled dead drop): reads 18 secret paths, cloud CLIs (AWS/GCP/Azure/doctl), Docker/Kubernetes/Terraform configs, .npmrc, .netrc, .gitconfig, SSH keys, OVH app keys, and the AI-agent credential stores (VS Code, Cursor, Continue, Cody, OpenCode, Claude, Hermes), stages a tar.gz in a NEVER-DELETED /tmp/envchecker-XXXX/ directory, and POSTs it to https://45.32.148.174/upload as Solana-RPC-shaped JSON with the archive base64-encoded in params. The staging directory is the host-based tell. - Detection lessons the replay settled: (1) the swap was caught only by a customer whose CI pinned the external SHA-256 of the Linux arm64 tarball, trusting the repository's own checksums passes (attacker updated them); (2) install.sh never exposed arm64 Linux and Homebrew was never an exposure path (per-arch cask hash pins refused the swapped files), exposure tables built from the installer script overcount; (3) a single ovhcloud version call identified the swapped build: it printed the attacker's build commit and timestamp in its build-metadata table (last_commit 5ead8ef9…, undefined version, the release pipeline's version ldflag was absent). Defender heuristics: pin external hashes on downloaded CLI binaries, gh release verify-asset before install, hunt /tmp/envchecker-*, treat ANY ovhcloud binary downloaded from GitHub releases Oct-19 12:47-14:21 UTC as fully compromised, rotate every secret the machine could read, from a different machine; reinstalling the CLI revokes nothing. Sweep capture → 196th stream section

Sources