MIXEDKEY
Summary
MIXEDKEY is a 64-bit Windows reflective loader documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in July 2026. It was deployed after TELESHIM in an East Asia-linked campaign against Middle Eastern government entities. The loader is side-loaded as pthreadVC2.dll by a legitimate GoPro service binary and decrypts a victim-bound BINDCLOAK implant from a .PCPKEY file.
Tags
- tools
- malware
- loader
- MIXEDKEY
- Windows
- DLL side-loading
- reflective loading
- environmental keying
- volume serial number
- XOR
- control flow flattening
- mixed boolean arithmetic
- opaque predicates
- BINDCLOAK
- TELESHIM
Reported execution chain
- The operator stages a legitimate GoPro binary,
MSVCP120.dll,MSVCR120.dll, and maliciouspthreadVC2.dllin a plausibleC:\ProgramDatavendor directory. - A scheduled task named
Feedbackruns the legitimate binary every ten minutes. - The binary side-loads
pthreadVC2.dll. - MIXEDKEY reads
C:\ProgramData\Crypto\DSS\C99F29AC08454855B3D538960BB2F34F.PCPKEYand loads its decrypted payload from memory.
Victim-bound decryption
- Retrieve the host's four-byte volume serial number with
GetVolumeInformationA. - Repeat it five times to form a 20-byte rolling XOR key.
- Use the first 311 bytes of the
.PCPKEYfile as another rolling XOR key for the remainder. - Apply the volume-derived key to the first-stage plaintext.
- Recover a PE with a stripped
MZsignature and a prefixed four-byte payload size. - Reflectively load the PE and invoke its export.
MIXEDKEY also uses large numbers of mixed-boolean-arithmetic operations and opaque predicates. ThreatLabz reported roughly 1,000 instructions to compute a single runtime string byte.
Defender heuristics
- Detect GoPro service binaries loading
pthreadVC2.dllfromC:\ProgramDatarather than an expected product path. - Hunt for the
Feedbackscheduled task,.PCPKEYextension,C:\ProgramData\Crypto\DSS, and the fixed published filename. - Preserve the original volume serial number with the encrypted payload; off-host analysis without it may fail by design.
- Look for a signed or legitimate process reading the
.PCPKEYfile and then allocating or executing private memory.
Public indicator
- SHA-256
3b3eaea783fd6dab90f0408274bf8a9c49adbdc70c0efd70658d65b0e1684a3f—pthreadVC2.dll.
Related pages
Sources
- Zscaler ThreatLabz: Targeted Attack on Government Entities in the Middle East — Part 1